Volume 88 — Connecticut Reports

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in' a trial to the jury before Bennett, J., from which judgment he appealed.

<p>A public beach may consist of the shore between high and low-water mark, or of a strip of the shore lying above high-water, which, by dedication or abandonment, has become a public beach.</p> <p>The title to that part of the beach below high-water is in the State as the representative of the public, and can be conveyed by the General Assembly as such representative.</p> <p>The grant to the early proprietors conveyed only to high-water. Such portion of the land covered by the grant as was not alloted to individuals, upon abandonment by the proprietors became common and undivided land open to the use of the general public, with the title thereto in the State, as the proper representative and guardian of such interest, and this title may be transferred or conveyed by Act of the General Assembly.</p> <p>A Special Act of 1907 (p. 574) provided that “any common or undivided lands situated within the town of Westport, that may have formerly belonged to the town of Fairfield or to the proprietors therein, shall belong to and be under the control of the town of Westport.” Held that this Act did not convey the beach below high-water, but did convey that part of the beach above high-water which had been abandoned by the proprietors and become common and undivided land; and that prior to its passage Westport had no title to or control of this part of the beach.</p> <p>Prior to 1907 Westport assumed authority over this beach and authorized the issuance of permits by its officials to occupy lots thereon upon compliance with certain conditions. In 1905 or 1906 the plaintiff, under a permit of occupancy for a year, given by one of the selectmen, and upon payment of a license fee, built a bathhouse upon a part of the beach above high-water, and thereafter continued to occupy it with the knowledge of the town, notwithstanding the year had long since expired. The conditions for the issuance of this license were not complied with by the town officials. The town in May, 1909, pursuant to its vote, by publication and by one- of its selectmen, gave the plaintiff notice to remove his bath-house, and in the following August the selectmen, the defendants, pursuant to said vote, removed it and its contents, doing no unnecessary injury to them. Held that the license to the plaintiff was revocable notwithstanding his expenditure made in reliance thereon; that his occupancy was, under the circumstances of the case, under color of right; that a revocation of his license could not be had except upon reasonable notice and after a reasonable opportunity to remove his property; that the relation between the plaintiff and the town was not that of landlord and tenant, and hence he was not entitled to the statutory notice to quit; and that the notice and opportunity given him to remove the bath-house was reasonable.</p> <p>An occupancy of land begun with permission of the owner and continued, after the permit has expired, with his knowledge, is under color of right, but the permit or license is revocable notwithstanding an expenditure has been made in reliance upon its continuance; such licensee is entitled, however, to a reasonable opportunity to remove his property before the revocation can become effective.</p> <p>An appellant will not be permitted to seize upon the inadequacy of the finding respecting some fact underlying a claim of law which was not contested upon the trial nor assigned as a ground of error; and this is especially true when the memorandum of decision renders it clear to the appellant that had the fact omitted from the finding been supplied, it would have been found adversely to him.</p> <p>A mere licensee is not entitled to the statutory notice to quit which must be given by a landlord to his tenant.</p>

<p>A verdict ought not to be directed unless there is but one inference or conclusion which can be drawn logically and reasonably from the evidence before the jury.</p> <p>In the present case the plaintiff, an employee of the defendants, while drilling a rock at the bottom of a sewer trench, was injured by the caving in of one side of the trench owing to its inadequate bracing.</p> <p>The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants upon the ground that the plaintiff had as much knowledge of the danger as his employers had, and that his continuance at work with such knowledge and appreciation of the risk prevented him from taking advantage of his masters’ breach of duty. Held that inasmuch as the basis for this direction was an erroneous assumption of fact upon the part of the trial court as to what the evidence actually tended to prove, the direction itself was erroneous and was prejudicial to the plaintiff.</p> <p>A risk which does not inhere in the contract of service, but arises subsequent thereto by reason of the master’s negligence, is an extraordinary one, which the servant does not assume unless he comprehended it and voluntarily encountered it by continuing in the work without promise of remedy.</p> <p>The question whether a servant did or did not assume a risk created by the master’s negligence depends, as a rule, upon the existence of many other facts and circumstances and the proper inferences to be drawn from them, and only becomes a question of law when the evidence is such that but one logical and reasonable conclusion therefrom is permissible.</p> <p>For a master to avail himself of the servant’s assumption of an extraordinary risk he must plead it, since it is an affirmative defense.</p> <p>All the risk of the service not arising from a violation of the master’s legal duty, the servant by his contract of employment takes upon himself. For such risk of service the master incurs no liability, not because the servant has assumed the risk, but because the master owes no duty in reference to it.</p> <p>An unsuccessful plaintiff cannot urge in this court a ground of negligence which was not alleged in his complaint.</p> <p>An allegation that a ditch was fifteen feet deep, and proof that it was from five to nine feet deep, is a mere trifling variance.</p> <p>There is no material variance between an allegation that the caving in of a ditch was due to a lack of bracing, and proof that it was caused by inadequate bracing.</p>

<p>Action to recover damages for breach of contract to accept and pay for certain patterns to be manufactured and shipped by the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Tuttle,./.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for 8895, from which the defendant appealed.</p>

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Sidney P. Ensign of Salisbury, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Curtis, J., for the advice of this court. Sidney P. Ensign, late of Salisbury, died July 24th, 1896, leaving both real and personal estate and a will duly probated.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the chauffeur of the defendant in the management of her automobile in violation of the law of the road, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and tried to the jury before Curtis, J.; verdict and judgment .for the plaintiff for $3,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action by a wife against her husband to recover damages for causing her to be committed to and detained in a hospital for the insane, although she was alleged to be sane, and for an assault and battery, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County where the defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground of coverture; the court, Williams, J., sustained the demurrer and afterward rendered judgment (Holcomb, J.) for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover the contract price for furnishing and installing twenty-four furnaces in the defendant’s tenement houses, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $978, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to restrain the defendants from removing sand and gravel from Round Hill, so-called, in the plaintiff town, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Holcomb, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant Riley.

Action to recover a sum of money paid upon a contract for the purchase of real estate, because of the alleged failure of the defendant to make a good title thereto, brought to and tried by the City Court of Hartford, Bullard, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $311, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury-before Tuttle, J., and from the refusal of the trial court to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by tbe plaintiff from an order of tbe Court of Probate for the district of East Windsor approving and confirming the appointment of the defendant Latham as trustee in insolvency of the estate of the defendant Talcott, taken to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the reasons of appeal was overruled (Holcomb, J.) and, after answer, a demurrer thereto was sustained (Case, J.), and no amendment of the answer having been filed, judgment was rendered…

Action to recover the amount of a tax, brought to the City Court of Hartford where a demurrer to the original answer was sustained and a second or special defense of the amended answer stricken out, after which the cause was tried on the issues raised by the first defense and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $439 (Bullard, ./.), from which the defendant appealed.

