Volume 87 — Maryland Reports

) At the trial the fourth exception was taken to the action of the Court in allowing the wharfinger of the appellee to be asked the following question: “ Was or not the issuing of these warehouse receipts in the usual course of your dealings with LeRoy & Co. ?” It was previously shown that LeRoy & Co. were the agents of the appellant.

) The appellant, as payee of a promissory note for $750, sued the maker, Rosenstock, and S. J. Stargardtner as endorser. The trial Court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, because the note sued on was given in part execution of a contract which was contrary to public policy and therefore void.

) William D. Hopkins, the plaintiff below and the appellee here, sold to Joseph H. Neal a parcel of land lying within the corporate limits of Cambridge. Years previous to such sale a street called Willis street had been opened at right angles to a street called Glasgow street, which it crossed, and was then extended for a short distance, northward, toward the Choptank River.

) William Numsen, by his will, devised his estate to trustees in trust to make partition, with power, however, to sell any parts and divide the proceeds. The trustees submitted the administration of their trust to the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, and on February 19, 1897, they reported to the Court an agreement to sell at private sale to Samuel H. Lyon for.$114,000, a lot of ground in Baltimore City, being the block bounded by Light, German, Grant and Mercer streets.

<p> Executors and Administrators—Commissions—Death of One Administrator Before Performance of Services—Appeal. </p> <p>Letters of administration upon an estate were granted to two persons. One of them died soon afterwards, before any inventory was hied and the surviving administratrix proceeded to settle the estate, and in the final account full commissions were awarded to her. More than a year afterwards the administrator of the deceased administratrix filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court, asking that the accounts be reopened and that one-half of the commissions be allowed to the estate of the deceased administratrix. Held, That the accounts should not be reopened long after the expiration of the time allowed for appeals from orders of the Orphans’ Court, and that the Court committed no error in awarding the entire commissions to the surviving administratrix by whom all the work of settling the estate was performed.</p> <p>An appeal lies from an order of the Orphans’ Court refusing to re-open an executor’s accounts on the ground of error.</p>

) The jury were instructed that if the plaintiff was a passenger on defendant’s train from Charlestown to Elk-ton, that then it was his duty to behave himself in a decent and seemly manner while on said train, and to leave it promptly and orderly when it stopped at Elkton; and if they find that he did not leave said train when it stopped at Elkton, with reasonable promptness, but stood upon the platform of the car and refused to descend therefrom, when requested to do so by…

<p>Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Frederick County (McSherry, C. J.), dissolving an injunction and dismissing the bill of complaint.</p>

2, of Baltimore City, by which the appellant was enjoined from paying in the future to the withdrawing members of the association the ten cents per share per month which it is provided in the by-laws shall be devoted to the operating expenses of the association, and that the surplus, if any, of the expense fund of said association shall be treated as profits, and as such shall remain in the association for the benefit of the members thereof who shall continue therein until…

) At the trial the following prayers were offered : Plaintiff's First Prayer.—If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff is the owner of the premises situated in a residential section of Baltimore City, and known as “ No. 1021 North Eutaw street,” the same being improved by a dwelling house fronting on Eutaw street and a smaller dwelling house on rear of said lot, and if they find that the defendant, being owner of the lot adjoining the plaintiff’s on the…

The bill prayed for a mandatory injunction directing the Mayor, City Comptroller and Commissioner of Health to execute a contract with the appellant for the removal of night-soil upon the same terms as were contained in the contract made by the city with the appellant in 1895.

