United States v. Eltayib’s Empirical Analysis
88 F.3d 157 · 1996
Citation profile
40 federal appellate · 1 district · 7 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 87 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably Commonwealth v. Grant (2002), State v. Singh (2002)
40 federal appellate · 1 district · 7 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 952
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Chapman v. State of California · Simmons v. United States · Neil v. Biggers · Edwards v. Arizona
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 87 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[w]here a defendant claims lack of knowledge but the evidence indicates that the defendant may have remained ignorant deliberately.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The Supreme Court has established a two-step inquiry for evaluating the constitutional permissibility of in court identification testimony based on out-of-court identification procedures. [Step 1:] That inquiry “requires determination of whether the identification process was impermissibly suggestive and, if so, whether it was so suggestive as to raise ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” [Step 2:] If pretrial procedures have been unduly suggestive, a court may nonetheless admit in-court identification testimony if the court determines it to be independently reliable. The court should consider the reliability of the identification in light of the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of [the witness’] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. For both pretrial and in-court identifications, the linchpin of admissibility is reliability. However, if im-permissibly suggestive procedures are not employed, “independent reliability is not a constitutionally required condition of admissibility, and the reliability of the identification is simply a question for the jury.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is perfectly acceptable practice for a prosecutor to use language in addressing the jury such as “you are free to conclude,” “you may perceive that,” “it is submitted that,” or “a conclusion on your part may be drawn,” to mention only a few examples of unobjectionable phraseology. It is obligatory for prosecutors to find careful ways of inviting jurors to consider drawing argued inferences and conclusions and yet to avoid giving the impression that they are conveying their personal views to the jurors.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.