867 So. 2d 151 - State v. Hamilton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 , rehearing denied , 444 U.S. 890 , 100 S.Ct. 195 , 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979) ; State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King , 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983) ; State v. Duncan , 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982) ; State v. Moody , 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino , 436 So.2d 559 ( citing State v. Richardson , 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983) ). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Giles · State v. Garnett

2. “[W]hen the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that such evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d 1207 (La.1984); State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984). However, La.R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than the rational juror's reasonable doubt standard. The statute serves as a guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Giles · State v. Garnett

3. “The supreme court has stated the following regarding the distinction of claims raised in a motion for new trial and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal: However, a motion for new trial presents only the issue of the weight of the evidence, see Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (setting aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence, as opposed to the insufficiency of the evidence, under the Due Process Clause does not bar retrial) and is examined under the so-called thirteenth juror standard under which the trial judge re-weighs the evidence. State v. Voorhies, 590 So.2d 776, 777 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991). The question of sufficiency is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. La.C.Cr.P. art. 821; State v. Demery, 28,396, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So.2d 518, 522 . But see Article 851 comment (d) (“[i]t is the duty of the trial judge to pass upon the sufficiency of the 1 .^evidence” once ground (1) is raised under Article 851). In the instant case, the constitutional issue of sufficiency is treated in assignment of error number 1 because the denial of a motion for new trial based upon La.C.Cr.P. art. 851(1) is not subject to review on appeal. State v. Skelton, 340 So.2d 256, 259 (La. 1976) (“[W]e have uniformly held that a bill of exceptions reserved to the refusal of the trial judge to grant a motion for a new trial based on Article 851(1), relative to sufficiency of the evidence presents n”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Boyer