<p>Appeals from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Wright, J.) The plaintiff obtained a judgment below for</p>

2, of Baltimore City (Harlan, C. J.) The Baltimore and Ohio Employees’ Relief Association was incorporated in 1882. This charter was repealed by an Act of the Legislature, which took effect on April 1st, 1889.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County.</p>

Two appeals from the Court of Common Pleas (Wright, J.) The affidavit referred to in the opinion of the Court set forth that “ John J. Rives, agent of James W. Fahnestock of, etc., made oath,” etc. At the trial the following prayers were offered, among others : Plaintiff’s 1st Prayer.— If the jury find that the defendant, George L. Hopper, executed the note for $1,584,70 to the plaintiff, sued on in this case, and that said George L. Hopper was a non-resident of the State of…

<p> Foreign Corporations—Liability to Suit in This State—Service of Process. </p> <p>The general rule is that a foreign corporation, which has no office and transacts no business in this State, is not liable to an action by service of process upon one of its officers who is temporarily within this State.</p> <p>Code, Art. 23, sec. 295, provides that a corporation not chartered by the laws of this State which shall transact business therein shall be liable to suit in this State on any dealings therein. Defendant, a foreign corporation, bought certain goods at a sheriff’s sale here by its agent. Plaintiff, a resident of this State, claimed that defendant had sold the goods to him and sued for the same in replevin, the writ being served on said agent. Held, that the defendant was not . engaged in business in this State, and that the writ should be quashed.*</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Somerset County (Lloyd, J.)</p>

), by which the J. C. Grafflin Company was directed to issue to James S. Wood-side, assignee of F. L. Grafflin, a certificate of stock for 362^ shares, then standing upon the stock book of the company in the name of F. L. Grafflin.

<p>Contributory Negligence—Injury to Trespasser on Railroad Company’s Private Right of Way— Violation of Municipal Ordinance as to Speed of Trains.</p> <p>When a person is injured by a railroad train in a city which was running at a greater rate of speed than that allowed by municipal ordinance, the violation of the ordinance is not per se such negligence upon the part of the company as will afford a cause of action. It must be shown that the injury was caused by the unauthorized speed, without any direct or contributory negligence on the part of ■ the plaintiff.</p> <p>Plaintiff, on a dark evening, attempted to cross the tracks of the defendant company at a point where there was no public crossing, and where there were several parallel tracks. He passed from behind three rows of cars standing on side tracks and started across, and was at once caught between two tracks upon which trains were passing in opposite directions and was injured by one of them. Held, that although plaintiff testified that he looked and did not see either train approaching, yet, it is clear from the nearness of the trains that if he had made proper use of his senses, he must have seen or heard the trains or one of them, and that consequently he was guilty of such contributory negligence in attempting to cross the tracks as precludes a recovery.</p>

<p>Restraint on Alietiation— Owner of Property Cannot Create a Trust for Himself, Reselling the Income, Without Liability to Creditors— Trust Created by a Woman in Contemplation of Marriage.</p> <p>While the creator of a trust of property for the benefit of a third person may lawfully prescribe that the income shall be payable to the beneficiary to the exclusion of the latter’s alienees and creditors, yet when a trust is created for the benefit of the grantor and owner of the property, he cannot place the income thereof beyond the reach of his own creditors.</p> <p>Nor can a woman by a deed of trust made in contemplation of marriage provide that she shall enjoy the income of her property, and that the same shall not be liable to her creditors.</p> <p>The reasons upon which are based the English decisions holding that when the property of a woman is settled by her upon trusts in contemplation of marriage there may be a restraint upon alienation of the income, do not apply in this State where the property of a married woman is fully prelected from the debts of her husband.</p> <p>Shortly°before her marriage a woman conveyed her property to a trustee to collect the-rents, &c., and to pay the net income to her, the grantor, “ into her own hands and not to another, whether claiming by her authority or otherwise, for her sole and separate use and upon her separate receipts without power of anticipation.” After her marriage she became indebted to the plaintiff and charged her separate estate with the payment thereof. Held, that die trustee-under the deed should be required to pay the debt due to plaintiff, out of the income of the estate in his hands.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Kent County (Wickes, J.)</p>