<p>Action to foreclose a lien to secure an assessment of ' benefits for a local public improvement, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained {Smith, J.) and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Tuttle, J., from which judgment he appealed. The plaintiff was the only witness as to the facts surrounding the accident.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of John W. Harms of Stamford, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Bennett, J., upon the facts alleged in the pleadings, for the advice of this court. John W. Harms, late of Stamford, died October 3d, 1884, leaving a will, duly probated, made about three years earlier, and both real and personal estate.

<p>Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Waterbury approving and admitting to probate a certain written instrument as the last will of Agnes Dick Munson of Waterbury, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, sustaining the will, and appeal by the plaintiffs.</p>

Action for money loaned, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the defendant’s executrix, who had been cited in after the defendant’s death, moved that the attachment of the defendant’s real estate be dissolved, that the action be abated and the cause erased from the docket, because the decedent’s estate was insolvent and in settlement as an insolvent estate in the Court of Probate, and no judgment had been rendered against the original defendant during his…

<p>Action to recover an alleged balance due for shingles sold to the defendant, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $440, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Action to recover, as damages, moneys advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant’s testator upon his alleged oral promise to leave her all his property, consisting of real estate, at his death, which he failed to do, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $7,494, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>To render a former judgment between the same parties conclusive, it must appear that the particular matters urged as res adjudícala were necessarily tried and determined in that action; that is, that their consideration and decision were essential to the judgment as rendered therein.</p> <p>In an earlier action between the present litigants, the Brass Company had sought, but unsuccessfully, to recover damages from Wilson for the alleged wrongful cancellation by him of certain fire insurance policies, and for refusing to disclose the names of the insurance companies which had issued the policies, in consequence of which the Brass Company was unable, as it alleged, to recover its loss after a fire had destroyed its property. Judgment in that action was rendered in favor of Wilson, and it appeared from the finding of facts made for the purposes of an appeal, and from the memorandum of decision, that the grounds of the judgment were, first, that the policies claimed to have been wrongfully cancelled by Wilson had not been cancelled; second, that the Brass Company had not been prevented, by Wilson’s refusal to disclose the names of the insurance companies, from making its proofs of loss; and third, that the policies had become void by reason of a mortgage which the Brass Company had placed upon the property, after its insurance, without notice to the insurers. In the present case the plaintiff, Wilson, sought to recover a balance of $623, claimed to be duo him for fire insurance premiums paid out in behalf of the defendant, the Cheshire Brass Company, seven months or more before the time of his alleged wrongful cancellation of the insurance policies. In its defense the Brass Company pleaded that the alleged balance had been reduced by the agreed cancellation of certain fire insurance policies and the application of the refunded premiums, and that the remainder of the account had been assumed as a liability by the president of the Brass Company with the assent of Wilson; and that these matters had been considered and determined in the Brass Company’s favor in the earlier action. The reply of Wilson denied the alleged reduction of the account and the novation, admitted the judgment in the earlier action, but denied that it had decided the matters urged by the Brass Company in its defense. Held:—</p> <p>1. That the issues raised in the present case were in nowise essential to, or involved in, the decision of the matters presented in the earlier action, and therefore the judgment rendered therein was not a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.</p> <p>2. That the present issues, if considered in the former action, had apparently been decided in favor of Wilson and not of the Brass Company.</p> <p>A statement in the judgment-file to the effect that “the issues” are found for the plaintiff or defendant, implies, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that all the issues were so found.</p> <p>In case of an inconsistency between the statements of the finding and those of the draft-finding respecting any particular matter, it is the duty of the appellant to request a correction to be made by the trial judge and to secure such a correction.</p> <p>The statements of the trial judge in the finding signed by him are to be treated as his finding respecting questions of fact, in the absence of anything elsewhere in the record to indicate the contrary.</p>

Action to restrain the defendant from maintaining an open terminal of its storm or surface-water sewer just above the premises of the plaintiff, and for damages to his land, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Gager, Jthe court directed a verdict for the defendant, from the judgment upon which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for refusal to accept and pay for certain carloads of oats, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, Associate-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $393, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Hartford approving and admitting to probate the will of Pietro A. Laraia of Hartford, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Case, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, sustaining the will, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Under General Statutes, § 819, a writ of error for errors in matters of law only, is limited to judgments rendered by the “courts” therein specified, and therefore does not lie to review a decision of a “judge” as to the legality of the vote of the electors of a city upon the liquor-license question pursuant to authority conferred upon him by chapter 152 of the Public Acts of 1909.</p> <p>That Act declared that the decision of the judge upon such questions should be “conclusive.” Held that as thus used “conclusive” meant final, and therefore precluded a review of the decision by a writ of error as well as by an appeal.</p> <p>Such decision is final as to all matters confided by the Act to the determination of the judge, upon which the parties were heard or had tñe opportunity to be heard.</p> <p>A transcript of the evidence has no place in a writ of error brought to this court to'review errors of law in the judgment of the court below; and if incorporated therein is of no avail to the plaintiff in error. Any facts essential to a proper understanding of the issues determined and of the alleged errors which it is desired to have reviewed, must appear either in the judgment-file (§ 763), or in a finding which is made part of the record pursuant to § 759.</p> <p>The memorandum of decision cannot, upon a writ of error, be treated as a finding.</p> <p>In hearing and determining any judicial matter confided to him,'a judge exercises a judicial function.</p> <p>The judgment rendered should be embodied in the judgment-file duly drawn up and recorded.</p> <p>A judgment is rendered when the decision is announced officially, either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk.</p> <p>A writ of error lies from final judgments only.</p> <p>A writ of error may raise questions (1) arising from interlocutory rulings upon pleadings, (2) relating to jurisdiction, and (3) those designed to show whether the adjudication made was, in law, both within the issues raised and within those determined.</p>

Information for an indecent assault, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

