875 So. 2d 408 - State v. Burris’s Empirical Analysis
2004
Citation profile
70 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 74 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2022 · most notably Stokeling v. United States (2019), 898 So. 2d 61 - Daniels v. Florida Dept. of Health (2005)
70 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 450 So. 2d 217 - Holly v. Auld · State v. Webb · State v. Glatzmayer · 604 So. 2d 471 - Green v. State · 824 So. 2d 105 - State v. JM
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Our purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. Instead, the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent.”
9 later decisions quote this exact passage“[a] statute's plain and ordinary meaning controls only if it does not lead to an unreasonable result”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“In State v. Houck, 652 So.2d 359 (Fla.1995), this Court interpreted “weapon” in the context of section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1991), the general enhancement statute. We stated that “[t]he obvious legislative intent ... is to provide harsher punishment for, and hopefully deter, those persons who use instruments commonly recognized as having the purpose to inflict death and serious bodily injury upon other persons.” State v. Houck, 652 So.2d at 360 (quoting Houck v. State, 634 So.2d 180, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)). However, despite this recognition of legislative intent, we declined to define any object that may be used to inflict death or serious bodily injury as a deadly weapon. So, in Houck, we rejected the State’s argument that pavement could qualify as a weapon to enhance- a homicide crime, in part because, “[a] paved surface is not commonly understood to be an instrument for combat against another person.” Houck, 652 So.2d at 360 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Gonzalez v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.