860 F2d 1089 Samples v. Jc Keeney

860 F.2d 1089

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Duane Edward SAMPLES, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
J.C. KEENEY, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 87-4313.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 11, 1988.
Decided Oct. 13, 1988.

Before GOODWIN, Chief Judge, and ALARCON and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.

1

MEMORANDUM*

2

Duane Samples ("Samples"), a prisoner incarcerated at the Oregon State Penitentiary, appeals the district court dismissal of his motion to vacate his guilty plea, made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Samples argues that the district court erred in denying his motion based on its findings that 1) the state trial court was not required to order, sua sponte, an evidentiary hearing on Samples' competence to plead guilty and 2) Samples' plea was voluntary and intelligently made. We affirm.

I.

3

On December 8, 1975, Samples stabbed and seriously injured one woman and murdered another. He exhibited bizarre behavior after the crimes. As a result, the prosecutor requested that a psychiatrist be present during police questioning to determine whether Samples was competent to give a statement.

4

On December 10, 1975, Samples was arraigned on charges of murder and attempted murder. Both the prosecutor and Samples' attorney requested that psychiatrists be appointed to determine if Samples was competent to stand trial. On January 2, 1976, Samples pleaded not guilty to both charges and filed a notice of intent to rely on the defenses of mental defect or disease and extreme emotional disturbance. He was examined during the first two weeks of February at the forensic psychiatry unit of the Oregon State Hospital. Plea negotiations took place but ended with no agreement reached.

5

On February 17, 1976--the day trial was to begin--the prosecutor advised the court that Samples wanted to change his plea. The court then inquired as to whether the issue of competence to proceed previously had been raised. Samples attorney indicated that it had, and stated that two psychiatrists--Dr. Suckow for the state and Dr. Dixon for the defense--had established that Samples could understand the nature and consequences of the charges against him and could assist in his own defense. The court then concluded that there was no present issue of Samples competency to proceed, and that even if there were the issue was resolved and Samples was competent to proceed to trial. Samples attorney agreed with the court's conclusion.

6

Samples signed and executed two petitions to enter pleas of guilty. The court advised Samples of the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty and the maximum sentences for each charge. The court also questioned Samples as to whether he was guilty of the crimes for which he was entering pleas. After the court accepted the pleas, both Samples' attorney and the prosecutor requested a presentence investigation report.

7

On April 6, 1976, Samples was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence on the murder charge. The prosecutor indicated at that time that he wished to dismiss the attempted murder charge to which Samples had already pleaded guilty. The prosecutor also requested that Samples be allowed to withdraw his plea on this charge, and indicated that his decision was based on Samples' plea and sentence on the murder charge. The court granted the request.

8

In 1984, Samples filed for post-conviction relief pursuant to Oregon statutes. He alleged that 1) the trial court should have held a hearing to determine his competence to plead guilty prior to accepting his plea, and 2) his plea was involuntary because he was not competent to plead guilty.1

9

A hearing was held on the matter on June 23-24, 1984. At the hearing, there was testimony concerning Post Traumatic Stress disorder ("PTS") and the fact that it had not been described as a mental disorder at the time Samples pleaded guilty. There was also extensive testimony concerning Samples' present and past mental condition, including that of three witnesses who had examined Samples before he had entered his plea. Dr. Suckow testified that at the time of the plea Samples was able to make a rational decision among the choices offered to him. Dr. Dixon stated that he was never asked earlier to make an opinion concerning Samples' ability to make reasoned decisions. He stated that Samples suffered from PTS, and indicated that, in light of current medical knowledge, he thought Samples' ability to make judgments was severly impaired at the time the plea was entered. He also stated, however, that had he been asked in 1976, he would have testified that Samples could have made decisions about what he was doing. Dr. Davis testified that Samples was suffering from mental illness at the time he committed the crimes, and stated that Samples' ability to make judgments was severely impaired at the time Samples entered his plea.

10

There was also testimony from Dr. Schmahl, a psychologist who had first examined Samples in 1979--three years after Samples pleaded guilty. He testified that in his opinion, Samples was incapable of making a rational choice at the time of the plea. He also stated that he believed Samples suffered from PTS.

11

The court heard additional testimony from a Vietnam veteran who had served in the Army with Samples and who testified about Samples' experiences in Vietnam. Samples testified that he did not feel that he was capable of making a decision at the time of his plea. He further stated that his attorney had told him that he would have to admit he intended to commit murder if he wanted his plea accepted.