<p>Negligence involves the existence of a primary right in3the plaintiff and its invasion by a wrongful act of the defendant.</p> <p>Prima facie, at least, a landlord is not liable for personal injuries sustained by one of his tenants from a fall upon a patch of ice upon the sidewalk in front of the tenement, which he, pursuant to a local ordinance, was attempting to remove, merely because such ice had formed from water which was permitted to drip or flow from the roof of the porch over the entrance to the building directly to the sidewalk, without the intervention of an.y conductor or similar device to carry it off.</p> <p>In the present case the plaintiff tenant claimed that the defendant landlord was under a duty to travelers on the highway and that he had violated such duty. Held that inasmuch as the tenant himself was obviously not a traveler upon the highway while he was engaged in cleaning the sidewalk, there was no occasion to pass upon the soundness of his contention in this particular.</p> <p>The tenant also urged that the sidewalk was in reality the common approach to the building, and that the landlord was bound to keep it in repair. Held that this contention, also, was inapplicable, for several reasons, to the situation as disclosed by the facts alleged. Special conditions creating a liability upon the part of a landlord, where, prima facie, none exists, must be alleged in the complaint.</p> <p>One who hires a tenement in a house the front porch of which obviously has no conductor or other device to carry off such water or melting snow as may fall thereon, assumes the risk arising from the lack of such an instrumentality.</p> <p>Under an ordinary lease there is no implied warranty that the premises are in a safe condition and reasonably fit for use; and much less is there any implied undertaking by the landlord that no accident shall thereafter befall the tenant from external forces or causes.</p>

Action in the nature of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective claimants in and to certain savings-bank deposits, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Curtis, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the defendants I. Burton Miller and Charles B. Miller, from which the plaintiffs and the defendant Nettie Miller Kirschner appealed.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty as charged, and appeal by the accused. The defendant and James Plew were jointly indicted for murder in the first degree, the charge being that they wilfully, deliberately and maliciously killed the defendant’s husband, William O. Wakefield, by shooting, stabbing and strangling him.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court 'in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty as charged, and appeal by the accused.

Application by a receiver of the defendant company for advice in the discharge of his official duties,! and especially as to the validity of claims of set-off made by certain debtors who were also depositors in one or more of the banking departments conducted by the defendant company, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New London County, Greene, J., upon an agreed finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the accused pleaded guilty and requested the court (Bur-pee, J.) to examine witnesses and determine… Held: the court found that the accused was guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentenced him to death, from which judgment he appealed.

Application to this court for an order directing the Hon. William L. Bennett, a judge of the Superior Court, to certify to this court a portion of the transcript of the evidence and rulings upon the trial presided over by him of a cause tried to a jury in the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and now pending in this court on appeal.

<p>Suit to secure the cancellation of a deed of real estate owned by the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been secured by the defendant by means of coercion and undue influence, and for $25,000 damages, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Case, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, setting aside said deed, from which the defendant appealed.</p>

<p>Action to recover one half of the cost of constructing and repairing a wall between the properties of the respective parties, brought to the Town Court of Norwalk and tried to the jury before Wilder, J.; after the plaintiff had been nonsuited as to the defendant Carrie A. Lockwood, a verdict was rendered for the other defendant, from the judgment upon which the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The plaintiff in this action against mother and son seeks to recover one half the cost of the construction of a division wall. The complaint is in two counts. Each alleges that the plaintiff and the defendant Carrie A. Lockwood were the owners, respectively, of adjoining properties, and that the division fence between them, about eight hundred feet in length, was insufficient. The first count relies upon an express promise made to one Keeney, the plaintiff’s agent; the second upon an implied promise. The third paragraph of the first count recites the express promise relied upon, and the circumstances attending i.t, as follows: “On said day the plaintiff, through his agent, Mr. Keeney, called upon the defendants, in relation to the construction of a new fence along the said portion of eight hundred feet, and to find out which part of the same should be constructed by the plaintiff, and which part by the defendants, and for the purpose of arranging to build a new fence along said boundary line, and was informed by the defendants that they did not know which portion of the same should be constructed by them, or which by the plaintiff, but if the plaintiff would fix the fence up, they would adjust the cost of the same later.” •</p> <p>The plaintiff’s evidence showed that the land, between which and the plaintiff’s the wall in question extends, was owned for about one third of the distance by the undivided estate of F. St. John Lockwood, deceased, and in charge of the defendant F. A. Lockwood, and for the remaining two thirds by the defendant Carrie A. Lockwood. Carrie A. Lockwood is the widow of F. St. John Lockwood, and F. A. Lockwood is one of his surviving children. The only evidence admitted or offered, tending to show any sort of agency on the part of F. A. Lockwood for his mother, was confined to his having filed tax lists with the assessors for her, made deposits in the bank for her, left her bank-book to be balanced, and, upon occasions during her absence from town, having drawn checks upon her account under a power of attorney authorizing him to do so.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s testimony was also to the following effect: In May, 1912, the plaintiff purchased his present property, then in a dilapidated condition, and thereupon made extensive improvements upon it, including filling and grading. This work was under the direction of Keeney as the plaintiff’s agent. As a part of the work, the plaintiff desired to replace a portion of the existing wall between his property and the adjacent Lockwood properties, which was an ordinary single stone wall broken down in places and insufficient as a division wall, with a new and better one, and repair the remaining portion. Keeney thereupon sought an interview with the defendant F. A. Lockwood, whereat, no third person being within hearing, there occurred, as he testified, what the third paragraph of the first count correctly and completely recites. There was no other conversation or communication between them upon the subject. Keeney forthwith caused the old wall to be removed along the land of the F. St. John Lockwood estate and for substantially one half the length of the Carrie A. Lockwood land, and replaced it with a new double stone wall and repaired the rest of the wall.</p> <p>F. A. Lockwood was fully aware of this work as it progressed.</p> <p>There was no evidence of any communication between any person and Carrie A. Lockwood with respect to the wall, or of any knowledge on her part of its reconstruction or repair.</p> <p>Upon the conclusion of the plaintiff’s, testimony a judgment of nonsuit was entered in favor of Carrie A. Lockwood, and the case proceeded against F. A. Lockwood. He flatly contradicted Keeney’s version of the interview with him, and denied that he made any promise to share in the payment for a new or reconstructed wall. He testified that the new fill and grading of the plaintiff’s property necessitated the construction of a new and different wall to serve as a bank wall, that •Keeney’s conversation with him consisted of the former’s inquiry if there was any objection to the plaintiff raising the wall, indicating particularly the portion where it was necessary to do so by reason of the depth of the fill, and to the plaintiff’s workmen going upon the Lockwood side to do the work, and of his response that he had no objection if the men would keep near the wall so as not to trample down the grass. He and other witnesses in his behalf testified that the old wall was a sufficient fence for farm purposes.</p> <p>The appeal assigned as errors the refusal of the court to set aside the judgment of nonsuit as to the defendant Carrie A. Lockwood; its refusal to set aside the verdict in favor of F. A. Lockwood, as being against the evidence; one passage in the court’s instructions to the jury; and two rulings upon the admission of testimony.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,300, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a carpenter in connection with the construction of a dam, the core wall of which was being built of concrete poured into wooden forms.

Action to recover damages for alleged false and fraudulent representations to the effect that a so-called corporation, of which the defendants claimed to be officers, had been fully organized and was competent to transact business, in reliance upon which the plaintiff was induced to loan it $1,696, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Gager, J facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant Russo appealed.

