dissent">CRAHAN, Judge,

dissenting.

Although I would otherwise concur in the majority’s thorough and well-reasoned analysis of the property division and maintenance issues, I must respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that the record supports the trial court’s determination that the marriage is irretrievably broken.

As the majority recognizes, the Missouri Legislature has not seen fit to adopt a “no-fault” dissolution law. Op. at 803; In re Marriage of Mitchell, 545 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Mo.App.1976). Rather, where the respondent denies under oath or affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the petitioner has the obligation of proving one or more of the circumstances set forth in § 452.320.2(1) RSMo 1986.1 In this case, Wife concedes that the only statutory circumstance potentially applicable under the evidence adduced at trial is § 452.320.2(l)(b): “That the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.” Wife offered the following as specific instances2 of conduct allegedly rendering it unreasonable for her to be expected to live with Husband:

1. The Van Incident: Even viewing the facts of the van incident in light of all of the inferences accorded in the majority opinion, the fact remains that Wife clearly and unequivocally stated that the entire matter was indeed an accident:

Cross Examination

Q: Throughout the course of your testimony and in response to your lawyer’s questions, you refer to the incident of May 12, 1989, as an accident.

A: That’s correct.

Q: It was an accident; wasn’t it?

A: As far as I know, it was an accident.

Q: So you’re not suggesting for a moment that Mr. Welsh intentionally tried to harm you in any way, shape or form; are you?

A: No. I have never said that.

Q: And you’re not saying that today?

A: No.

Redirect Examination

Q: ... Are you testifying that the event was not necessarily intentional but you simply don’t know?

*811A: I have never said it was intentional. Q: But you do not know whether it was intentional?

A: Only Dave knows what he did,—

Q: Okay.

A: —and I would never question him. Q: But are you testifying—

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A: I said only Dave knows that. I would never know. I don’t think any of us know, and that — that wasn’t my basic problem.3

Wife conceded that Husband had immediately stopped the van upon realizing what had happened, summoned emergency medical care, and remained with her in the emergency room. When it was clear that Wife was not in danger and would be released shortly, Husband proceeded with a scheduled business trip to the Orient after arranging for a relative to take Wife home.

2. The Bagel and Cream Cheese Incident: Shortly after Husband’s return from his trip, Wife asked Husband to go to the grocery store to pick up several items. He forgot the bagels and cream cheese Wife asked him to get and unkindly remarked that Wife should get them herself.

3. Wife Catches Husband’s Cold: Husband refused to go to the doctor when he had a cold and Wife later manifested the same cold symptoms.

4. Keeping Tennis Engagement When Wife Had A Fever: On one occasion, Husband proceeded to meet a friend for a tennis engagement when Wife had a fever.

5. Husband’s Flying: Wife did not like to fly with Husband when he piloted the company plane and on one occasion flew back on a commercial flight rather than accompany him. Husband ceased flying several years prior to trial.

6. Golf Ball Chipping: Wife was forced to move her chaise lounge to avoid being struck by golf balls when Husband practiced chipping in their back yard. On another occasion, a ball actually struck Wife but caused no injury.

7. Tennis Injury: Several years prior to filing, Husband and Wife collided while playing tennis, injuring Wife.

8. Insult to Friend: Husband made a boorish and anti-Semitic remark about the size of a mutual friend’s nose, causing embarrassment to Wife.

9. Child’s Wedding Arrangements: Wife was resentful about arrangements for the wedding when Husband’s last child was married.

10. Criticism Pertaining To Business Matters: Back in 1981 or 1982, Husband harshly criticized Wife for what he apparently perceived as meddling in personnel matters at his business.

Aside from the van incident, which Wife conceded to be an accident, it is unlikely that close scrutiny of even the best of marriages of any substantial duration would fail to disclose incidents of similar character. In my view, such incidents, either individually or collectively, are insufficient to support a determination that it would be unreasonable for Wife to continue living with Husband. Indeed, Wife continued to do so and attended social occasions with Husband for at least a year after the latest of the incidents described above. They continued to use their condominium at the Lake of the Ozarks together and to attend performances at the Muny Opera.

In Nieters v. Nieters, 815 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Mo.App.1991) we held that vague, but potentially more serious testimony that “it got *812somewhat violent on both parts,” that husband and wife could not get along on several occasions, and that there were differences about the raising of the parties’ children was insufficient to support the required findings under § 452.320.2. Although testimony here is somewhat more specific, aside from the admittedly accidental van incident the specifics themselves, although clearly not ideal, are essentially commonplace. By holding that a marriage can be deemed irretrievably broken on the basis of the incidents set forth above, it is truly a misnomer to characterize Missouri’s statutory scheme as anything other than “no-fault”.