<p> Negligence—Accident at Railway Crossing—Contributory Negligence—Failure to Blow Whistle or Ring Bell. </p> <p>It is the duty of a person about to cross a railway track to look and listen in order to learn if a train is coming. The fact that no bell was rung or whistle sounded by the train does not relieve a person from the imputation of contributory negligence who attempts to cross a track in front of a train which he sees approaching and by which he is injured.</p> <p>Plaintiffs’ deceased, driving along a country road uphill, attempted to cross a railway track at a point towards which a freight train was backing. There was a clear view of the train. When deceased reached the track his horse balked and the train struck the vehicle, killing the deceased. No brakeman was on the end of the car which struck the vehicle and there was evidence tending to show that no bell was rung or whistle sounded. Field, that since the deceased saw the train coming and endeavored to cross the track ahead of it, which he was unable to do because his horse became frightened and balked, he was guilty of such direct contributory negligence as precludes plaintiffs from recovering damages for the injury.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore.</p>

Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Stockbridge, J.) The contract sued on was for the sale of certain unimproved land lying at Irvington, a suburb of the city of Baltimore.

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore. After a verdict of guilty was rendered, a motion for a new trial was overruled by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City.</p>

<p> Corporations—Bonus Tax—Act of 1890, c. 336-—No Suit Maintainable by Corporation Until Payment Thereof—Question as to Valid Existence of Corporation May be Raised Collaterally. </p> <p>When a statute provides that no new corporation of a certain class shall possess any corporate powers until the payment of a designated bonus tax, then the question as to the validity of the incorporation because of non-payment of the tax may be raised collaterally by a person sued by the corporation. The legal existence of a corporation is always open to inquiry, although after a corporation is validly formed, a cause of forfeiture of the charter can only be taken advantage of by the State.</p> <p>The Act of 1890, ch. 536, provided that every corporation thereafter incorporated should pay a bonus tax upon the amount of its capital stock in two instalments, the first upon the incorporation of the company and the other one year thereafter, “and no company as afore-1 said shall have or exercise any corporate powers until the firstl instalment of said bonus has been paid.” The Act of 1894, chap.' 114, provided that all corporations chartered after the date of that Act should pay the whole bonus tax on the amount of the capital stock upon the incorporation, and that no company incorporated after the date of the Act should exercise any corporate powers until payment. This Act, while repealing inconsistent statutes, provided that no corporation incorporated prior to its passage should be released from the payment of any bonus tax due under the Act of 1890. The Act of 1894 also provided for a suit by the State to recover the bonus tax, and directed that if a judgment therefor remain unpaid for two years then the charter of the company should be forfeited. Plaintiff, a corporation, in 1892, before the payment of the bonus tax, made a contract for the purchase of certain land from the defendant, and in that year filed a bill for the specific performance of the contract. In the following year the above-mentioned bonus tax on the capital stock was paid. Held,</p> <p>1st. That under the statutes the plaintiff had, when the contract was made and the bill filed, no legal existence as a corporation, and consequently is not entitled to maintain the suit.</p> <p>2nd. That although plaintiff was liable to action by the State for the recovery of the tax, yet it had no legal existence until the same was paid.</p> <p>3rd. That the payment of the tax by the plaintiff after the institution of this suit does not entitle it to prosecute the same.</p>

