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88 Ala. 390

Ross v. Goodwin

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided November 15, 1889

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1889-11-15

Tried before the Hon. Leroy F. Box. This action was brought by Thomas J. Goodwin and others, against Thomas Strong, to recover the possession of a tract of land described as the “N. E. quarter of section 18, township 17, range 10;” and was commenced on the 21st July, 1887.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Continuity is an essential element of an adverse holding, such as can ripen into a title. Different entries, at different times, by different persons, between whom there is no privity of estate, nor connected claim of rightful holding, are but a succession of trespasses, and neither can furnish any support to the other.” Ross v. Goodwin, 88 Ala. 390 , 6 South. 682 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Little v. Vice

Relies on McArthur v. Carrie's Adm'r · Riggs v. Fuller · Woodstock Iron Co. v. Roberts

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1889-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently April 1942

8 state decisions

301889189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

STONE, C. J.

¶1Continuity is an essential element of an adverse holding, such as can ripen into a title. Different entries, at different times, by different persons, between whom there is no privity of estate, nor connected claim of rightful holding, are but a succession of trespasses, and neither can furnish any support to the other. — Riggs v. *396Fuller, 54 Ala. 141; Bell v. Denson, 56 Ala. 444; Ladd v. Dubroca, 61 Ala. 25. Nor can it vary the principle, if the same person perpetrate several, separate tortious takings and holdings, if no one of them is long enough to amount to a bar, provided he permit some other wrongdoer to interlace his holdings with an actual possession in independent right. Such permitted adverse holding breaks his continuity of possession, and prevents it, no matter how adverse its character or assertion, from ripening into a title. The Circuit Court did not err in any of the affirmative charges given.

¶2There is nothing in the contention, that the claim of plaintiffs was barred by the lapse of twenty years. That presumption rests on the theory, that a meritorious claim will not be suffered to lie dormant, or unasserted, for twenty years. To raise it, there must be continued, unchanged status, without acknowledgment, express or implied, that a liability or trust exists, or that the apparent is not the real status. To raise it, there must have been continuity, the same as is required to perfect the statutory bar. It is not raised until there have been twenty continuous years, during every moment of which time the right could have been asserted, for the destruction of which the presumption is invoked. A hundred disconnected trespasses on the lands of another, by different trespassers, and running through any number of years, if no one of them, of itself, was of sufficient duration to perfect a bar, could not impair the title of the rightful owner. — McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala. 75; Fleming v. Gilmer, 35 Ala. 62; Austin v. Jordan, Ib. 642; McCartney v. Bone, 40 Ala. 533; Tayloe v. Dugger, 56 Ala. 444; Philippi v. Philippi, 61 Ala. 41; Solomon v. Solomon, 76 Ala. 505.

¶3There was no error in the rulings on the admission of testimony.— Woodstock Iron Co. v. Roberts, 87 Ala. 436; s. c., 6 So. Rep. 349.

¶4Affirmed.

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