Hines v. Garrett’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

322 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 325 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “there is no genuine issue as to material fact and [ ] the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

   58 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 75 So. 3d 544 - Matte v. Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. · 212 So. 3d 6 - Kasem v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

2. “(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, motion, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.”

   19 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 182 So. 3d 1093 - Estate of Belaire v. Crawfish Town USA · 186 So. 3d 230 - Spanish Lake Restoration, LLC v. Petrodome St. Gabriel II, LLC

3. “[I]t was not plaintiff's burden to prove that Smith [the defendant] was driving the car, but rather that either he or someone authorized by him was doing so. To establish this fact plaintiff introduced eye witness testimony that the car involved in the rear-end collision was an old, maroon Oldsmobile, bearing a license plate number which identified Smith as the owner of such a vehicle. These facts are clearly sufficient to establish as more probable than not the reasonable inference that Smith or someone authorized by him was driving the car at the time of the accident.... On this prima facie showing, it was then incumbent upon Imperial to go forward with evidence to refute the above inference. It attempted to do so by introducing Smith's assertion that his vehicle had been stolen on the night in question and therefore that neither he nor anyone authorized by him was driving the car when the accident occurred. Unfortunately for Imperial, the trier of fact did not find Smith's version of events credible. There being no other evidence to refute plaintiff's showing that more probably than not Smith or someone with his permission was the driver, judgment was properly entered in plaintiff's favor on the liability [Citation omitted.] "The purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 892 So. 2d 62 - Stortz v. Waguespack · 246 So. 3d 15 - Colson v. Colfax Treating Co.