Volume 87 — Florida Reports

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County; H. Pierre Branning, Judge.</p>

<p>Where constructive service of process by publication is desired, the statutory requirements must be complied with or the court will be without jurisdiction to proceed in the cause.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>A Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>This ease was decided by Division B.</p> <p>An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Broward County ; E. C. Davis, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Where the equities in a cause are settled by a decree that is affirmed on appeal, a subsequent appeal from orders made after tlie first decree appealed from, does not open up matters that are res adjudicata.</p> <p>2. Where a decree in a mortgage foreclosure orders the debt to he paid in ten days and in default sale to he made, and an appeal is taken after the ten days expires, a sale made eleven days after the return of the mandate is not error, due ad- • vertisement having been made.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County; H. Pierre Branning, Judge.</p>

<p>1. AVhere the chancellor denies an injunction to prevent the issuing or selling of municipal bonds sought on the ground that the bonds had not been legally authorized, and on appeal an injunction is asked in this court under the provision of Section 5', Article V of the Constitution, that the Supreme Court shall have power to issue “all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction,” and the case is fully submitted on its merits, questions of law 'only being involved, this court may, in view of the public interests directly involved, determine the merits of the appeal, even though the return day has not yet arrived. Jacksonville Electric Light Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 229, text 262, 18 South. Rep. 677; Antuono v. City of Tampa, filed February 4, 1924.</p> <p>2. Chapter 9294, Acts of 1924, a general law, which became effective June 7, 1923, provides that, “it shall be unlawful for any person to vote or participate in any county, district or other bond election held in this State, who is not a freeholder therein and who is not otherwise qualified as a voter therein,” and repeals all Conflicting laws or parts of laws. Such provision is applicable to municipal bond elections and should have been applied to a bond election held in the city of Ocala on July 17, 1923.</p>

A Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge. STATEMENT. Held: used and exercised, and still do hold, use and exercise, severally, the office of Member of the County Welfare Board of Duval County, Florida, and, collectively, pretend to constitute the County Welfare Board of Duval County, Florida, claiming to hold their said offices and to constitute said County Welfare Board and to exercise the…

<p>A fire insurance policy contained the following provisions:</p> <p>“This insurance is affected subject to the following Conditions which are hereby made warranties by the assured, and are accepted as part of this contract:</p> <p>“Total insurance permitted, warranted, concurrent herewith, including this policy, as follows:</p> <p>$........ on stock; $........ on furniture and fixtures; if........ on .....................</p> <p>“It is understood and agreed that no insurance in addition is permitted to this policy unless the total insurance, including this policy, is entered in paragraph above.”</p> <p>“This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added thereto, shall be void if the insured now has, or shall hereafter make or procure any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on property covered in whole Or in part by this policy.”</p> <p>The blank spaces in the concurrent insurance clause were not filled in. Held: That knowledge of the insurer of other insurance upon the property insured at the time of the issuance of the policy with the omission to insert in the concurrent ¿>r additional insurance clause of the policy the amount, or that no additional concurrent insurance is permitted, is not, as to policies subsequently issued up'on the property of which the insurer had no notice, a waiver nor is the insurer as to such policies, because of the omission to fill in the blank spaces in the concurrent insurance clause, estopped from asserting or relying up'on the express provisions of the policy that “no insurance in addition is permitted to this policy unless the total insurance, including this policy, is entered in paragraph above,” (meaning the additional concurrent insurance clause) and declaring the policy to be void if the insured “shall hereafter make or procure” any other Contract of insurance on the property covered unless provided by agreement endorsed on the policy.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County; J. J. Dickinson, Judge.</p>

<p>Where an equity appears for an accounting between guardian and ward, the enforcement of a judgment against the sureties 'on the guardian’s bond may properly be enjoined until appropriate decree upon an accounting are rendered in the equity cause.</p>

<p>A Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The writ of certiorari lies only to review the actions of courts, boards of officers exercising functions clearly judicial 'or quasi-judicial.</p> <p>2. The exercise of judgment is not the only criterion by which a proceeding must, be viewed to determine whether it is . judicial.</p> <p>3. The appointment of municipal officers is not a judicial proceeding.</p> <p>4. The power 'of removal, of a police officer, which power is vested in the executive department of the City of Jacksonville, is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial.</p> <p>5. When a police officer under the provisions of an act providing for the 'creation of' a relief fund becomes potentially entitled to benefits by reason of a definite length of service in the department, such circumstance gives him no vested interest in the position he occupies that renders his removal from such position by the proper municipal authorities a judicial act.</p>

<p>This case was decided by' Division A.</p> <p>1 An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.</p>

<p>1. An order dissolving an ancillary attachment is a -final judgment at law, to reyiew which a writ of error lies.</p> <p>2. A court which has in its rightful possession or under its control property involved in litigation may exercise jurisdiction over such property to the exclusion of all other courts, and another court of concurrent jurisdiction cannot interfere and wrest from it the jurisdiction first obtained.</p>

<p>1. The rule for the construction and interpretation of insurance contracts is that the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured So as not to defeat, without a plain necessity his claim to the indemnity which, in making the insurance, it was his object to secure. , ¡</p> <p>2. While insurance contracts should be construed most strongly against the insurer, yet language used in a policy of insurance is to be given its popular and usual significance unless the context requires a different construction.</p> <p>3. The word “collision” used in a contract of insurance indemnifying the insured against loss to an automobile described in the policy from collision with another hbject, either moving or stationary, means the act of colliding; and imports striking together; violent contact.</p> <p>4. A contract of insurance indemnified the owner against l'oss or damage sustained to an automobile described “if caused solely by collision with another object, either moving or stationary.” In an action 'on the policy it was proved 'at the trial that “all of a sudden” the roadbed “gave way under the car” and it “went down in soft sand” and “stuck.” Held: Not a “collision” within the meaning of the term as employed in the policy.</p>

<p>An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, Judge.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division B. •</p> <p>A Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Polk County; John S. Edwards, Judge.</p>