<p>Joint and Several Tortfeasors—Payment of Judgment Against One a Bar to Suit Against Another—Judgment of Non Pros, when Verdict Below Jurisdiction of ike Court— Tender.</p> <p>When a tort has been committed by two persons, each is liable in solido to the injured party, but that party is entitled to but one satisfaction.</p> <p>If the injured party has recovered a judgment for the injury against one of several tortfeasors, and the amount of that judgment has been paid or tendered, he cannot maintain an action against another tortfeasor for the same injury.</p> <p>When an architect agrees to make the plans for a building and to supervise its erection by a builder in accordance therewith, and the owner brings an action against the builder alleging the substitution of inferior material and defective work, &c., the verdict in that suit followed by satisfaction is a bar to an action against the architect for alleged failure to supervise the erection of the building according to the specifications.</p> <p>Code, Art. 26, sec. 17, provides that whenever a judgment of non pros, is entered because the verdict of the jury is for a sum below the jurisdiction of the Court, the judgment shall be a bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, but the amount of the verdict shall be a debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff recoverable in any Court having jurisdiction to that amount or before a Justice of the Peace. Held, that where the plaintiff in an action against one of several parties who were jointly or severally liable recovers a verdict for one cent damages upon which there was a judgment of non. pros, because the amount was below the jurisdiction of the Court, the tender of that sum to the plaintiff is a bar to the further continuance of a suit against another party for the same cause of action.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County (Watters, J.) The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $ i ,000.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Washington County (Stake, J.), vacating and setting aside a deed from W. E. Stockslager to Sarah M. Stockslager, his wife.</p>

<p>Appeal from .an order of Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Stockbridge, J.), sustaining exceptions to the-claim of George P. Benjamin against the trust estate of’ Henry Evans, Jr.</p>

J.) The question referred to in the fourth bill of exceptions was as follows: ‘‘State whether or not you have ever seen boys stealing rides on electric cars similar in construction to this car, No. 412, of the Green Line, by riding on the truck bars and holding on the wooden leg at the side of the car?” To this question the plaintiff objected and the Court sustained the objection, and refused to permit the said question to be asked or answered.

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Dennis, J).</p>

They sought, obtained and executed the order of this Court, in the manner before stated, for the investment originally of the $2,goo in Western Maryland stock, and in such a way as to effectually secure the interests of both the legatee for life and the legatees in remainder, and passed their final administration account. What more remained for them to do ?

) The evidence objected to in the second bill of exception was that the appellant fished with a net in the waters in question.

) At the trial the defendant offered the following prayers : Defendant's istPrayer.—That it is the duty of the jury to determine whether or not the whole of the contract between the defendant and C. L. Gwinn & Co. was embraced in the letter from C. L. Gwinn & Co. to the defendant, making the offer to construct the one hundred fenders, more or less, and the acceptance of said offer by the defendant by the writing set out in the pleading, and if they shall find that the whole…

), by which an injunction was issued as prayed with leave to defendants, upon filing answérs to move for the dissolution of the same.

<p>Participation in Breach of Trust—Liability for Money Received— Guardian and Ward.</p> <p>When a party uses money which is lent to him by a guardian and which he knows to be the property of the wards in paying debts for which he is jointly liable with another, he is liable to the wards for the amount so used.</p> <p>The proceeds of a life insurance policy belonging to certain infants was paid to their mother as guardian. This sum was by her transferred to S., her deceased husband’s partner, who used the money in paying a debt due by him and his deceased partner. Afterwards S. agreed to pay said amount to the wards, but did not do so and made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors. Held, that the wards were entitled to share as creditors in the distribution of the assets.</p>

<p> Gifts—Savings Bank Deposit—Deposit in the Names of Two Persons as Joint Owners. </p> <p>M. deposited money in a savings bank in the names of herself and her niece “joint owners, payable to the order of either or the survivor.” M. retained the pass-book until her death, when the fund was claimed by the niece as a gift. There was no evidence of any intention on the part of M. to make a gift to her niece, and she left a will by which this fund was bequeathed to other parties. Held, that the entry in the pass-book did not itself constitute a gift of the money, and that since there was no proof of an intention to give and no transfer of dominion over the fund, there was no gift, and the money so deposited belonged to the estate of M.</p>

), by which it was adjudged that “ it appearing to the Court that the defendants have abandoned as a hospital or pest-house the property spoken of in the proceedings and known as the old “ Quarantine Hospital,” and that, consequently, neither the (Mayor nor the Commissioners of Health has the power to send to said abandoned property the leper woman, Mary Sansone, named in the proceedings, to be there received and kept by Mr. and Mrs. Hemstetter under the agreement stated in…

