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← 877 F.2d 594 - Crippin Pie Nationwide Inc

Crippin Pie Nationwide Inc’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16
cited by 16 later decisions
July 2015
most recently cited

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently July 2015

701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on In Re Lawrence N. Jolly, Debtor. Chattanooga Memorial Park v. C. Kenneth Still, Chapter Xiii Trustee · Pacific Express, Inc. v. Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. · White Motor Corp. v. Nashville White Trucks, Inc. (In Re Nashville White Trucks, Inc.) · Bankers Trust Co. v. Gibbons · Schnabel Serrano

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We think, however, that it was error to treat the SIP as. simply a contract to buy and sell stock. Instead, the SIP is a part of PIE’s compensation system, and thus an integral part of the entire employment relationship.... Although the courts below thought that PIE was required to invest the 15 percent the SIP participants gave up in PIE stock ... the stock’s value bears no direct relationship to the value of wages the employees give. Also, when the SIP participants agreed to reduce their wages, they also agreed to reduce their wage-based fringe benefits — including incentive compensation, vacation and holiday pay, and short-term disability benefits — because PIE based those benefits on the participants’ reduced wages, not on the wages they would have received if they had elected not to participate in the SIP. These facts indicate that the wage reduction really was a wage reduction and not simply part of a contract to purchase stock through payroll deductions. In other words, the SIP was an alternative form of compensation to straight wages. Bruce and Crippin could not reject the SIP while accepting the other benefits their reemployment provided them.... When a debtor rejects a contract he rejects his obligation to perform under the contract and to receive benefits that go along with that performance.... But at the time Bruce and Crippin elected to participate in the SIP, they had to choose how they wanted PIE to compensate them for their work: by not joining the SIP, they c”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “2. Given our disposition of the case, we need not reach PIE’s [debtors’ employer’s] contention that the SIP [employee stock investment program] is a spendthrift trust under Illinois law and therefore not part of Bruce’s and Crippin’s bankruptcy estates. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) (making non-bankruptcy law restrictions on the transfer of beneficial interests enforceable in bankruptcy cases).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We must decide whether Bruce and Crip-pin [Chapter 13 debtors] could reject their participation in the SIP as an exec-utory contract and force PIE [employer] to restore their wages to pre-reduction levels.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.