874 F2d 815 Frost v. Perrill
874 F.2d 815
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Peter Wayne FROST Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
William PERRILL, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 87-2882.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted* April 27, 1989.
Decided May 1, 1989.
Before HUG, SCHROEDER and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM**
Peter Wayne Frost, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's summary dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Frost alleges that five disciplinary hearings conducted between February 11, 1986 and March 13, 1987 violated his due process rights because the hearing examiners were prison officials who supervised the officers who had investigated the charges against him. Frost contends that the district court erred in summarily denying his petition and questioning his allegation, without providing him an evidentiary hearing, that he exhausted his administrative remedies. We affirm.
An impartial decisionmaker is a fundamental requirement of due process. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). However, the decisionmaker need not be from outside the institution involved in the dispute. Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 n. 1 (9th Cir.1984); Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir.1981). In particular, in a prison setting the decisionmaker need not be from outside the prison. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (involuntary transfer of state inmate to mental hospital); Ruley v. Nevada Bd. of Prison Com'rs, 628 F.Supp. 108, 112 (D.Nev.1986) (disciplinary hearing to determine state prisoner's liability for restitution).
Frost contends that, because his hearing examiners were prison officials, they had a "vested interest" in upholding charges investigated by officers under their supervision. He does not allege any personal bias. Accordingly, Frost has failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496. The district court did not err by summarily denying Frost's petition. See id.; Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.1987), petn. for cert. filed, Jan. 31, 1989.
Nor did the district court make any ruling concerning Frost's exhaustion of remedies that requires our review. Rather, the district court accepted as true Frost's allegation that he had exhausted his administrative remedies.
AFFIRMED.