Hawes v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 108 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 111 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is not enough that it may not clearly appear the ruling below was right, or that we, acting as a court of original jurisdiction, would have hesitated to have decided as the primary court has decided, but we must see, and see clearly, that its action was wrong.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 22 Ala. App. 214 - Gordon v. State · 537 So. 2d 59 - Tucker v. State

2. ““The law presumes innocence of crime in all cases until the contrary is shown. But we know of no principle upon which to this general presumption of innocence, other presumptions, depending on the relations which the alleged criminal bore to the victims of the crime, could be added. If a man, in addition to the general presumption, is entitled to further protect himself from punishment by a presumption of affection for his daughter, we see no reason why the principle may not be extended to other relatives indefinitely, and to his friends, and even to mankind at large, upon evidence of his kindly and affectionate disposition, or relations general and special, thus multiplying the issues without limit, and confusing the jury. Such is not the law. The presumption is single, and the same in all cases, and in all must be overturned by evidence which excludes every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. Beyond this, whatever the relations of the alleged author and the victim of the act charged, the prosecution need not go. * * *””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Bruner

3. “It is . . . well established law that an interpreter, intermediary, agent, or clerk of an attorney, through whom communications between attorney and client are made, stands upon the same footing as his principal, and will not be allowed to divulge any fact coming to his knowledge as the conduit of information between them. But the rule extends no further than this. . . . The privilege, in other words, is confined to communications between the attorney and his client; and extends to the necessary organs by which such communications are made, but no further.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 632 So. 2d 547 - Grimsley v. State