12

In addition to this testimony, there was deposition testimony from the state court judge who had accepted Samples' plea. That judge stated that Samples appeared to be articulate and intelligent in all of his appearances before the court.

13

The state post-conviction court also had before it both a deposition from Samples' former attorney and a letter which Samples had written to the attorney before entry of the guilty plea. The attorney stated in his deposition that the change of plea was entirely Samples' decision. The attorney also detailed the reasoning process Samples used to arrive at his decision. In his own letter, Samples indicated that he had analyzed the alternatives and concluded that the penitentiary was a better place to be than the state mental hospital.

14

Based on all of this evidence, the state post-conviction court made a retrospective determination of Samples' competence to plead guilty.2 The court determined that at the time of Samples' trial, i.e. when Samples changed his plea, Samples 1) was competent to plead guilty because he did not have a substantially impaired ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him, and 2) was able to understand the nature and consequences of his plea. The court then concluded that, since Samples was competent to plead guilty, his plea was voluntary and intelligent.

15

The court stated that it based its decision on--in order of importance--the deposition testimony of Samples' attorney, Samples' letter to his attorney, Dr. Suckow's testimony, Dr. Dixon's testimony, the transcripts of the hearings, the plea petition, and Samples' own testimony. The court then stated that its conclusions would be the same even considering the medical knowledge presented to it that was not known at the time Samples pleaded guilty. On August 16, 1984, the court issued a brief summary of its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.

16

The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Samples subsequently petitioned the federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. Keeney, the superintendent of the Oregon penitentiary and the appellee in this action, moved for summary judgment in the habeas action. Samples offered no evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The district court denied Samples section 2254 motion, granted Keeney's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the action. Samples timely appealed the dismissal.

II.

17

A district court's decision on a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir.1987). A state court's factual findings, however, are entitled to a presumption of correctness in a federal habeas corpus proceeding if they are fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d); Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir.1986). Such factual findings are entitled to deference and only are reviewed for clear error. IAEA v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir.1986).

18

Due process requires a court sua sponte to hold a hearing on a defendant's competence to plead guilty whenever the court has or should have "a good faith doubt as to the defendant's ability to understand the nature and consequences of the plea, or to participate intelligently in the proceedings and to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented." Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir.1981). "Whether a good faith doubt should have existed in the trial court's mind is not a factual finding entitled to the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)." Harding, 834 F.2d at 856. A district court's finding on this issue is thus reviewed de novo. See id.; cf. United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982) (appellate review of failure to hold a competency hearing is comprehensive).

19

Samples argues that there was substantial evidence before the court to have raised a good faith doubt as to his competence to plead guilty. He relies on evidence that he filed a notice of intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect and extreme emotional disturbance, was examined by psychiatrists to determine whether he was competent to stand trial, was evaluated for two weeks at the forensic psychiatric unit of the Oregon State Hospital, and pleaded guilty to both charges for no apparent consideration. He also alleges that doubts as to his competence should have been raised by the unusual circumstances in his case, i.e. the use of plea petitions3; the dropping of the attempted murder charge after Samples had pleaded guilty to it; the request by both the defense and the prosecutor for a presentence investigation report--despite a mandatory life sentence for murder; the bizarre and heinous nature of the crimes; and the lack of any apparent motive for the stabbings. Samples argument is unpersuasive.

20

A good faith doubt arises when there is substantial evidence in the record that the defendant is not competent. Harding, 834 F.2d at 856. Such evidence "includes, but is not limited to, a history of irrational behavior, medical opinion, and the defendant's behavior at trial." Id. Though certain evidence may raise doubts if viewed in isolation, it may fail to do so when viewed along with all of the other evidence. See Harding, 834 F.2d at 857 (evidence of defendant's competence to waive attorney allayed any doubts created by a motion for a mental examination); Smith v. YLST, 826 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir.1987) (no evidentiary hearing required despite evidence creating doubt as to competence when there was sufficient evidence precluding doubt). Thus, when "determining whether or not there is substantial doubt, the trial judge must evaluate all the evidence and evaluate the probative value of each piece of evidence in light of the others." Chavez, 656 F.2d at 518.

