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← 877 F.2d 210 - United States v. Kiszewski

United States v. Kiszewski’s Empirical Analysis

877 F.2d 210 · 1989

Citation profile

94
cited by 94 later decisions
7
states following
November 2021
most recently cited

45 federal appellate · 5 district · 10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 94 later decisions — most recently November 2021 · most notably United States v. Torres (1990), United States v. Williamson (1995)

45 federal appellate · 5 district · 10 state decisions

56019891990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1623 · 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974) · 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974) · 18 U.S.C. § 894

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Bagley · United States v. Agurs · Giglio v. United States · Napue v. People of the State of Illinois

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Materiality is thus demonstrated if the question posed is such that a truthful answer could help the inquiry, or a false response hinder it, and these effects are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than probability. Thus, in applying this gauge to specific situations, it is only the question, at the time of its asking, which is considered. It is of no consequence that the information sought would be merely cumulative * * *, that the response was believed by the grand jury to be perjurious at the time it was uttered * * * or that the matters inquired into were collateral to the principal objective of the grand jury. * * * “ * * * The grand jury’s mandate was to probe a scheme to deprive various individuals of their civil rights. By denying that he had confided in others that he had been entreated to join in this illicit effort, [Berardi] potentially hampered the investigation in several significant ways. Through his disclaimer, [Berardi] created the false impression that he was ignorant, unaware or untouched by the scheme and thereby deprived the grand jury of the benefit of his knowledge of the plot. It is a truism that questions aimed directly at a witness’ [sic] knowledge or awareness of the principal matter under investigation are material. * * * [T]he false declarations could have frustrated the inquiry by casting doubt upon the credibility of other witnesses who had attested both to Berardi’s assertions of having been solicited for the scheme and to matters bearing”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “in Richter, the prosecutor asked the defendant, on cross-examination, to state whether the FBI agent lied on the stand. Then, the prosecutor called a second FBI witness to corroborate the first agent's story, and misquoted the defendant's testimony in summation.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “[P]erjury strikes at the heart of the integrity of the judicial system. . . .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.