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← 879 F.2d 359 - Cotter v. Bowen

Cotter v. Bowen’s Empirical Analysis

879 F.2d 359 · 1989

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
November 2011
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 4 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2011 · most notably Gisbrecht v. Barnhart (2002), 78 F. Supp. 2d 944 - McDannel v. Apfel (1999)

4 federal appellate · 4 district ·

2201989199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2412 · 42 U.S.C. § 406 (§ 206 of the Social Security Act of 1935)

Relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart · Blum v. Stenson · Pierce v. Underwood · Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. · Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The EAJA provides that attorney’s fees “shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,” but “shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A)(ii). In allowing fees at a rate in excess of the $75 cap (adjusted for inflation), the District Court relied upon some circumstances that arguably come within the single example of a “special factor” described in the statute, “the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “We agree with our sister circuits that [Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 , 107 S.Ct. 3078 , 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987)] Delaware Valley IFs holding concerning contingency enhancements under the Clean Air Act should not be mechanically applied to Social Security fee determinations. While the ‘rebuttable presumption’ and traditional “lodestar” approaches may in the end result in much the same “reasonable fee.” we find the lodestar approach more consistent with the statutory mandate of a reasonable fee with 25% of past-due benefits representing the maximum, as opposed to the standard, attorney’s fee.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions: (3) the skill requisite, to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.