State v. Timoteo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Aplaca · State v. Bukoski

2. “Under different circumstances, we have required an express waiver of a right through an on-the-record colloquy. For example, in [Black ], we held that a defendant did not waive his right to insist on proof of venue by failing to raise this issue prior to his motion for judgment of acquittal. However, cases such as Black are distinguishable from the instant ease because, unlike Timoteo, the defendant in Black did not affirmatively act in any manner indicating that he was waiving the right at issue. More importantly, unlike the statutory requirement that the prosecution must prove “that the offense was committed within [a specific] time period[,]” HRS § 701-114(l)(e), the venue requirement in Black is a constitutional right. Article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution specifically guarantees that a defendant has a right to a “public trial by an impartial jury of the district 'wherein the crime shall have been committed, ... or of such other district to which the prosecution may be removed with the consent of the acctLsed[.]” (emphases added). Because the language of the Hawai'i Constitution specifically guarantees this right regarding venue unless the prosecution or trial court obtains “the consent of the accused[,]” id. (emphasis added), this “language clearly requires an affirmative act on [the] defendant’s part indicating knowing and intelligent waiver.” [State v.] Miyashiro, 3 Haw.App. [229,] 232, 647 P.2d [302,] 304 [ (1982) ]. In contrast to the constitutional right”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Adams v. State

3. “we are unwilling to close our eyes to the social cost of petitioner’s proposed rule. Beck does not require that the jury be tricked into believing that it has a choice of crimes for which to find the defendant guilty, if in reality there is no choice. Such a rule not only would undermine the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system, but it also would do a serious disservice to the goal of rationality on which the Beck rule is based. If the jury is not to be tricked into thinking that there is a range of offenses for which the defendant may be held accountable, then the question is whether Beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given, with the defendant being forced to waive the expired statute of limitations on those offenses, or whether the defendant should be given a choice between having the benefit of the lesser included offense instruction or asserting the statute of limitations on the lesser included offenses. We think the better option is that the defendant be given the choice.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Oliver