879 So. 2d 594 - Harrison v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`When the trial court has required a party to state reasons for the strikes, that party must articulate reasons that are clear, specific, and legitimate, that relate to the particular case, and that are nondiscriminatory. Ex parte Bird , 594 So. 2d 676 , 679 (Ala. 1991); Carter v. State , 603 So. 2d 1137 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Adkins v. State , 639 So. 2d 515 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), aff'd, 639 So. 2d 522 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 851 , 115 S. Ct. 151 , 130 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1994). After race-neutral reasons have been articulated, the moving party can offer evidence showing that those reasons are really a sham or pretext. Ex parte Branch , 526 So. 2d 609 , 625 . On appeal, the trial court's ruling *Page 19 on the question whether the responding party offered legitimate race-neutral reasons will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. K.S. v. Carr , 618 So. 2d 707 , 710 (Ala. 1993), citing Ex parte Branch , 526 So. 2d at 622 .' " Ex parte Brooks , 695 So. 2d 184 , 190 (Ala. 1997). "Defense counsel stated that she had struck veniremembers 8 and 9 because they allegedly had been laughing and talking and had not been attentive while she asked questions during the voir dire proceedings. However, the trial court indicated that it had watched the entire venire during the voir dire proceedings. Apparently, it did not observe the conduct about which counsel complained because it told counsel she should have brought any such conduct to his attention. `The trial court is in ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 78 So. 3d 458 - Craig Newton v. State of Alabama.

2. “"(1) Intentionally. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, when his purpose is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct. "(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance exists. "(3) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication, as defined in subdivision (e)(2) of Section 13A-3-2, acts recklessly with respect thereto. "(4) Criminal Negligence. A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance which is defined by statute as an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would obse”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 917 So. 2d 159 - Scott v. State

3. “"In Ex parte Edwards, 816 So.2d 98 (Ala.2001), the Alabama Supreme Court faced the task of determining what mental state is required to commit the offense of vehicular homicide, as set forth in § 32-5A-192, Ala.Code 1975. Section 32-5A-192(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: "`Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle, or vessel, as defined in Section 33-5-3, or to the regulation of traffic or boating, shall be guilty of homicide when the violation is the proximate cause of the death.' "(Emphasis added.) The supreme court determined the following: "`We conclude that the trial court's initial reservations about tying the requisite mental state to the word "unlawfully" were sound. We endorse the "Use Note on Mens Rea Element" that accompanies the Alabama pattern jury instruction applicable to § 32-5A-192; that note states that "unintentional" is not defined in the Code but that the committee drafting the instruction assumes that word to refer to all forms of mens rea except that described by the word "intentional." The Use Note then refers to the previously referenced defined terms governing mens rea elements — "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "criminal negligence."11 Then, the Use Note correctly concludes: "`"The judge should insert the appropriate mens rea element considering the indictment and the”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 917 So. 2d 159 - Scott v. State