¶1concurring as to Part II and dissenting as to Part I.
¶2I concur in the holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the wife an attorney fee. However, I dissent from the holding that the trial’s court property-division and periodic-alimony awards were inequitable.
¶3*1161The wife received a substantial marital-property award. Although the monthly periodic-alimony payments of $4,000 from the husband were to end in 12 months, the trial court compensated for the lack of a monthly payment by awarding the wife the use of a $200,000 house on which the husband was ordered to pay the indebtedness and by ordering the husband to make the payments on the wife’s $30,000 vehicle. The majority’s reversal of the property-division and periodic-alimony awards constitutes, in my opinion, a substitution of this court’s judgment for that of the trial court. See Ex parte Durbin, 818 So.2d 404 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Bland, 796 So.2d 340, 343 (Ala.2000); Ex parte Wallace, 795 So.2d 719 (Ala.2000).
¶4concurring as to Part I and dissenting as to Part II.
¶5I agree with the main opinion that the trial court’s property division and alimony award were inequitable. However, given the disparity in the parties’ incomes, I believe the trial court erred in refusing to award the wife an attorney fee. Therefore, I concur as to Part I of the main opinion, but I dissent as to Part II.