Sullens v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “11 Then, the Use Note correctly concludes:”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 42 So. 3d 138 - ALL v. State · 879 So. 2d 594 - Harrison v. State

2. “"(1) Intentionally. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, when his purpose is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct. "(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists. "(3) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication, as defined in subdivision (e)(2) of Section 13A-3-2, acts recklessly with respect thereto. "(4) Criminal Negligence. A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance which is defined by statute as an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would obse”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Danner v. State · 879 So. 2d 594 - Harrison v. State

3. “"`Failure to charge an offense is the kind of defect involved in due process of law and it cannot be waived. Nelson v. State, 50 Ala.App. 285 , 278 So.2d 734 (1973). Although the law does not compel a "ritual of words" in an indictment, "[t]he omission of an element of the crime, however, is not a mere formality that may be waived." United States v. Purvis, 580 F.2d 853, 857, 858 , rehearing denied, 585 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 , 99 S.Ct. 1229 , 59 L.Ed.2d 463 (1979). "An indictment that fails to allege each material element of an offense fails to charge that offense." United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir.1977). "Failure to charge specific intent is but a particular aspect of the failure to charge an offense." Purvis, 580 F.2d at 858 . "`A defect in the indictment associated with an essential element of the offense which leaves the accused unaware of the nature and cause of the charge cannot be waived. Crews v. State, 374 So.2d 436, 442-43 (Ala.Crim.App.1979); Andrews v. State, 344 So.2d 533, 534-35 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 538 (Ala.1977). Where an indictment is void and does not charge an offense, this Court is bound to take notice of such a defect even in the absence of an objection. Edwards v. State, 379 So.2d 336, 338 (Ala.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied, 379 So.2d 339 (Ala.1980).' "` The fact that the indictment refers to its statutory source cannot save it from being fatally deficient. The rule is that "the indictme”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. A.L.L. v. State · 42 So. 3d 146 - ALL v. State