State v. Greco’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To comport with the dictates of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State must disclose to the defense evidence that is favorable to the defense and is material to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); State v. Porter, 98-0279 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/00), 756 So.2d 1156 , writ denied, 2000-1135 (La.1/10/02), 790 So.2d 3 . Included in this rule is evidence that impeaches the testimony of a witness whose credibility or reliability may determine guilt or innocence. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). “[T]he prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial, that is, evidence favorable to the defendant which is material to guilt or punishment.” State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 970 (La.1986). See also Porter, supra. | (¡Materiality was defined in U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985): “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” The same test is to be employed whether or not the defense makes a pretrial request for exculpatory evidence. Bagley; State v. Phillips, 92-10”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Haywood · 881 So. 2d 1229 - State v. Goodwin

2. “Where a prosecutor allows a State witness to give false testimony without correction, a reviewing court must reverse the conviction if the witness's testimony reasonably could have affected the jury's verdict, even if the testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 , 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); State v. Broadway, 96-2659, p. 17 (La.10/19/99), 753 So.2d 801, 814 ; State v. Williams, 338 So.2d 672, 677 (La. 1976). To prove a Napue claim, the defendant must show that the prosecutor acted in collusion with the witness to facilitate false testimony. Broadway , 96-2659 at p. 17, 753 So.2d at 814 . Furthermore, fundamental fairness, i.e., due process, is offended "when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 , 79 S.Ct. 1173 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 . When false testimony has been given under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a new trial unless there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged false testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial. Broadway , 96-2659 at p. 17, 753 So.2d at 814 ; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). However, the grant of a new trial based upon a Napue violation is proper only if: (1) the statements at issue are shown to be actually false; (2) the prosecution knew they were false; and (3) the statements were material. United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 922 So. 2d 577 - State v. Jefferson