21

In the instant case, the only medical opinions submitted to the court indicated that Samples was competent to stand trial. Cf. United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310, 314 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1024 (1980) (determination of competence to stand trial "may be relevant to determine competency to plead guilty where there is a relatively short time span between the hearing on competency to stand trial and the plea proceedings"). Samples also had no history of prior irrational behavior and did not exhibit any unusual behavior in any of his court appearances prior to and including his change of plea hearing. Moreover, though he spoke very little at the plea hearing, he appeared intelligent and articulate as he had in his previous appearances before the court. Thus, even if the evidence upon which Samples relies might arguably have raised doubts as to his competence, there were sufficient facts present to allay those doubts. Cf. Harding, 834 F.2d at 857 (evidence showing defendant expressed himself effectively at trial and wrote letter to attorney admitting he had no good defenses and was satisfied with counsel indicated that hearing on competence to waive counsel was not required despite defendant's earlier request for competence examination).

22

The district court therefore did not err in concluding that the state court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on Samples' competence to plead guilty before accepting his plea.4

III.

23

Samples also argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not competent to plead guilty. Whether a guilty plea is voluntary is a question of law not subject to the deferential review accorded a state court's findings of fact. IAEA, 800 F.2d at 864. The district court's conclusions as to the voluntary nature of a guilty plea are thus reviewed de novo. Id.

24

The underlying question of Samples' competence to plead guilty, however, is not reviewed de novo. A state court's determination of competence is entitled to a presumption of correctness in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Evans, 800 F.2d at 887 & n. 3.;5 see also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). Competency is "the sort of determination that should be accorded deference despite the fact that it may be a mixed question of fact and law." Evans, 800 F.2d at 887. The state court's conclusions regarding competency thus are not disturbed if they are fairly supported by the record. Id.

25

Samples argues that the fair weight of the evidence at his post-conviction hearing shows that he was not competent to plead guilty.6 Although there was conflicting evidence on the issue of Samples' competence to plead guilty, "the state court resolved the conflicts in the state's favor." See id. The state post-conviction court's conclusion is fairly supported by the record. Thus, its determination is presumed to be correct.

26

The record of the "retrospective hearing indicates that its substance and procedure met the standards of due process." Id. Moreover, the factual decision of the state court disposes entirely of the competence issue. See id. at 887 n. 3. The district court thus did not err in affirming the state court's conclusion that Samples was competent to plead guilty.

27

Samples bases his claim that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent entirely on the grounds that the state court erred in finding that he was competent to plead guilty. Since we reject this argument--and since there is no other basis for finding that Samples' plea was involuntary--the district court did not err in its legal conclusion that Samples' plea was voluntary and intelligent.

28

AFFIRMED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

1

Samples also alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel but did not include this claim in his Sec. 2254 motion

2

Rather than making an independent determination as to whether the trial judge erred by not holding a competency hearing before accepting Samples' guilty plea, the state post-conviction court simply assumed that a hearing should have been held

3

These petitions, which had been prepared by the prosecutor, were not ordinarily used in such proceedings

4

Samples also argues that the trial judge erred because he assumed the standard for competence to plead guilty was the same as that for competence stand trial. Samples is correct that a higher standard of competence is required to plead guilty than is needed to stand trial or participate in on-trial proceedings that do not involve a waiver of constitutional rights. See Chavez, 656 F.2d at 518. While the standard for competence to stand trial is that the defendant have the ability to aid in his defense and have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings, competence to waive constitutional rights requires in addition that the defendant have the ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature and consequences of those choices. Id. We need not address Samples' argument as to this issue, however, since we find that there was not sufficient evidence to raise doubts in the trial court's mind about Samples' competence to plead guilty. The court thus was not required to apply the higher standard in Samples' case

5

Evans addressed the standard of review for a state court's determination of competence to waive counsel. No case has specifically addressed whether the state determination of competence to plead guilty is entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness. Since, however, the standard used to determine competence to waive counsel is similar to that used for competence to plead guilty, the same degree of deference should apply. See Harding, 834 F.2d at 856

6

Samples also contends that the retrospective competency hearing was insufficient to meet due process requirements because it was conducted eight years after he had pleaded guilty. "The threshold question is whether the circumstances surrounding the case permit a fair retrospective determination of the defendant's competency at the time of [the hearing]". de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 986 n. 11. (9th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977). Samples was found to be competent to stand trial at the time his plea was taken. Even though the post-conviction proceeding was held eight years later, the state post-conviction court could adduce sufficient evidence to determine the additional issues of competency to plead guilty and of voluntary and intelligent waiver. See Evans, 800 F.2d at 888 (affirming state court's determination--made five years after hearing held on defendant's competence to stand trial--that defendant was competent to waive counsel and that waiver was knowing and intelligent)