<p> Unlawful Interference with Another's Property■—Inducing one Party to a Contract to Break it—Pleading—Misjoinder. </p> <p>If a man knows that certain property is not his but another’s and that his apparent title to the same was acquired by fraud and is void, then his intermeddling with such property to the damage of the real owner is an unlawful act for which an action lies.</p> <p>A declaration sets forth a good cause of action which alleges that the plaintiff was the owner of certain houses and lots, that the defendant obtained a mortgage thereon from a person whom he knew not to be the owner, and knowing that the mortgage was fraudulent and void caused the tenants of the property to cease paying their rents to the plaintiff and advertised the property for sale under an ex parte decree of foreclosure on the mortgage ; that the mortgage was after- • wards annulled and vacated by a Court of Equity, and that in consequence of the premises, the plaintiff’s tenants moved away and plaintiff lost the rents, etc.</p> <p>Semble, that when a man induces one of the parties to a contract to . break it, intending thereby to injure the other party to the contract or to obtain a benefit for himself, he is liable in an action to the other party.*</p> <p>It is error to unite in the same count of the declaration two distinct and independent causes of action.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Dennis, J.), dismissing the bill of complaint.</p>

), by which the Bagby & Rivers Co. were enjoined from using the name Rivers as part of its corporate title, and dismissing the cross-bill filed by that company against Arthur D. Rivers and the Rivers Furniture Company, asking that Rivers be enjoined from conducting the furniture business in Baltimore City, and that the Rivers Co. be enjoined from using that name.

), by which it was adjudged “that under a proper construction of the will of Daniel B. Banks, deceased, Anna Godwin, Sarah Godwin, Margaret Godwin, Rebecca Godwin, Alice Godwin and W. Frank Godwin, children of Anna W. Godwin, each took contingent remainders in fee in the one-sixth of the property passing under said will which, in the case of Andrew Banks v. Margaret W. Dorsey and others (a suit for partition instituted in this Court), was allotted to Andrew Banks as trustee…

<p>Appeal from a pro forma order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in Insolvency.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Wills—Where to be Probated—Jurisdiction of Orphans’ Court to Determine Residence of Testator— When Question as to Residence Must be Raised—Appeal.</p> <p>An order of the Orphans’ Court passed in pursuance of its statutory jurisdiction is valid until reversed on appeal or set aside by its own order, although it should be made to appear that the order was not warranted by the facts of the case.</p> <p>Code, Art. 93, sec. 326. provides that a decedent’s will must be probated in the Orphans’ Court of the county where he resided, etc. Held, that when a will is offered for probate in a certain county the Orphans’ Court has jurisdiction to determine and must determine whether decedent was a resident of that county or not. When this question is decided by the admission of the will to probate and the grant of letters testamentary, without any issues being asked for to contest the question of residence, or any appeal taken from the order, such adjudication is conclusive upon the question of residence and it is too late, after the settlement of an account in that Court by the executors, to file a petition alleging that the decedent was not a resident of that county and asking that issues be sent to a Court of Law to determine the question of residence.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals must deal with cases as they are presented by the record, and it has no power, while reviewing the particular order from which an appeal was taken, to receive evidence or to remand the record for the Court below to hear testimony on a different question that in no way concerns the only issue brought before the Court of Appeals for review.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Henderson, J.), dismissing the bill of complaint.</p>

) At the trial the Court instructed the jury that their verdict must be for the garnishees and rejected the following prayers offered by the plaintiffs : .