Suit to secure the cancellation of certain taxes assessed against the property of the plaintiff and the removal of the liens created thereby, and for other relief, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Greene, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

<p>A written expression of opinion by a captain respecting the fitness for promotion of a member of his company, and the probable effect of such promotion upon the company and the military service, made in response to a request from his superior officer, is upon its face a privileged communication, and can become actionable only upon proof that the statements therein contained were not only false and defamatory but were published with malice, that is, with an unjustifiable motive.</p> <p>In the present ease there was an entire absence of any evidence of malice, and therefore the action of the trial court in setting aside a verdict for the plaintiff was sustained.</p> <p>No finding of facts is required upon an appeal from the action of the trial court in setting aside a verdict as against the evidence. All that is necessary is a certification of the evidence, a copy of which must be provided for that purpose by the appellant at his own expense.</p>

Action to foreclose a judgment lien,, brought by appeal of the defendant from an adverse judgment of the Town Court of Norwalk to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Scott, J., upon demurrer to the answer and counterclaim of the defendant; the court sustained the demurrer and afterward rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $93.29, from which the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff’s intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of an automobile, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $2,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries . alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in allowing ice and snow to accumulate on a sidewalk whereby it was rendered unsafe for public use and travel, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Wilder, Acting-Judge; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,000, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Reuben Eaton of Kent, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Case, J'., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the advice of this court. Reuben Eaton died in 1889 leaving a will with two codicils duly probated, and also a widow and the four children named in the will, who were his only heirs at law.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Russell Eaton of Kent, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Case,./., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the advice of this court. Russell Eaton died March 23d, 1899, leaving a will, of which the plaintiff is executor, executed November 18th, 1891, and a codicil thereto executed March 1st, 1897, both duly probated.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a covenant of seizin in fee simple, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Middlesex County, Case, upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. Lucia A. Rand died in 1892, seized and possessed in fee simple of the real estate described in the complaint.

, upon a demurrer of the relator to the defendants’ return; the court overruled the demurrer, found the return sufficient, and, upon the declination of the relator to plead further, rendered judgment… Held: whereat a resolution, within the call, was passed repealing the action of the selectmen in discharging the relator and.appointing Casner, and directing the selectmen to reinstate the relator in the position he had held. The selectmen have refused to comply.

<p>A policy issued to the owner of an automobile to indemnify him against loss for bodily injuries accidentally inflicted upon others, provided that the insurer should not be liable while the automobile was driven by any person “under the age fixed by law” or under the age of sixteen in any event. Held that this clause had reference solely and exclusively to the minimum age (not less than sixteen) at which one might lawfully drive a motor-vehicle, and that inasmuch as § 5 of chapter 85 of the Public Acts of 1911 expressly permitted a person sixteen years old or more, although not licensed, to drive a motor-vehicle in this State if accompanied by a licensed operator, sixteen must be regarded as the minimum age fixed by law; and therefore the insurance company could not escape liability, under this proviso, for a loss sustained by the insured while his car was driven by an unlicensed person over sixteen, merely because of the non-observance, upon the occasion in question, of the statutory requirement that a licensed operator should accompany the unlicensed driver—a requirement which had no relevancy whatever to the age of the driver.</p> <p>No one can operate a motor-vehicle upon the highways of this State, under the provisions of the Act of 1911, who is less than sixteen years old. "</p>

Action to recover damages for ptomaine poisoning alleged to have been caused by unwholesome food furnished to the plaintiff by the defendants, as restaurant keepers, in violation of an implied warranty of its fitness, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $6,500, and appeal by the defendants.

<p>Under the Act of 1895 (12 Special Laws, pp. 412, 413) the district committee of the Center school district of Waterbury was empowered to select and purchase school sites, whenever so directed by the legal voters of the district, provided the cost thereof was within the amount appropriated by the voters therefor. In 1899 the limits of , ' Waterbury were extended to include the territory within the Center school district (13 Special Laws, p. 498), which was virtually abolished, a department of education was created under the control of a board of education, and to this board were granted entire charge and direction of all the public schools of the district, “and all other powers of boards of education, school committees, and school visitors in this State,” subject to the limitations of the Act. Held:—-</p> <p>1. That by abolishing the district and devolving the powers of its committee upon the board of education, in general terms, the legislature conferred the power to select and to purchase school sites upon the newly-created department of education, free from the control of any other municipal body, but in conformity, nevertheless, with the other provisions of the Act.</p> <p>2. That the board of education could not, under the Act of 1899, buy nor agree to buy a school site without first securing an appropriation therefor as required by §§ 92 and 93 of the revised charter (12 Special Laws, pp. 434, 459), although such appropriation might be for a specific site already designated by the board of education, or for such site or sites as the board in its discretion might thereafter select.</p> <p>3. That the appropriation of $40,000 in the present case, made by the board of aldermen for “new school and land, North End,” in response to an estimate and request of the board of education for $60,000 for a “new Locust Street school” in the section of the city known as the “North End,” was a special appropriation for a designated site and building; and that after such site had been procured and the school building constructed thereon, at a cost of $22,000, the unexpended balance of the appropriation reverted to the city treasury at the end of the fiscal year, as provided by the city charter, and the board of education could not use any portion of it either for another school site or for any other school purpose.</p> <p>4. That a landowner, who contracted to sell his land to the board of education after its purchase of the site upon which the school building was erected, was bound to know the limitations upon the power of the board, as well as the provisions of the city charter affecting it, all of which became a part of his agreement.</p> <p>The landowner’s deed tendered to the city required it to assume a mortgage of $3,500 and a lien of $35. Held that this was not in accordance with his contract.</p> <p>Appropriations of municipal funds, whether general or specific, for a given object or a definite purpose, cannot be diverted to any other purpose.</p>

