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← 863 F.2d 822 - Fludd v. Dykes

Fludd v. Dykes’s Empirical Analysis

863 F.2d 822 · 1989

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
April 2004
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2004 · most notably Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (1991), Michael McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Center, Inc (1989)

24 federal appellate · 13 state decisions

290198919902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Batson v. Kentucky · Swain v. State of Alabama · Taylor v. Louisiana · Johnson v. Robison · Strauder v. West Virginia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"Thus, until the trial judge overrules a party's objection to the racial composition of the venire, the law treats any previous decision on the part of a state entity to discriminate as harmless, insofar as the objecting party is concerned. The trial judge's decision — to proceed to trial, over the party's objection, with a jury selected from the venire on the basis of race — is the one that harms the objecting party. In overruling the objection, which informed the court that the peremptory challenger may be excluding blacks from the venire on account of their race, the judge becomes guilty of the sort of discriminatory conduct that the equal protection clause proscribes. Because the trial judge constitutes the discriminatory state actor under the equal protection clause, we conclude that there is no constitutional bar to the application of Batson to a civil suit."”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “"When blacks are excluded from jury service on account of their race, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the discriminatory actor is the trial court — even when the decision to exclude blacks may have originated in another state entity, such as the legislature. . . .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.