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← 87 F.3d 1491 - Coleman v. Kaye

Coleman v. Kaye’s Empirical Analysis

87 F.3d 1491 · 1996

Citation profile

88
cited by 88 later decisions
5
states following
January 2019
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 14 district · 16 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 88 later decisions — most recently January 2019 · most notably Bloch v. Ribar (1998), Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department (1999)

18 federal appellate · 14 district · 16 state decisions

390199620002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1343 · 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 33 U.S.C. § 1365 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Blum v. Stenson · Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. · Carey v. Piphus · Missouri v. Continential Insurance Cos. · Smith v. Wade

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 88 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[i]t is well established that when county prosecutors execute their sworn duties to enforce the law by making use of all the tools lawfully available to them to combat crime, they act as agents of the State. On the other hand, when county prosecutors are called upon to perform administrative tasks unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions, such as a decision whether to promote an investigator, the county prosecutor in effect acts on behalf of the county that is the situs of his or her office.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The extension of . . . agency principles to Coleman's sex discrimination suit against the County of Monmouth is logically unacceptable because county prosecutors are clearly government officials who, reason dictates, must be acting on behalf of some governmental entity when they make personnel decisions. The agency paradigm fails here because it would require us to reach the specious conclusion that Prosecutor Kaye was not acting under the authority of any state governmental body, either state or county.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[w]hen county prosecutors engage in classic law enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State. But where, as here, the county prosecutor decides whether an employee in his or her office is worthy of an open promotion, the county prosecutor is performing an administrative function on the local level entirely unrelated to the duties involved in criminal prosecution.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.