<p> Conflict of Laws—Bequest, of Personal Property Governed by Law of Testator's Domicile—Bequest of Shares of Stock—Lapsed Legacies. </p> <p>The construction and effect of a will by which personal property is bequeathed is governed by the law of the testator’s domicile, and not by that of the place where the property is located.</p> <p>The devolution of title to shares of stock of a corporation is governed by the law of the owner’s domicile upon his decease, and not by that of the situs of the corporation.</p> <p>Shares of stock in a Maryland corporation were bequeathed by the will of the testator, living in another State, to a party who died before the testator. Under the law of that State, such a legacy lapsed and became void by the prior death of the legatee ; while in Maryland, such a legacy is saved from lapsing by virtue of a statute. Held., that the bequest is governed by the law of the testator’s domicile, and that the legacy lapsed.</p>

) The bill of sale referred to in the opinion of the Court was as follows : “ I, Lewis F. Fersner, of Allegany County, State of Maryland, in consideration of seven hundred and thirty-five dollars, and paid me by Samuel H. Fersner, of -Washington County, State of Maryland, do hereby bargain and sell unto the said Samuel H. Fersner, the following personal property situated in Allegany County, Maryland, to-wit: One-half interest in 8 horses, one-half interest in five single…

) At the trial the jury were instructed that their verdict must be for the garnishee because there was no legally sufficient evidence to sustain the issue on the part of the plaintiff.

) At the trial the following prayers offered by the plaintiff were granted: 1st. If the jury find from the evidence in the case that, on the 6th day of February, 1897, the plaintiff was the tenant of the defendant of a portion of the ground floor of a building in Lonaconing, known as the “ Town Hall,” owned by the defendant, comprising one store-room and several dwelling-rooms on said floor, and, as such tenant has the right to occupy said rooms, as such store and…

<p>Appeal from a pro forma decree of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.</p>

<p> Constructio7i of Building Co7itract—Optio77, to Purchase GrouTid Rents—Agreement Not to Assign Without Conse7it of Lessor. </p> <p>Defendant, the owner of a tract of land, leased the same in lots to a builder,‘subject to certain ground rents. A contract between the parties provided that the lessee should erect a house on each of the lots, the defendant agreeing to make bonus advances to the builder during the progress of the work, and it was stipulated that the builder should have the right at any time within one year to purchase the ground rents at a certain valuation. The builder covenanted that he would not assign or sublet the leasehold interest in the houses or in the contract to any person until after the completion of the houses, except with the written consent of the defendant. Plaintiff contracted to furnish certain materials for 'the houses and the builder agreed that as additional security for payment plaintiff should have all the sums obtained for the ground rents over and above the prices named in the agreement between the builder and defendant. Plaintiff afterwards assigned to another party his rights in certain of the ground rents. Defendant refused to assent to either of these assignments. Upon a bill by the assignee for specific performance of the contract to sell the ground rents at the prices named, Held,</p> <p>1. That the agreement between the builder and plaintiff did not amount to an assignment of the option to buy the rents and conferred no right as against the defendant, but only gave the plaintiff the right to claim from the builder the profit made by him in case he had exercised the option,</p> <p>2. That even if said agreement were an assignment of the option then under the terms of the contract between defendant and the builder the latter had no right to assign his option to purchase the ground rents without the consent of the defendant, and that defendant had not given his consent to the assignment to the plaintiff nor acted in such a way as to be estopped from setting up such defence.</p>

