Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.’s Empirical Analysis
867 F.2d 1234 · 1989
Citation profile
16 federal appellate · 5 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently November 2018 · most notably Fletcher v. Atex, Inc. (1995), Combs II Cta II v. International Insurance Company (2004)
16 federal appellate · 5 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005)
Relies on Erie Co v. Tompkins · United Families of America v. Kendrick · International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union Local 37 v. Boyd · California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc. · McLinn F/v Fjord Johnson F/v Supersonic Churchill v. F/v Fjord F/v Supersonic F/v Supersonic
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A] person or entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a compo nent part of a product prior to the sale of the product to a user or consumer. The term includes any seller who has actual knowledge of a defect in a product or a seller of a product who creates and furnishes a manufacturer with specifications relevant to the alleged defect for producing the product or who otherwise exercises some significant control over all or a portion of the manufacturing process or who alters or modifies a product in any significant manner after the product comes into his possession and before it is sold to the ultimate user or consumer. The term also includes any seller of a product who is owned in whole or significant part by the manufacturer or who owns, in whole or significant part, the manufacturer. A seller not otherwise a manufacturer shall not be deemed to be a manufacturer merely because he places or has placed a private label on a product if he did not otherwise specify how the product shall be produced or controlled, in some significant manner, the manufacturing process of the product and the seller discloses who the actual manufacturer is.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[W]hether a trademark licensor is subject to strict product liability under § 402A of the Restatement (Second)' of Torts (made the law of Arizona in Tucson Industries, Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464 , 501 P.2d 936 (1972) by reason of being either (a) a “manufacturer” or “seller” within the meaning of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 12-681-686 (1982), or (b) an “integral part of an enterprise” responsible for placing allegedly defective products on the market). See O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556 , 447 P.2d 248 (1968) (en banc), and its progeny.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Pursuant to Rule 27(b), ... the Court accepts jurisdiction____ This court will decide the following, issue under the questions certified: Under the facts of this case, as indicated in the Opinion and Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and in the relevant record before that court, is the trademark licensor strictly liable for personal injuries caused by a defective product put into the stream of commerce by the trademark licensee?”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.