870 So. 2d 762 - Cogman v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2003
Citation profile
8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
May 2007
most recently cited
8 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Santoni v. United States · United States v. London · United States v. Purvis · Ex Parte Cole · 417 So. 2d 611 - Barbee v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"`The Alabama Supreme Court addressed a similar problem in Ex parte Lewis, 811 So.2d 485 (Ala.2001). In Lewis , the indictment charging Lewis with second-degree assault did not include the essential element of "inten[ding] to cause physical injury," as required by § 13A-6-21(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the indictment was void "for its failure to charge an essential element of that offense" and that "Lewis could not waive the defect...." 811 So.2d at 489 . In so holding, the Alabama Supreme Court applied the following law and analysis: "`"In Ivey v. State, 710 So.2d 946 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed two convictions of assault in the second degree under § 13A-6-21(a)(4) because the jury had not been instructed that in order to convict the defendant it had to find that he intended to cause the physical injury. The jury was instructed only that it had to find that the defendant had intended to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty and that the defendant had caused physical injury to a person. This instruction omitted an essential element of the charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated: "`"`In the present case, the trial court's instruction failed to correctly define the offense of assault in the second degree because the instruction failed to include as an element of the offense that the defendant intended to cause physical injury and did cause physical injury to any person. Instead, the trial court i”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Madden v. State · Grant v. State“"A person commits the crime of receiving stolen property if he intentionally receives, retains or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Madden v. State · Grant v. State“"The State did not in the circuit court and does not on appeal dispute Cogman's assertion that his indictment reads as stated; therefore, because nothing in the record indicates otherwise, we accept his assertion as true. Bates v. State , 620 So.2d 745 , 746 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) (`"When the State does not respond to a petitioner's allegations, the unrefuted statement of facts must be taken as true."' (quoting Smith v. State , 581 So.2d 1283 , 1284 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991))). "Section 13A-8-16 , entitled "Receiving stolen property — Definition," reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "`A person commits the crime of receiving stolen property if he intentionally *Page 367 receives, retains or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen or having reasonable grounds to believe it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.'"”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Grant v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.