878 F2d 386 Lastimosa v. Hughes Aircraft Company
878 F.2d 386
131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3072
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Catalino LASTIMOSA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Jack Curtis, Defendents-Appellees.
No. 86-5899.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted*Oct. 18, 1988.
Decided June 22, 1989.
Before TANG, FARRIS*** and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM***
This case is back before us on remand from the Supreme Court, which vacated our prior decision and instructed us to reconsider in the light of Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988). The facts are set out in our original disposition. There we affirmed the district court's actions removing Lastimosa's state tort action to federal court and dismissing it as preempted by Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. We identified several grounds for our decision including the fact that Lastimosa's claim substantially depended on analysis of the terms of the labor contract; the fact that the state laws were not independent of the employment relation; the fact that the state action provided no more protection than the labor contract; and the public policy of favoring arbitration procedures in the labor area. While some of the latter grounds may no longer be a sound basis for Sec. 301 preemption under Lingle, the first ground meets precisely the test for preemption set out by the Supreme Court. Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1881.
The mere fact that Lastimosa's complaint may set out a claim that does not depend explicitly on the analysis of the collective bargaining agreement does not prevent the district judge, or this court, from looking beyond the complaint to determine whether the claim can actually be resolved without reference to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.1988). The record in the district court makes it abundantly clear that the gravamen of Lastimosa's claim was that he was discharged in violation of the safety provisions written into the collective bargaining contract.
On remand, Lastimosa argues, as he did before the district court, that he was discharged in retaliation for his filing of a complaint with CAL-OSHA. This case was decided on summary judgment, however, and Lastimosa produced no evidence to support a contention that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a complaint. All of the evidence indicated that Lastimosa was discharged because he insisted upon wearing a safety mask at work, when Hughes had determined that none was necessary. In deposition testimony Lastimosa himself conceded that his complaint was not based on retaliation.
The district court correctly interpreted Lastimosa's claim as one for discharge in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The claim was properly dismissed as preempted, and that result is entirely consistent with Lingle.
AFFIRMED.