Augman v. Colwart’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Here, the issue is the “other side of the coin.” If the plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim cannot urge the suspension of peremption of his cause of action, or that his cause of action does not “ripen” and the peremptive period does not begin until a definitive judgment in the original litigation, then it seems obvious that the defendant may not urge prematurity as a defense on the same grounds. To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result that a suit for legal malpractice would always be premature pending a final and definitive judgment on the relevant issue in an underlying action, even if the peremp-tive period accrues prior to that time, extinguishing the cause of action. Such an interpretation is not only unreasonable, but patently unjust. The Supreme Court’s holdings in Brand v. New England Insurance Company, 576 So.2d 466 (La.1991) ] and Reeder [v. North, 97-0239 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1291 ] compel the conclusion that the dilatory exception pleading prematurity is not properly applicable to this cause of action.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 95 So. 3d 565 - Dwyer v. Binegar