I fully recognize the apparent futility of reversing the judgment of the trial court in view of the fact that the time consumed by the trial and appeal would presumably be sufficient to enable Wife to refile immediately and satisfy one of the other grounds specified in § 452.320.2(1). See, e.g., § 452.320.-2(1)(e) RSMo 1986. But such considerations alone cannot justify departure from statutory mandates. As we observed in Nieters:

This marriage may well be beyond saving, and in holding as we do that there is not sufficient evidence in this record to support the finding of the trial court that this marriage is irretrievably broken within the terms of § 452.320.2(1) we are but delaying the inevitable; nevertheless, we as an appellate court, construe and apply the law, we do not make it.

Nieters, 815 S.W.2d at 127 (quoting In re Marriage of Mitchell, 545 S.W.2d 313 (Mo.App.1976)).

As the court did in Nieters, I do not hesitate to acknowledge that strict adherence to the statutory requirements may well be a futile exercise in many if not most instances. Nevertheless, by its enactment of § 452.320.-2(1), our Legislature has unmistakably decreed that marriage contracts should be far more difficult to terminate than commercial transactions. When the allegation that the marriage is irretrievably broken is contested, the petitioner must either prove (a) that the respondent committed adultery and that the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; (b) behavior by the respondent sufficient to render it unreasonable for petitioner and respondent to live together; (c) abandonment of the petitioner for at least 6 months prior to filing; (d) consensual separation for at least 12 months prior to filing; or (e) separation for at least 24 months prior to filing. § 452.320.2(l)(a)-(e).

If ground (b) can be established by relatively commonplace incidents of inconsiderate behavior, there would have been no reason for the Legislature to have included grounds (c) through (e). Further, if evidence of the respondent’s adultery is insufficient without additional evidence that the petitioner (subjectively) finds it “intolerable” to live with the respondent, surely a determination that the respondent’s conduct renders it (objectively) unreasonable for petitioner and respondent to live together would require a showing of conduct at least as repugnant to the marital relationship as adultery. Thus, the Legislature must have contemplated a showing of conduct well beyond the normal range of behavior incident to the marital relationship.

Beyond question, a good number of the incidents recounted in this case could properly be characterized as inconsiderate, petty or even boorish. But they do not rise to the level of cruelty, abuse, adultery, lack of support or other behavior which would be commonly acknowledged as rendering it unreasonable for the parties to continue to live together. Nor does it appear that Wife viewed the incidents that way, at least when they occurred. Wife continued to live, socialize and travel with Husband for about a year after the most recent incident described in her testimony and apparently made only halfhearted, if any, attempts to air and settle her grievances.

Under such circumstances, the Legislature has provided a means for obtaining a dissolution, but only after a two year period. Section 452.320.2(l)(e). Such delay is presumably intended to provide time for reflection on the wisdom of terminating the relationship and to permit attempts at reconciliation if the parties are so inclined. See also § 452.320.2(2).4 The wisdom and practicality *813of such a scheme is not an issue for this court.5 Our role is to enforce the law in accordance with the legislative intent whenever possible. By accepting the relatively minor and commonplace grievances put forth by Wife in this case as grounds for dissolution of marriage, the majority thwarts the legislative intent as recognized and confirmed in Nietersand Mitchell and effectively transforms the dissolution statutes into a pure “no fault” scheme.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and deny the relief requested in the petition.

. All further statutory references are to RSMo 1986 unless otherwise indicated.

. Wife provided very few dates or even approximate time frames for most of the incidents recounted in her testimony, although it is clear from the context of her testimony that a number of them occurred several years prior to filing.

. The majority seizes on this passage of Wife’s redirect examination for the proposition that Wife "did not rule out the possibility that Husband intended to hurt her." Given the nature of the questions, it is difficult to imagine how Wife's responses could truthfully have been anything other than what they were. In the face of her unequivocal testimony that she did not contend the incident was anything other than an accident, this testimony surely cannot serve as evidence to support a determination that the incident was intentional. Moreover, in view of Wife’s testimony that Husband’s intent or lack thereof was "not my basic problem,” the van incident cannot possibly serve as evidentiary support for a determination that Husband’s behavior made it unreasonable for Husband and Wife to continue to live together.

. Wife testified that it was Husband’s lack of compassion and kindness toward her that were *813really the crux of the problem and that if Husband had even once said "I'm sorry,” she would have felt better. Although the behavior and attitudes recounted in the testimony are strongly indicative of a marriage that is in need of help, by opposing the dissolution and specifically requesting an attempt at reconciliation, Husband appears to be willing to address the problems.

. Some might argue that requiring parties to prove fault before a neutral factfinder may itself solidify attitudes that will not only preclude reconciliation but also prolong recriminations and bad feelings after the dissolution is granted. Such considerations are properly aired and resolved in the Legislature and not in this court. Once the Legislature has made its determination, as it has in § 452.320.2(1), our role is to enforce it.

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