<p>Employers, as well as employees, may form associations for the protection and advancement of their mutual interests, and when so associated may pass by-laws and regulations for the conduct of the business common to the members of the association, including a shut-down of their respective plants, if the object sought thereby and the means of its accomplishment are lawful; and such by-laws may also provide for an enforced' payment to the association, from each member of it, for disobedience of its lawful decisions and ' orders.</p> <p>The plaintiff was a non-stock incorporated association, composed of fifty-eight corporations, firms, and individuals engaged in the manufacture of felt hats, including the defendant whose factory was located at Bethel in this State. It was created to improve the business conditions of its members, to reform abuses incident thereto, to secure freedom from unjust and unlawful exactions, and to promote certainty and uniformity in the relations existing between its members and their respective employees. Its by-laws required all decisions, orders and regulations made by the association to be complied with in good faith by every member; and to insure such obedience “all members hereby agree to pay to the Association $5,000, as liquidated damages,” for their violation of any lawful decision, order or regulation of the association,'and that in any action to recover said sum “it shall not be necessary or incumbent upon this Association to prove any special damages whatsoever.” Another by-law provided that no member could resign until after ninety days’ notice in writing of such intention ' had been given to the secretary, and that no resignation should be accepted “during a suspension of work ordered by the Association." After unavailing attempts to adjust differences with the United Hatters, an unincorporated labor-union organization with a large membership, the plaintiff association, on January 14th, 1909, voted unanimously to discontinue the use of the union label, owned by the United Hatters, in every factory of every member of the association, and on January 28th, two weeks later, voted to operate such factories thereafter as “open shops,” offering situations to operatives as individuals only. The hatting industry in the vicinity of Danbury and Bethel was dominated by the United Hatters, and, with two exceptions, none but “union” men were allowed to work in the factories of that locality. The defendant was thus unable to obtain help, and its factory remained idle until about the 9th of June, when it, and the United Hatters, assented in writing to certain “propositions” submitted by one of the residents of Danbury, a self-appointed mediator. These propositions called, among other things, for the resignation of the defendant from the plaintiff association, and an arbitration of all the defendant’s differences with the United Hatters as soon as such resignation became effective; and until that time but no longer the United Hatters were to allow their union men to enter the employ of the defendant “as individuals.” Upon the execution of this understanding the strike was declared off, and the union men went to work ostensibly “as individuals” but retained their membership in the union and paid to it the regular union dues based upon the wages earned. In an action to recover the stipulated sum of $5,000, it was held:—</p> <p>Í. That the vote of the plaintiff association to “offer situations to operatives as individuals” was not an order for a lockout and suspension of work, as contended by the defendant, but merely a declaration for an “open shop,” its purpose or object being to preserve to all employers belonging to the association the inalienable right to contract for workmen regardless of whether they were or were not members of a labor union.</p> <p>2. That the record furnished no basis for the defendant’s further claim that the use of the union label of the United Hatters was the object of the plaintiff association; and that so far as appeared the label had nothing whatever to do with the resolution for an open shop.</p> <p>3. That such a resolution was not a restraint of trade within the provisions of the Federal Act commonly known as the Sherman Law.</p> <p>4. That the expressed intent of the plaintiff association and of its members to treat the $5,000, payable for disobedience of the association’s orders, as liquidated damages, although not controlling, was entitled to weight; and that in view of the difficulty of estimating or measuring the loss entailed by a breach of the resolution to maintain open shops, and the absence of anything in the record to indicate that the sum specified as liquidated damages was greatly disproportionate to the presumable loss, the expressed intent erf the parties would be carried out and the damages regarded as liquidated.</p> <p>5. That the written resignation of the defendant from the plaintiff association became effective upon its receipt by the plaintiff on September 9th, without any acceptance upon its part, such acceptance not having been made a prerequisite of a valid resignation eitner by the rules of the association or the law of the land; and that the provision in the by-laws, to the effect that no resignation should be accepted during a suspension of work ordered by the association, was inapplicable, since no suspension of work had been ordered, nor was any general shut down of the factories of its members contemplated by the order for open shops.</p> <p>6. That the agreement made by the defendant with the United Hatters was in fact one for the employment of union labor exclusively, and was a clear and palpable violation of the “open shop” vote of the plaintiff association, which the defendant was bound in good faith to observe so long as it continued a member thereof, and therefore the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, with interest thereon from the date of such violation.</p> <p>7. That the present action was not one for the recovery of a “fine or assessment,” which, under the by-laws, required authorization by a three-fourths vote of all the members of the plaintiff association, but was a mere incident of the plaintiff’s ordinary business affairs over which its directors had full and complete authority.</p>

<p>Information for selling food in package form, to wit, a can of tomatoes, without having the net quantity of the contents plainly marked on the outside of the can, in violation of § 1 of chapter 134 of the Public Acts of 1911, brought by appeal of the defendant from an adverse judgment of the City Court of Stamford to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, where a demurrer to the information was overruled and the cause tried to the jury before Walsh, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Information for manslaughter, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment of not guilty, and appeal by the State for alleged errors in the charge of the court.

Action to recover the value of certain wood and lumber alleged to have been cut and converted by the defendants, also the agreed price of a boiler and engine sold to them, brought, by an assignee of the claims, to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the jury before Waller, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit to restrain the defendant from using or attempting to use a certain strip of land alleged to be owned by the plaintiff upon which was an ash-bin and chute connected therewith, and also for damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Holcomb, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>In the absence of a finding of facts, no basis is laid for reviewing alleged errors in the charge of the trial court.</p> <p>The incorporation in the finding of the entire evidence properly presents the question whether a verdict was rightly directed or not, and whether one was or was not rightly set aside; but further than this it cannot serve, since this court has no power to find facts from evidence.</p> <p>Where the evidence alone is all that is required to properly present the questions raised by the appellant, an alleged inadequacy in the finding cannot be harmful to him.</p> <p>A contract containing no words purporting to bind the corporation of which its signers were in fact .directors, but which they signed simply as individuals and without any indication that they acted or intended to act in its behalf or officially as its agents, is, upon its face and as matter of law, the contract of its individual signers and not that of the corporation.</p> <p>in the present case a building-contract entitled “Specifications for carpenter and mason work on garage to be built for the Barker Auto Co.” provided in its body that “N. E. Nystrom [the plaintiff] agrees to build garage . . . for the Barker Auto Co.,” and was signed by the defendants merely as individuals. Held that the words “for the Barker Auto Co.” had reference to the use of the structure and to its erection, and not to the obligation imposed by the contract or to the capacity in which its makers signed.</p> <p>One of the signers was a woman, married before 1877, who owned stock in the corporation and acted jointly with her husband and the other directors in making the contract. Held that inasmuch as the building of the garage would add to the assets of the company and thus increase the value of her stock, the contract was one for her own benefit and the benefit of her separate estate, within the provisions of § 591 of the General Statutes.</p>

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of John Moon of New London, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New London County, Reed, J., upon the facts stated in the complaint, for the advice of this court.

