Rudd v. Laughlin’s Empirical Analysis
866 F.2d 1040 · 1989
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 1 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently January 2014 · most notably Adams v. Zarnel (2010), Jones v. United States, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (In Re Jones) (1991)
5 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 109 · 11 U.S.C. § 1307 · 11 U.S.C. § 301 · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) · 28 U.S.C. § 1334
Relies on Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. · Promenade National Bank v. Phillips · In Re Anastasios · In Re Republic Trust & Savings Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Though by no means a settled question, it has been held that the filing of a chapter 13 petition by an ineligible individual does not constitute the commencement of a case and does not result in the entry of an order for relief. It is the logic of these decisions that a voluntary chapter 13 case can be commenced under 11 U.S.C. § 301 only by an entity “that may be a debtor under such chapter.” It is at least arguable that the filing of a petition by an ineligible individual does not commence a chapter 13 case. Absent commencement of the case, no order for relief would be required by 11 U.S.C. § 301 . Following this logic further, if the debtor is not eligible, a chapter 13 petition by an ineligible debtor does not commence a bankruptcy case, and there is no case pending which might then be converted to another chapter. It would also follow that ineligibility could be raised as a ground for dismissal at any stage of the case, even after confirmation. It is conceivable that ineligibility could be raised collaterally as an attack upon any discharge entered in the chapter 13 case, [footnotes omitted]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.