<p>Appeal from a pro forma decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p> Sheriffs—Lynching of Prisoner by Mob—Negligence in Custody of Prisoner—Liability of Sheriff and Sureties. </p> <p>A person charged with murder and confined in a county jail was forcibly taken thence by a mob and lynched. In an action against the sheriff by the children of the prisoner to recover damages for negligence in his custody, whereby his death was caused, the declaration alleged that" the sheriff had been warned of the existence of public excitement concerning the crime charged against the prisoner, and had been requested to confine him in a more secure place, but refused to do so and removed the guards previously stationed at the jail and gave the keys to an old and infirm negro; that this negro, upon the demand of the mob, delivered the prisoner to them, and that the sheriff was present at the hanging of the prisoner by the mob and offered no resistance thereto. Held, upon demurrer, that the sheriff was not liable in the action, there being no allegation that he acted with malice .towards the prisoner or participated in the violence of the mob, or was able to resist them, and the prisoner having been confined in the county jail, which was the proper place for his custody. If in such case the sheriff had sufficient means at hand to resist the mob but failed to do so, he would be liable.</p> <p>Under Code, Art. 87, secs. 43, &c., it is the duty of the sheriff to keep a prisoner committed to his custody in the county jail unless it becomes necessary to remove him elsewhere. It is for the sheriff to determine when such necessity exists, and if in the honest exercise of that discretion he fails to remove a prisoner in time to avert a threatened danger, he is not civilly liable.</p> <p>It is the duty of the sheriff of the county to preserve the public peace. For neglect in the performance of that duty he is punishable by indictment, but no civil action therefor lies against him by persons who have suffered injury from the violence of mobs or insurrections.</p> <p>The sureties upon a sheriff’s bond are not liable for a wrong committed by him in aiding and abetting a mob in lynching a prisoner committed to his custody.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Stockbridge, J.), dismissing the bill of complaint.</p>

2, of Baltimore City (Stockbridge, J.), by which it was adjudged that the plaintiff, Ella L. Castleman, a creditor of the Salem Loan and Real Estate Investment Company, is entitled to recover from T. A. Bryan the amount due by him to the said company under his subscription to the capital stock, etc.

<p> jQualification of Voters—Residence on Vessel—Domicile of Origin. </p> <p>An unmarried man employed as a clerk on a steamboat which plies between various points and whose only sleeping room is on the boat, does not thereby acquire a residence in the home port of the vessel which entitles him to be registered as a voter there.</p> <p>A seafaring man retains his former domicile and residence, although he may be absent for a long period of time, until by actual residence elsewhere he acquires a new domicile.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore.</p>

J.), in an action of trespass q. c. f The following diagram (from appellant’s brief) illustrates the situation of the lots in question :… Held: used and occupied [said] [all] lands [east of C. & P. D. R. R.] during the periods of their respective ownerships, and that said holding, use and occupation by said grantees and devisees respectively was open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, adverse and under claim of title and for a period of twenty years, that then the defendant…

), to which the case had been removed for trial from the Circuit Court for Cecil County: The thirteenth exception was taken below to the ruling of the Court allowing Davis to testify to the circumstances attending the execution of the deed from Davis to Pugh, and to the declarations of Pugh made afterwards.

Two appeals from the Court of Common Pleas (Harxan, C. J.) The defendant’s first and second prayers, which were rejected, were as follows : 1st. That as it appears from the uncontradicted evidence in the cause that William H. Hanna was employed by the defendant, Joseph P. Smith, to conduct a series of balloon .ascensions on land leased to the said Smith for a fixed sum •of money, at one of which ascensions the alleged injury to the plaintiff, Mary Benick, occurred by reason…

<p>Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Ritchie, J.)</p>

<p> Injunction—Appeal—Following Proceeds of Stolen Property Deposited in Bank in the Names of Conspirators. </p> <p>After an equity cause has been argued by both parties and a final decree made, it cannot be objected on appeal that the cause had not been regularly set down for final hearing, especially when the decree' states that the cause stood ready for hearing.</p> <p>A preliminary injunction was issued upon a bill not supported by a sufficient affidavit. Subsequently, the defendants answered, testimony was taken and a permanent injunction granted. Held, that on appeal the question as to the regularity of the preliminary injunction was immaterial and that the matter to be determined was whether the final decree was properly made upon the evidence in the case.</p> <p>When money arising from the sale of stolen property is deposited in bank in the names of persons who conspired together to conceal it, the owner of the property, upon proof of such facts, is entitled to maintain a bill in equity to restrain the bank and the depositors from dealing with the fund and to have the same paid over to him.</p> <p>The evidence in this case established the following facts : One of the defendants, who was the wife of a saloon-keeper in. Berlin, had an intrigue with a cab driver in that city. When this affair was discovered, she stole from her husband certain Prussian Government bonds, which she sold and fled with her paramour, the other defendant, to America. Part of the proceeds of the bonds were deposited in a savings bank in the joint names of the man and the woman, the latter representing herself as being his wife. Neither of them brought to this country any other property. Held, that plaintiff, the woman’s husband, was entitled to a decree enjoining the defendant’s from drawing out the money and declaring the same to be his property.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Ritchie, J). overruling the demurrer to the answer and dismissing the petition for a mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Dennis, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from decretal orders of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Dennis, J.), overruling exceptions to the sale reported in this case and dismissing a petition to vacate the decree for a sale.</p>