<p>The burden of proving that a will was obtained, in whole or in part, by undue influence, rests upon the party who asserts it.</p> <p>The relation of parent and child is naturally one of close personal confidence and trust, and therefore furnishes, in itself, no basis for an inference or presumption that a testamentary gift by a parent to a child was obtained by means of undue influence exerted by the legatee.</p> <p>While it is conceivable that a testatrix in good health and possessing a quick, active mind, retentive memory, and sound and independent judgment, may be unduly influenced, such a conclusion must rest upon the safe foundation of material facts proven, and upon inferences which fairly and convincingly lead to that result; and therefore a verdict adverse to the will, which is based upon mere surmise, suspicion, or deductions from inconsequential facts and circumstances, will be set aside upon appeal.</p> <p>The existence of undue influence may be shown either by direct proof, or by inferences from proven facts which logically and reasonably lead to that conclusion.</p> <p>A will which represents the wishes of a testatrix of sound mind, and which disposes of her property as she desires, is her will and not another’s. Under such circumstances the testatrix has done nothing contrary to her wishes, nor has her discretion or judgment been controlled or her free agency overcome. Proof of the mere fact that the favored legatee had, or might have, poisoned the mind of the testatrix against the contestant, in the absence of any evidence that such legatee ever spoke to the testatrix about her will or had any knowledge of its contents, is not a sufficient basis for an inference of undue influence.</p> <p>The evidence and claims of the parties in the present case reviewed, and the verdict of the jury in favor of the contestant set aside as manifestly against the evidence.</p>

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Louise M. Lee of Hartford, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Holcomb, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. The reservation presents two questions. The testatrix executed a will in December, 1897, by the third clause of which she gave to her sister Sarah R. Guinn $10,000, and to her sister Jerusha A. Winsolow $5,000.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the instantaneous death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; upon its motion a verdict was rendered for the defend- ant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed. This case was formerly before this court as reported in 87 Conn. 328, 87 Atl. 990.

Action upon the so-called common counts to recover money alleged to have been paid, laid out and expended for the defendants without consideration, to which a special count was afterward added for damages for breach of contract, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Gager, J., after default of appearance by the DeTamble Motors Company; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant bank $1,302, and appeal by that…

<p>Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport directing the distribution of the estate of an absentee unheard of for twenty-seven years and presumed to be dead, taken by the administrator of said estate to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Tuttle, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.</p>

) who heard the parties and reported the facts; the court (Gager, J.) overruled the plaintiff’s remonstrance to the acceptance of the report, accepted the report and rendered judgment, in accordance therewith, in favor of the defendant Turner for $3,500, and (Holcomb, J.) in favor of the defendant Terrill for $4,500, from which the plaintiff appealed.

<p>An amendment to the charter pf the city of New Haven, approved in July, 1911 (16 Special Laws, p. 323), established a “teachers’ retirement fund” for the benefit of “the teachers” of the public day schools of that city. Held that one who had ceased to be a teacher three years or more before the passage of the amendment did not come within its provisions, which were not retroactive but had reference solely to those who were actually engaged in teaching at the time of its passage and to those who might thereafter become teachers.</p> <p>One of the clauses of § 5 of the Act provided for the retirement of “any teacher who has taught in the public day schools of the New Haven city school district for a period of forty years previous to the date when this Act becomes operative.” Held that the word “previous,” as thus used, meant “next preceding” or “next prior to” the date upon which the Act took effect.</p>

Writ op error to reverse a judgment of the Superior Court in New Haven County, Tuttle, J., rendered in favor of the defendants in an action by the plaintiff to foreclose a mortgage, brought to the Supreme Court of Errors at New Haven within and for the third judicial district on the first Tuesday of June, 1914.

Complaint for alleged professional misconduct by the defendant as an attorney at law, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered suspending the defendant from practicing law in the courts of this State indefinitely, from which he appealed.

<p>Application for an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the respondents, comprising the Board of Estimate and Taxation of the City of Norwalk, to make certain deductions in the tax rate of the first taxing district and corresponding additions to the tax rate of the fourth taxing district, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Tuttle, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the Public Utilities Commission apportioning the cost of a bridge over the Norwalk River, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the appeal and reasons of appeal was sustained, Curtis, J., from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to restrain the defendant from levying taxes upon the land of the plaintiff for the purpose of defraying any other burdens or expenses than such as said land would have borne before the consolidation of the town and city of Bridgeport, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J., upon demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and, upon the refusal of the plaintiff to plead further, rendered judgment for the defendant,…

<p>Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,300, and appeal by each of the defendants.</p>

Writ of habeas corpus to determine the legality of the imprisonment of the petitioner, issued and reserved by the Hon. Earnest C. Simpson, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, upon the facts alleged in the pleadings, for the advice of this court.

<p>As one of the exceptions to the rule rejecting hearsay evidence, ancient documents—that is, documents a,t least thirty years old—and the recitals contained therein, are admissible to establish ancient ownership and possession of land, which, in many cases, could not otherwise be proved.</p> <p>While nonuser and lapse of time are not enough to constitute abandonment, they are nevertheless competent evidence of an intent to abandon, and as such may be entitled to great weight when considered with other circumstances.</p> <p>The evidence in the present case reviewed and held to warrant a finding by the trial court that the plaintiff railroad company had abandoned the land in question, which lay within its right of way as established by condemnation proceedings in 1833.</p> <p>A letter to the plaintiff railroad company offering to sell it the property in question, and the answer of the company thereto, were admitted in evidence. Held that for the purpose of proving notice to the company of the alleged ownership of the writer, this letter, in connection with its answer, were properly received.</p> <p>An answer to a letter addressed to an agent of a corporation respecting a matter in which it is interested, will be presumed to have been made by one whose duty it was to act in that matter, until the contrary appears.</p> <p>A claim that the loss of a letter had not been sufficiently shown to admit secondary evidence of its contents, is not available upon appeal unless the record discloses that such claim was made in the trial court; for had it been made there, further evidence of the loss would, or might, have been required.</p> <p>In an action in the nature of ejectment, evidence of the time and money spent in good faith by the defendant in making improvements upon the locus in the belief that he was the absolute owner thereof, is admissible under a general denial of the averments upon which the defendant’s claim.for such improvements is based.</p>

Action by a member of the fire department of the city of Bridgeport to recover his salary for a period of two weeks during which he was incapacitated by illness not arising out of his employment, brought to and tried by the City Court of Bridgeport, Coughlin, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for tlie defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit in the nature of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective claimants in and to a sum of money paid into court by the Mutual Life Insurance Company as the amount due from it under a policy upon the life of the plaintiff’s deceased husband, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $9,028, and appeal by the People’s Bank and Trust Company, one of the defendants, who…

