86 Okla. Crim. 175 - Boykin v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Whether a postponement (of pronouncing sentence) is rightful depends not upon its length or definiteness, nor upon whether it extends beyond the term, but upon its purpose and character.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Henegar v. State · Jackson v. Page

2. ““The case of State ex rel. Dawson v. Sapp, supra [ 87 Kan. 740 , 125 P. 78 , 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 249] relied upon by the defendant, was discussed in the later Kansas case of City of Lawrence v. Kagi, 105 Kan. 520 , 185 P. 60, 61 , where the court distinguished those cases where the trial court by its af firmative act indefinitely suspended the pronouncement of judgment from those cases where the record disclosed that a motion for new trial was pending, or that it was evident that the court at some time had the intention of pronouncing judgment in accordance with the verdict; it was therein stated: “ ‘Defendant appears to rely on State ex rel. Dawson v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740 , 125 P. 78 , 42 L.R.A..N.S., 249, where the court indefinitely suspended the rendition of judgment as a disciplinary measure and with the understanding that judgment might or might not be subsequently rendered, depending on the good behavior of the defendant. This was held to be be-beyond the power of the court. In holding this it was declared that the court has practically unlimited discretion in the postponement of judgment so long as the rendition at some time remains in contemplation. It is true that the motion for a new trial was not determined and judgment rendered until the term succeeding the one in which the verdict was returned, but the passing of the term did not impair the power of the court to render judgment at a later term. In effect that was said in State ex rel. Dawson v. Sapp, supra, so much rel”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Grant v. McLeod

3. ““The only statutory provision pertaining to the time within which the judgment and sentence must be pronounced after a verdict of guilty, is that it cannot be pronounced for at least two days after the verdict (22 O. S.' 1941 § 962). This provision of the statute is intended to fix the minimum and not the maximum limit for the pronouncement of judgment. It is intended tg prevent hasty and ill considered judgments, and to give the defendant time for such further proceedings as may be deemed necessary to protect his rights, including the right to file a motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment. “The general rule is that where there is a valid conviction, the power of the court is not exhausted nor its. duty completed until sentence is pronounced, and the cause remains pending, and stands continued with the unfinished business from term to term. “Where court obtains jurisdiction of defendant and of offense, decision of all other questions arising in case is but exercise of court’s jurisdiction. “Trial court may delay' pronouncement of judgment for purpose of determining motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment or for other causes. “Where court fixes definite time for pronouncing judgment and sentence, but record shows that judgment and sentence were not pronounced on day set, and is silent as to what was done, presumption exists that sufficient cause appeared to court for not pronouncing judgment at that time. “Where court fixes definite time for pronouncing judgment a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 95 Okla. Crim. 259 - Ex Parte Faulkenberry