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← 875 F.2d 1520 - Julius v. Jones

Julius v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

875 F.2d 1520 · 1989

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
May 2005
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2005

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

60198919902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Bagley · Murray v. Carrier · Sanders v. United States · Francis v. Franklin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"[P]etitioner argue[d] that the trial court's instruction at the guilt phase of the trial that `no sympathy, bias or prejudice for any person or individual should enter in your deliberations in rendering a verdict in this case ...,' and afterwards the instruction at the sentencing phase that `I want to again remind you of the charge I gave you earlier concerning the basic law, as far as reasonable doubt and moral certainty are conerned, as well as your functions as jurors ...' offended the Eighth Amendment requirement that a capital sentencer be free to consider any evidence or factor offered by the defendant as a reason for a sentence less than death. Petitioner argue[d] that his sentencer was precluded from considering his mitigating evidence before making its sentencing decision. This Court disagrees. "In evaluating this alleged constitutional error, the Court must determine how a reasonable juror could construe the instruction. Francis v. Franklin, U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971-1972 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). The court first notes that the trial court did not repeat its previous instruction as to sympathy, but rather referenced `the basic law, as far as reasonable doubt and moral certainty are concerned,' which was contained in the charge in the guilt phase of the case. The reference to sympathy in the guilt phase was clearly an instruction which would benefit an accused. It is illogical to believe that the jurors thought that the reference to sympathy in the guilt phase a”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Record at 303-304. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that Now the fact that I list these mitigating circumstances to you does not mean that those are the only mitigating circumstances that you can consider in this case. That is not meant to be an all inclusive of mitigating circumstances. You may find that there are other mitigating circumstances in this case from the evidence you heard and from anything that you may have heard in the evidence about Defendant's character or his life ...”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “'In evaluating this alleged constitutional error, the Court must determine how a reasonable juror could construe *Page 1082 the instruction. Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 1971-72 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). . . .'”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.