<p>Action for the specific performance of an agreement to sell and convey certain real estate, and for damages, brought to and tried by the District Court of Waterbury, Meigs, Deputy-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for a specific performance, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>The complaint alleged that on October 18th, 1910, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract (Exhibit A) for the purchase and sale of a lot of land described therein as “Lot No. 1 on map of lots at Walnut Beach and filed at the Town Clerk’s office at Milford, Connecticut, to which reference may be had for a more particular description of said lot;” that this lot had a frontage of one hundred feet on Milford Point Road and ninety feet on Beach Avenue, its opposite sides being equal and parallel; that the plaintiff had carried out the terms of the contract, and the defendant had not executed the deed of said lot as agreed. The complaint claimed a decree for a specific performance of the contract, and for $500 damages.</p> <p>The defendant’s answer admitted the execution of the contract, denied that the lot was as described in the complaint and that the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract, and denied that the defendant had not executed the conveyance as agreed.</p> <p>In a special defense the defendant pleaded that the lot described in the contract had a frontage of one hundred feet on Milford Point Road and fifty feet on Beach Avenue; that the plaintiff had paid the consideration of the contract but had refused to accept the deed of the same which the defendant had tendered him and was ready to redeliver to him.</p> <p>The plaintiff replied, admitting the tender and his refusal to accept the deed, and denied the other allegations of the special defense.</p> <p>The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, finding all the allegations of the complaint true, and adjudging that the defendant execute and deliver to the plaintiff a warranty deed of said lot, one hundred feet on Milford Point Road and ninety feet on Beach Avenue, free from all incumbrances.</p> <p>The court made a finding of facts on the appeal as follows: Before the execution of Exhibit A, the plaintiff and defendant met on the premises and the defendant offered to sell to the plaintiff, and then pointed out, the lot described in the complaint, and the plaintiff agreed to purchase the same for $225 to be paid in instalments according to a written contract to be subsequently executed by the parties, and thereafter Exhibit A was executed and delivered pursuant to this agreement.</p> <p>About a month or six weeks after the defendant purchased the land at Walnut Beach, he prepared a rough sketch of it and subdivided it into nine thirty-foot lots fronting on Beach Avenue, and numbered from one to nine. No map of these lots, or of the defendant’s land at Walnut Beach, or of lot No. 1, was ever on file in the Town Clerk’s office in Milford, and no map or sketch was shown by the defendant to the plaintiff until he demanded the deed, when the defendant showed him said sketch of these premises containing lot No. 1 having a frpntage of thirty feet on Beach Avenue. When the plaintiff had fully paid for the lot he demanded a deed of the same, and the defendant tendered him a deed of a lot with a frontage of thirty feet on Beach Avenue, which the plaintiff refused to accept.</p>

Action to recover the reasonable worth of services as a real-estate broker, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Booth, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $750, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Where it is sought to correct a statement of what occurred upon the trial, as distinguished from a finding of fact resulting from evidence, the remedy is by an application for a rectification of the appeal, supported by depositions, under § 801 of the General Statutes.</p> <p>Written interrogatories submitted to the jury, and their answers thereto certified by their foreman, should be filed and recorded as part of the verdict, since the sole purpose of their submission is to obtain specific findings to explain or limit a general verdict.</p> <p>The doctrine of supervening negligence does not apply where—as in the present case—the defendant has no chance or opportunity to save the plaintiff from the peril caused by his own negligence.</p> <p>Instructions touching the defendant’s negligence, even if erroneous, become harmless where the jury distinctly find that the injury and death of the plaintiff’s intestate were directly, due to his own negligence.</p> <p>An agricultural association which invites the public to its grounds to examine the exhibits or enjoy the amusements provided, is not an insurer of their safety, but is bound to use reasonable care to keep its premises in a safe condition for its visitors; and for a personal injury to one of its patrons caused by a breach of this duty the association is responsible, notwithstanding it had employed an independent contractor or concessionary to give the particular exhibition in the course of which the injury occurred.</p> <p>In determining whether a charge correctly stated the law or not, it must be considered as a whole.</p> <p>The case of Turgeon v. Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 541, explained and followed.</p>

Edward L. Smith, judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County, and referred by him to a committee (William J. McConville, Esqr.) who found and reported the facts. The report of the committee was accepted by Judge Smith and thereupon judgment was rendered ratifying and confirming the assessment complained of, from which the appellant appealed to this court.

Application in receivership proceedings pending in the Superior Court in Hartford County for advice and, if judged wise, an order of court authorizing the receivers of the JEtna Indemnity Company to compromise and settle certain claims made by them against the Munich Reinsurance Company under an alleged reinsurance contract pursuant to and in accordance with a proposal of settlement made by the latter; the court, Greene, J., after hearing the parties in interest, passed its…

Action to recover damages for an injury to the plaintiff’s automobile caused by the negligence of the defendant, resulting in the loss of the use of the car for several weeks, brought to the City Court of Hartford and tried to the jury before Bullard, J.; upon motion of the defendant the court directed, and the jury returned, a verdict for the plaintiff for $1, from the judgment upon which the plaintiff appealed.

Action in the nature of scire facias against a nonresident executor, who had been made an alleged garnishee upon the original action, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, O’Meara, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $485, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for furnishing the plaintiff with water infected or contaminated with typhoid-fever germs, and thereby causing her to suffer with that disease, in alleged violation of the defendant’s contract obligations and of its legal duty, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County, where the plaintiff was non-suited in a trial to the jury before Case, J., from which judgment she appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Bennett, J., after the death of the original plaintiff and the entry of her executrix; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $3,586, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony are matters peculiarly within the province of a jury. Accordingly, the jury are under no obligation to accept the figures given by the defendants’ witnesses, although not directly contradicted, as to what it would cost to make good deficiencies in a building which the plaintiffs had contracted to erect for the defendant.</p> <p>If the owner of a building, when sued by the contractor, desires to rely in his defense upon a provision in the specifications that the work was to be done “to the complete satisfaction of the owner,” it is incumbent upon him to plead such provision and also his dissatisfaction with the work.</p> <p>Such a provision may be waived by the owner, and is waived if he takes possession of and uses the building, and, when sued, merely denies the performance of the contract and asks damages for specified imperfections in the work.</p> <p>Special damages are not recoverable if the evidence offered furnishes no basis whatever for their estimation beyond a mere guess.</p> <p>In the present case a building contract provided for a payment by the contractor of “$25 per day forfeit for noncompletion of the work” as specified. Held that inasmuch as it was apparent that the parties intended to liquidate the uncertain amount of damage which would result to the owner in the event of delay in completing the building, and that the amount agreed upon was not unreasonable, the provision would be enforced as one for liquidated damages, notwithstanding the payment was described in terms of a forfeiture.</p> <p>Where the parties have stipulated in advance as to the amount of damages that may be awarded, a further recovery, or a recovery upon some other basis, is not allowable.</p> <p>In the present case the defendant, owner of a tobacco warehouse built for it by the plaintiffs, filed three counterclaims, two for a recovery of the liquidated damages of $25 per day, and one for a recovery of special damages for injuries to its harvested tobacco alleged to have resulted from the plaintiffs’ delay in completing the warehouse; but before trial, and pursuant to an order of court, elected to proceed upon the claim for special damages only. Held that the defendant had by this election deprived itself of any right it might have established to recover liquidated damages for the delay; and that inasmuch as the defendant could not, under its contract, recover any other damages for that cause, instructions to the jury respecting the period of delay, even if erroneous were harmless.</p>

