State v. Hazelwood’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where evidence has been obtained in violation of constitutional protections such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The doctrine is essentially a variation on the independent source rule, except that the question is not whether the police actually obtained evidence from an untainted source, but whether evidence obtained through a constitutional violation would inevitably have been discovered through a lawful means. The Supreme Court noted that the "core rationale" for the exclusionary rule is "to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections." [ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).] "On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired." Id. at 443 [ 104 S.Ct. at 2508 ]. However, the rule is not meant to put the prosecution in a position worse than if no police misconduct occurred. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine. If the prosecution can prove that the challenged evidence "ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smith v. State

2. “The court of appeals appears to have weighed whether Alaska law, rather than federal law, should recognize inevitable discovery in immunity cases. See Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 951 (“For present purposes, we may assume that the inevitable discovery doctrine would be adopted in Alaska in appropriate cases_”). The court’s reliance on Justice Marshall's dissent in Kastigar, [v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)], see Hazelwood, 836 P.2d at 952 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470-71 , 92 S.Ct. at 1669-70 (Marshall, J„ dissenting)), would be appropriate had the court of appeals been deciding Alaska law. But in this case we are interpreting federal law, and thus are bound by the acceptance of the inevitable discovery rule in Nix and the constitutionality of use and derivative use immunity in Kastigar .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Hazelwood v. State

3. “We therefore hold, in accordance with the applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine has no application in the context of this statutory grant of immunity. Since our reading of Kastigar and Nix [v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) ] impels us to the conclusion that application of the doctrine of inevitable discovery to the use and derivative use immunity provided for in 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(5) is permissible, we remand this case to the court of appeals for further proceedings.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hazelwood v. State