¶1concurring.
¶2I agree with the majority that a valid consent to search occurred, and therefore the trial court properly refused to suppress the contraband here. I write, however, to emphasize that our decision does not rest upon the State’s argument that exigent circumstances justified Appellant’s arrest and search here.
¶3To prove exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest and search, the State must meet a three pronged test: (1) that the police had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there was an immediate need for action to protect life or property; (2) that the police were not ’primarily motivated by a desire to arrest a person or seize evidence; and (3) that a reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, existed to associate the emergency with the area searched or person arrested. Janicek v. State, 634 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Foster v. State, 767 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref.). Here, the INS agents themselves created the exigent circumstance by alerting Appellant of his imminent arrest. Thus, the second prong of the exigent circumstance test failed as a matter of law. The situation here, manufactured solely to evade the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, cannot justify a warrantless search or arrest. Nothing here prevented the agents from first obtaining a warrant, then doing what they felt was reasonably necessary to safely execute it.
¶4Nevertheless, I believe the trial court’s ruling is sustainable because Appellant voluntarily and knowingly consented to this search. I concur with the majority.