State v. Jumila’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““because HRS § 134-6(a) [(1993 and Supp.1997) 19 ] requires the actual commission of an underlying felony,” the prosecution “is required to prove all of the conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct that comprise the underlying crime” in order to convict a defendant of violating HRS § 134-6(a). State v. Israel, 78 Hawai'i 66, 74-75 , 890 P.2d 303, 311-12 (1995). Therefore, by virtue of the statutory definition of HRS § 134-6(a), the felony underlying an HRS § 134-6(a) charge will always be “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the” HRS § 134-6(a) offense. Consequently, the felony underlying an HRS § 134-6(a) offense is, as a matter of law, an included offense of the HRS § 134—6(a) offense. [[Image here]] Because the felony underlying an HRS § 134-6(a) offense is an included offense of the HRS § 134—6(a) offense, pursuant to HRS § 701-109(l)(a) [ (1993) 20 ], [the defendant] should not have been convicted of both the HRS § 134-6(a) offense and the underlying second degree murder offense. If he should not have been convicted of both offenses, then, of course, he should not have received separate sentences for each offense.... In order to remedy the HRS § 701-109 violation, the conviction and sentence for one of the two offenses must be reversed. When a defendant is convicted of an offense and a “lesser” included offense, see State v. Malufau, 80 Hawai'i 126, 138 , 906 P.2d 612, 624 (1995) (order on mo”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Christian · Tomomitsu v. State

2. “[w]e have found no indications in the language of HRS § 134-6(a) or the legislative history preceding its original enactment in 1990 to suggest!] that the legislature intended that an individual could be convicted of both an HRS § 134-6(a) offense and its underlying felony or that the legislature otherwise intended to create an exception to HRS § 701-109....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Van Den Berg · State v. Brantley

3. “Sentence of imprisonment for use of a firearm, semiautomatic firearm, or automatic firearm in a felony,”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Vanstory · State v. Feliciano