876 F2d 897 Ringrose v. Frohnmayer

876 F.2d 897

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

James Robert RINGROSE, Petitioner/Appellant,
David FROHNMAYER, Attorney General of Oregon, Fred Pearce,
Sheriff of Multnomah County, Oregon, Respondents/Appellees.

No. 87-4349.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 19, 1989.
Decided June 9, 1989.*

Before BARNES, WALLACE, and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges.

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James Robert Ringrose appeals pro se the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends the state failed to bring him to trial within the 120 days required by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2, Art. IV(c) (1982). The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the delay beyond the 120 days was due to continuances sought by Ringrose's court-appointed attorney and hence the IAD was not violated. We agree and affirm.



Ringrose was transferred to Oregon pursuant to provisions of the IAD allowing a state prisoner to be brought to another state to face pending charges. See id. at Art. III. The IAD requires that the prisoner be brought to trial within 120 days after transfer except that "for good cause shown in open court ... the court ... may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." Id. at Art. IV(c). Thus, a prisoner may waive speedy trial rights under the IAD through counsel's request for a continuance. See Johnson v. Stagner, 781 F.2d 758, 763 (9th Cir.1986); Brown v. Wolf, 706 F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir.1983).


Ringrose contends that the continuances sought by his attorney were not valid because Ringrose intended to represent himself throughout the proceedings. That contention is not supported by the record. Upon his arrival in Oregon, Ringrose signed and filed a request for appointment of counsel. Subsequently, that attorney filed a motion for discovery, a motion for delay of trial, a request for an omnibus hearing, a motion to suppress, two motions in limine, a motion to produce written evidence and issued a subpoena. On each of these documents, the attorney represented that he was acting as counsel for Ringrose. Finally, a different attorney from the same firm represented Ringrose at trial.


Ringrose nevertheless complains that additional discovery would support his claim that he was proceeding pro se. Ringrose did not, however, formally move for additional time or discovery. See Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1986) (failure to formally move for additional discovery is a proper ground for denial). Even if he had so moved, the district court would not have abused its discretion in denying such a motion. The record shows that (1) Ringrose requested appointed counsel; (2) counsel filed numerous motions on Ringrose's behalf including continuances; and (3) counsel appeared at Ringrose's trial and represented him without objection. Whatever evidence Ringrose could produce to show that he sought to represent himself would not be sufficient to prove that he was not in fact represented by counsel.


Finally, Ringrose argues that the record does not show that the continuances were sought in "open court." The record, indicates, however, that the state court granted the motions for continuances during its daily call following defense counsel's oral requests.



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The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for submission on the record and briefs and without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4


This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3