Clark’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Court encountered greater difficulty, however, in affirmatively defining the plaintiff’s burden of proof. The Court acknowledged that legislatures will “almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predomi nates in the redistrieting process.” [Miller, 515 U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2488 ]. Distinguishing between permissible awareness and impermissible motivation “may be difficult” and will require courts “to exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a state has drawn district lines on the basis of race.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court attempted a definition: The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographies or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations. Id. Justice O’Connor added in her concurring opinion that this standard was “a demanding one,” requiring the plaintiff to show that the legislature “has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices.” Id, at-, 115 S.Ct. at 24”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson · Edward Chen et al Edward Chen

2. “(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of members of the minority group to register, vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against' the minority group; (4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether'the members' of the minority group have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder the ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Benavidez v. CITY OF IRVING, TEX. · Perez v. Pasadena Independent School District

3. “[T]o establish a constitutional vote dilution claim, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) [Pleasant Grove's] black population lacks an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect candidates of its choice; (2) this inequality of opportunity results from [Pleasant Grove's] at-large voting scheme; and (3) a racially discriminatory purpose underlies [Pleasant Grove's] voting scheme.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ala. State Conference of the Naacp v. City of Pleasant Grove · Dennis Theriot