Vaca v. Whitaker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"That issue is not to be resolved, as the opinion below directs, by having the jury in the malpractice case evaluate all plaintiff's `injuries and damages caused by all the tortfeasors' and comparing its evaluation with the $ 17,000 awarded by the jury in the automobile accident case. Such a comparison would be of no legal significance. The very nature of the process of admeasuring damages for personal injuries results in different juries reaching different results in evaluating the same injuries. The injuries for which plaintiff seeks recovery in the malpractice case are those set forth in plaintiff's answers to interrogatories and in the pretrial order. The injuries for which plaintiff recovered damages in the automobile accident case are to be ascertained by the court from an examination of the pertinent portions of the record in that case. Such portions of the record may include plaintiff's answers to interrogatories, the pretrial order, the testimony, the charge of the court and the opening and closing statements of counsel. The procedure to be followed is analogous to that used in deciding a plea of collateral estoppel in order to ascertain whether or not the issues sought to be presented in the instant case were presented at the former trial. * * * * * * Since resolution of the posed question involves a study and comparison of the records in the two cases, the issue is to be tried by the court, not by the jury. The issue should be disposed of before trial of the merits”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Underwood-Gary v. Mathews · Owen v. Burn Construction Co.

2. “A plaintiff is entitled to but one compensation for his loss and satisfaction of his claim prevents its further enforcement. In effect, where payment of the judgment in full is made by the judgment debtor, the plaintiff is barred from further action against another who is liable for the same damages.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sanchez v. Clayton · Sanchez v. Clayton

3. ““(b) As defined, collateral estoppel may be applied only to parties or privies to the action in which the judgment was rendered. This limitation is known as the doctrine of mutuality. See Moore’s Federal Practice, [IB, 2d ed. 1965], paragraph 0.411. ‘[T]he mutuality requirement prevents a litigant from invoking the conclusive effect of a judgment unless he would have been bound if the judgment had gone the other way.’ Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, paragraph 0.412[1], “(c) New Mexico decisions have not expressly referred to the doctrine of mutuality. However, Employers’ Fire Insurance Company v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494 , 433 P.2d 79 (1967) states: ‘As a general rule, the rights of the parties, for the purposes of subsequent controversies between them, are not determined in the absence of adversity in the suit in which the original judgment is rendered.’ See Adams v. Cox, 55 N.M. 444 , 234 P.2d 1043 (1951); compare Salazar v. Murphy, 66 N.M. 25 , 340 P.2d 1075 (1959). “•(d) Defendant asserts the quotation from Employers’ Fire Insurance Company v. Welch, supra, is dicta and, therefore, not a ‘precedent’ binding on this Court. See Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717 , 507 P.2d 778 (1973). “(e) On the basis that the mutuality requirement is an open question in New Mexico, defendant urges us to adopt the so-called ‘modern’ view of mutuality. That view is that where there is identity of issues between two suits, a party bound by a judgment in the first suit would be bound by the judgmen”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Atencio v. Vigil