<p>A joint-stock corporation organized under the general law for the purposes of promoting, holding and giving agricultural fairs in this State, including horse racing, exhibitions of horses, cattle, dogs, cats, poultry, fruit, vegetables, wild animals, and similar attractions, and for giving purses,' prizes and premiums for any and all of such exhibitions, is an “agricultural society” within the meaning of that expression as used in General Statutes, § 2315, exempting from taxation “the stock or property of every incorporated agricultural society.”</p> <p>Such an exemption cannot be said to be contrary to public policy, merely because an agricultural society here and there may occasionally make a profit.</p> <p>The history of the exemption statute briefly reviewed and held not to disclose an intent to discriminate against the property of agricultural societies organized with a capital stock.</p> <p>The fact that an agricultural society has at times leased its grounds, when not required for its own uses, for horse and automobile racing—presumably using the rent received therefor for the purposes of its creation—does not deprive it of the exemption afforded by the statute.</p>

Action of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective defendants in and to the sum of $1,275 in the hands of the plaintiffs, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered awarding the money to the defendant Seymour, trustee, from which the other defendants, Messrs. Olds and Whipple, appealed. Olds and Whipple were copartners dealing in fertilizers and agricultural supplies.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,000, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>In an action to recover damages for personal injuries by a servant while riding upon a freight elevator, the defendant master offered evidence to prove that it had provided stairways in its factory for the use of its employees, who had been forbidden to ride upon the elevators, and that the plaintiff had also! been personally warned not to do so. The plaintiff denied having received any personal warning, and offered evidence to prove that the elevators had been constantly used by the employees in going to and from their work, with the knowledge of the defendant, and that such use justified a finding of implied permission or license. Under these circumstances the court instructed the jury that if the plaintiff was using the elevator to go to his work with the express or implied permission of the defendant,—each of which was explained to the jury,—it was the duty of the defendant to see that the elevator was reasonably safe for such purpose. Held that in view of the evidence and claims of the parties this was a proper and adequate instruction for the guidance of the jury upon that branch of the case.</p> <p>A count in the complaint in support of which no evidence is offered, may very properly be excluded from the consideration of the jury by the trial judge in his charge.</p> <p>After reciting in some detail the claims of the defendant to the effect that it was entirely the plaintiff’s own fault that he was injured, the trial judge said to the jury that “if you find the facts as so stated,” a verdict for the defendant should be returned. Held that the jury could not have been misled by the words quoted into believing that the recital of the judge embraced facts actually proven, rather than the defendant’s claims upon the evidence.</p> <p>The plaintiff alleged that he was injured while using the elevator in the performance of his duty and by the orders and requirements of the defendant. Held that under a denial of this averment the defendant might prove not only its untruth, but also that the exact opposite was the fact: that the plaintiff had been forbidden to use the elevator and was disobeying that injunction when injured.</p> <p>The trial court instructed the jury that if the defendant furnished the elevator for the plaintiff to use, it was its duty to instruct him how to use it, and to warn him of such dangers as were not obvious or known to him. Held that in the absence of any request to charge, the evidence and claims of the parties did not require any further instruction upon this point.</p> <p>Whether the trial court erred or not in refusing to set aside the verdict, is to be determined solely by a consideration of the evidence; and therefore an amendment or correction of the finding would be of no aid to the decision of that question.</p> <p>The evidence in the present case briefly reviewed and held sufficient to warrant the jury in finding a verdict for the defendant.</p>

<p>Raise representations, relied and acted upon to one’s loss, are actionable when made either knowingly or recklessly, with an intent to deceive, or when made under an unreasonable, groundless belief in their truth, with intent to induce the other party to act upon them.</p> <p>In the present case the defendant greatly overstated the frontage and depth of his lot, intending that the plaintiff, who was unfamiliar with real estate measurements, should, as he did, rely on such statements in buying the property. The defendant had no actual knowledge as to the truth of his statements nor any reasonable ground for believing them, but based thbm on memory and guess, without ever having ascertained the accurate measurements as he represented he had done. Held that jthe representations were actionable, notwithstanding the boundaries of the lot were pointed out to the plaintiff during the negotiations for the sale, when he could have measured the distances between them had he chosen to do so.</p>

F. Hotchkiss of Madison, deceased, taken by the plaintiff to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, sustaining the will, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries nsulting in the immediate death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Williams, ,/.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s intestate met his death while engaged in the service of the city of Waterbury as a policeman.

Suit to restrain the defendants as treasurer and financial secretary of Loyal Circle No. 7, a subordinate branch or division of the plaintiff organization, from paying out or issuing in any way moneys alleged to belong to said Circle No. 7, and also for an accounting of all moneys in their hands as such officers, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County upon demurrer to the complaint; the court, Holcomb, J., overruled the demurrer, and, upon the refusal…

Action in the nature of trespass qu. cl. fr. to determine the title to a strip of land about two acres in extent, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff Alice E. Evarts appealed.

Action praying for a divorce upon the ground of desertion, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Holcomb, Jfacts found and judgment rendered dismissing the action upon the ground that the marriage relation theretofore existing had already been dissolved by a valid judgment of the Circuit Court in South Dakota, in a suit begun and prosecuted in that State by the present defendant against the plaintiff, and from this judgment of dismissal the…

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision between a runaway team and a trolley-car in which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger, which was alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Actions to recover damages accruing to the respective plaintiffs—-a sole surviving parent and her minor child—from personal injuries to the latter caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried together to the court, Gager, J.; facts found and judgments rendered for the parent to recover 8275 and the minor child 8700, from which the defendant appealed.

Information for violating by-laws and regulations of the town of Orange in the operation of a plant for rendering fats and manufacturing commercial fertilizers, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Action by the indorsee against the maker to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Holcomb, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,564, and appeal by the defendant. This is an action upon a renewal note dated December 8th, 1909, payable six months after date to Randolph C. Andrus and William D. Johnson, or order, and transferred by them to the plaintiff.

Action to secure the transfer of eighty-four shares of stock which were alleged to belong to the plaintiff and to have been held in trust for her by the defendant’s intestate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Holcomb, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been .caused by the defendant’.s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a .trial to the jury before Case, J., and from the refusal of the trial, court to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Williams, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for the nondelivery and loss of certain goods entrusted to the defendant as a common carrier, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County.-and tried to the jury before Waller, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $145, and appeal by the defendant.