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← 878 F.2d 883 - Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio

Small Engine Shop, Inc. v. Cascio’s Empirical Analysis

878 F.2d 883 · 1989

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
3
states following
August 2016
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently August 2016 · most notably Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos (In Re Charter Crude Oil Co.) (1991), In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. (1993)

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions

2001989199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. · Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill · Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority · Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. · Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A. The failure to notify any lienholder or other interested person having an interest in the property shall not affect the rights of the seizing creditor nor invalidate the sheriff's sale; nor shall any lien, privilege, or other encumbrance that is inferior to the rank of the lien of the seizing creditor affect the property after the sheriff's adjudication. The exclusive remedy for any person affected by the provisions of this Subsection shall be to institute a claim by summary pleadings, within one year from the date of the sheriff's adjudication, proving that he has been damaged by the failure to notify him. In connection with any such claim, the court shall consider and the person claiming damages shall have the burden of proving all of the following: (1) That his name and address were reasonably ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence. (2) That he lacked actual knowledge of the seizure. (3) The respective ranking and amounts of all liens, privileges, and other encumbrances affecting the property as of the date of the sheriff's adjudication. (4) The value of such respective rights. (5) The value of the property as of the date of the sheriff's adjudication. (6) The respective positions the parties would have occupied had the required notice been given. (7) His ability and capacity to have obtained funds to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale had the required notice been given. (8) That in such circumstances he would have bid on the property in s”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the district court, simply concerns Louisiana’s allocation of the burden of pre-deprivation actual notice in foreclosure actions. Unlike the statutes in Locke and Short, [the Louisiana statute] does not represent a direct attempt, predicated on state interests relating to land use, to condition the continued retention of property rights in Louisiana. The Louisiana statute, under the district court’s reading, simply purports to address the process that is one’s due when an external event — default — draws into question the continued retention of one’s property right. In Locke and Short, the event bearing on the continued retention of a property interest had its genesis in the content of the legislative enactment, and the enactment of the substantive regulation afforded all the process that was due in those cases.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “gives property owners, whose identities a reasonably diligent, responsible state actor could not reasonably ascertain, the opportunity to request such notice and thereby become ascertainable.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.