874 So. 2d 575 - Simpson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In Meadows v. State, 644 So.2d 1342 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), this court considered whether a defendant charged with a felony could be tried in absentia if he was not present at the beginning of trial. We held that, in the absence of affirmative evidence indicating that a defendant has voluntarily waived his right to be present, a defendant charged with a felony cannot be tried in absentia if he is not present at the beginning of his trial. In reaching this decision, we relied on the Committee Comments to Rule 9.1(b), quoted above, and on H. Maddox, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure (1990), in which former Justice Hugh Maddox concludes that a court cannot infer a waiver of the right to be present unless the defendant was present at the commencement of the trial. We also relied on Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 , 113 S.Ct. 748 , 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit the trial of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial. However, the Crosby Court declined to review Crosby’s claim that his trial in absentia was unconstitutional. Therefore, the states may consider this issue in light of their own statutes and procedural rules. “The Committee Comments to Rule 9.1 and Justice Maddox’s treatise were based on a draft of Rule 9.1 which, like Rule 43, Fed. R.Crim. P., provided that the court may infer waiver of the right to be present if a defendant is absent after his trial h”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 12 So. 3d 723 - Thompson v. State

2. ““Section (b) allows a defendant to waive the right to be present. The defendant may make an express waiver in open court or may waive the right by voluntary absence from the proceeding. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 , 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) [[Image here]] “Waiver of the right to be present must be clear and unequivocal. Waiver must be affirmative and positive in nature and made by the defendant personally. Consent or acquiescence of a defendant to a waiver of the right cannot be presumed but must affirmatively appear from the record. Berness v. State, 263 Ala. 641 , 83 So.2d 613 (1955). Thus, section (b) allows the court to find an implied waiver only when the defendant has been present at the commencement of the trial and fails to appear at some later stage of the trial. Such a waiver may not be inferred if the defendant has never appeared at trial, except in the case of a minor misdemeanor, which by definition carries no threat of imprisonment. (Emphasis added [in Simpson ].)””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 12 So. 3d 723 - Thompson v. State

3. ““[A] defendant may waive the right to be present at any proceeding in the following manner: “(i) With the consent of the court, by an understanding and voluntary waiver in open court or by a written consent executed by the defendant and by the defendant’s attorney of record, filed in the case. “(ii) By the defendant’s absence from any proceeding, upon the court’s finding that such absence was voluntary and constitutes an understanding and voluntary waiver of the right to be present, and that the defendant had notice of the time and place of the proceeding and was informed of the right to be present.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 12 So. 3d 723 - Thompson v. State