<p>Appeal from decretal orders of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Dennis, J.)</p>

<p> Fire Insurance Policy Issued by a Foreign Company in Violation of the Statute of this State—Place of Making Contract. </p> <p>Code, Art. 23, secs. 118 etseq., provide that itshall not be lawful for an insurance company created by another State to take risks or transact any insurance business in this State unless certain conditions shall have been complied with. Defendant applied to a broker in Baltimore for fire insurance on its property. This broker made application by letter to certain insurance brokers in New York, and these applied to a Massachusetts Ins. Co., which had not complied with the statute of this State. Policies of insurance were signed in Boston, forwarded by the company to the New York brokers, and by them sent to the broker in Baltimore. He delivered the same to the defendant, collected the premiums mentioned in the policies, and, after deducting his commissions, remitted the balance to the New York brokers, by whom it was paid to the Massachusetts company. Plaintiff, the receiver of this company, brought an action to recover certain assessments on the policies. Held, that these contracts of insurance were made in.-this State and not in Massachusetts, because they were not completed until the policies were delivered and the premiums collected by the broker in Baltimore, who was the agent of the company for these purposes, and that, since the contracts so made were in violation of the statute, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.</p>

<p>Taxation—Patent Rights—Assessment of Shares of Stock in Corporations— Constitutional Law.</p> <p>Under the provisions of Code, Art. 81, relating to the taxation of shares of stock in corporations, the Tax Commissioner is directed to deduct from the aggregate value of all the shares, the assessed value of the real estate owned by the corporation, to divide the residuum by the number of shares, and the quotient is declared to be the taxable value of each share. The tax in such case is not levied upon the stock itself nor upon the corporation, but upon the owners of the shares, although the officers of the corporation are required to collect it. The shares are assessed according to their value without regard to what particular property or rights create that value.</p> <p>The fact that the capital stock of a corporation is principally invested in patent rights granted by the United States does not exempt the owners of the shares of stock from taxation upon the real value of such shares, or entitle them to claim that the value of the patents should be deducted from the aggregate value of the shares.</p> <p>A State tax levied upon the shareholders in a corporation owning patent rights, according to the value of the shares, is not in violation of the Constitution of the United States, Art. i, sec. 8, by which the Congress is authorized to promote the progress of science by securing for a limited time to inventors the exclusive right to their inventions.</p>

) At the trial the plaintiff’s first prayer, after a statement of the title, instructed the jury that if they found that said Mary A. Myers was, and remained in possession of said property until the time of her death, and that she died on March 19th or 20th, 1881, leaving her said husband, John H. Myers, surviving her, and also leaving a last will and testament, and that said will was probated in the Orphans Court of Baltimore City, and that said John H. Myers, her said…

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Lynch and Henderson, JJ.), vacating the deed mentioned in this case.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Stake, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granting an ex parte injunction with leave to the defendant to move for a dissolution.</p>

<p> Negligence—Knowledge of Risks of Employment. </p>

<p>Appeal from an order of Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Stockbridge, J.)</p>

<p> Assault with Intent to Rape—Admissibility of Evidence—Recalling ■ Witness. </p>