¶1(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶2I respectfully dissent from the part of the opinion that holds that specific intent is an essential element of the crime defined in the following segment of § 54 — 11-22(A), supra: “ … it is unlawful for any person to intentionally distribute … a controlled substance …
¶3I have become persuaded that I was in error when I decided to the contrary in my specially concurring opinion in State v. Montoya, supra. I am still of the opinion that the following segment of § 54 — 11— 22(A), supra, does require specific intent as an essential element -of the crime defined : “ … it is unlawful for any person to … possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance …
¶4In State v. Austin, supra, general criminal intent was defined as a mental state of conscious wrongdoing. Applying that definition to the first segment of § 54 — 11-22(A) set forth above, an individual to be guilty of that crime would have to know that what he was distributing was a controlled substance. This in my opinion is a mental state of conscious wrongdoing. Crimes of specific intent, however, consist of the doing of a prohibited act together with the mental intent to do the additional act specifically required for guilt. For example, § 54 — 11-22(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (Vol. 8, pt. 2, Supp.1973) provides in pertinent part: “ … it is unlawful for any person to … possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance … Therefore to constitute the crime defined by the second segment of § 54 — 11-22(A), supra, a person must commit the crime of possessing a controlled substance together with the mental intent to distribute it. Section 40A-16-3, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Vol. 6, 2d Repl.) provides: “Burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit any felony or theft therein.”