Gilpin v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees’s Empirical Analysis
875 F.2d 1310 · 1989
Citation profile
50 federal appellate · 8 district · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 95 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2024 · most notably National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc. v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (1989), Broussard
50 federal appellate · 8 district · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (§ 35 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 17 U.S.C. § 504 (§ 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Carey v. Piphus · Smith v. Wade · Abood v. Detroit Board of Education · Memphis Community School District v. Stachura · Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 95 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[a] potentially serious conflict of interest within the class precluded the named plaintiffs from representing the entire class [of nonunion workers] adequately. Two distinct types of employee will decline to join the union representing their bargaining unit. The first is the employee who is hostile to unions on political or ideological grounds. The second is the employee who is happy to be represented by a union but won’t pay any more for that representation than he is forced to. The two types have potentially divergent aims. The first wants to weaken and if possible destroy the union; the second, a free rider, wants merely to shift as much of the cost of representation as possible to other workers, i.e., union members. The “restitution” remedy sought by ... the nine named plaintiffs, is consistent with — and only with — the aims of the first type of employee.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“if it did, the notice would be as long and complicated as an SEC prospectus.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he union negotiated on behalf of these employees as it was required by law to do, adjusted grievances for them as it was required by law to do, and incurred expenses in doing these things .... The plaintiffs do not propose to give back the benefits that the union's efforts bestowed on them. These benefits were rendered with a reasonable expectation of compensation founded on the collective bargaining agreement and federal labor law, and the conferral of the benefits on the plaintiffs would therefore give rise under conventional principles of restitution to a valid claim by the union for restitution if the union were forced to turn over the escrow account to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to them .... In claiming restitution the plaintiffs are standing that remedy on its head.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.