Volume 88 — Iowa Reports

— Hon. J. L. Stevens, Judge. The defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen. He appeals.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. The issue tried in this case in the court below was whether the garnishee, Clark, was indebted to the defendant, the Colfax Hotel Company. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict that Clark was so indebted in the sum of one thousand, three hundred and sixty-five dollars and five cents, and interest. From a judgment on the verdict, Clark, the garnishee, appeals.—

— Hon. J. H. Preston, Judge. The plaintiff is the owner of eighty acres of land in the north half of the north half of section 10, township 82, range 1 west. One A. H. Beddow was the owner of land adjoining it on the south, being in the-south half of the north half of said section. A. H. Beddow is deceased, and his widow and daughter are-the owners of the land. The daughter is the wife of the defendant.

— Hon. James D. Gteitn, Judge. Proceeding upon the application of Amanda Dewell, widow, for an allowance and for certain orders, and the objections of the administrators and heirs thereto. An order was made, allowing the widow five hundred dollars, from which the administrators and-heirs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Tama District Court. — Hon. L. G. Kinne, Judge.</p> <p>Action for personal injury. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.—</p>

— Hon. W; I. Babb, Judge. The defendant was indicted for lewdness. He pleaded not guilty, was convicted, and sentenced to the county jail, and appeals.

— Hon. J. P. Connee, Judge. Action in equity to have canceled a tax deed purporting to convey land which the. plaintiff claims to own. From a decree in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

— Hon. J. H. Preston,. Judge. The plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers of Iowa county, brought this action, in three counts, against the defendants, the board of supervisors of said county, to enjoin them from selling certain lands belonging to-said county, and expending the proceeds in the erection of a courthouse in the town of Marengo.

— Hon. Charles D. Leggett, Judge. Action to enjoin the obstruction or diversion of a stream of water. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

— Hon. Dayid Byan, Judge. The defendant was indicted, convicted, and sentenced for the crime of seduction, and he appeals.

— Hon. A. W. Wilkinson, Judge. Action in equity to determine the validity of two mortgages upon certain real estate. The mortgages are held and owned by the plaintiff, and were executed by the defendants W. B. Campbell and Greeley Campbell, and their wives.

— Hon. J. H. Henderson, Judge. The defendant is the owner of a blacksmith shop in the town of Stuart, in Guthrie county. The shop is located close to the sidewalk, on the south side of Nassau street. Án anvil used by the defendant stands •six feet from the sidewalk in the shop, with the horn' of the anvil towards the door. The door leading from the sidewalk into the shop is about six feet wide, and the anvil stands nearly opposite to the’west side of the door.

— Hon. L. G-. Kinne,. Judge. Action in equity for the reformation of an agreement in writing, to recover damages for an alleged, breach thereof, and for other relief. The defendant S. H. Watson demands judgment on a counterclaim for an alleged breach of the same agreement. There was a hearing on the merits, and a decree reforming the-agreement in part, and in favor of Watson for damages. From that decree the plaintiffs appealed.

— Hon. Chaeles D. Q-oldsmith, Judge. Action in equity to restrain the opening of a street within the limits of the incorporated town of Rockwell. There was a hearing on the merits anda decree in favor of the plaintiff;. The defendants appeal.

— Hon. J. H. Apple-gate, Judge. J. L. Platt is one of the defendants. On the twentieth of July, 1881, the plaintiff made to Platt a written lease of certain described lands in Dallas county for the purpose of mining coal therein.

The plaintiff was enjoined from maintaining a nuisance in the keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors, and upon complaint made he was attached for contempt. Upon the hearing he was adjudged guilty, and a fine of five hundred dollars was imposed, with a judgment for imprisonment until the fine was paid. Certain complaints are made as to the legality of the proceedings, to test which this action was institutéd.

— Hon. H. M. Townee, Judge.. The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of nuisance, and, his motion for a new trial being overruled, judgment was entered .against him, from which he appeals.

— Hon. J. H. Applegate, Judge. Proceeding to establish a claim against an estate. There was a judgment against the plaintiff for.costs, and he appeals.

— Hon. A. R. Dewey, Judge. The defendant was indicted and put upon trial on the charge of having seduced one Alice Wignall. Judgment was rendered as follows: “At the conclusion of the evidence on the part, of the prosecutrix the court arrests further proceedings in this case for the reason that the evidence shows no seduction.

— Hon. E. L. Burton, Judge. Action in equity to foreclose a mortgage upon certain real estate. There was a decree for the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. J. H. Peeston, Judge. Action to recover the amount due on a promissory-note indorsed by the defendant Miller. He filed a motion for a change of the place of trial, which was .-sustained, and an allowance was made in his favor for ■expenses incurred-in attending court in Jones county. ‘The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. O. P. Holmes, Judge. Action on a delivery bond given to release attached property. A verdict for the plaintiff was returned by direction of the court. Prom the judgment rendered thereon the defendants appeal.

— Hon. Charles D. Leggett, Judge. This is a special proceeding, by which it is sought to establish the corners and boundaries of certain real estate owned by the parties. A commissioner was appointed with the consent of the parties. The commissioner filed his report, and the appellant excepted to the sáme, and the court, after the introduction of evidence by the respective parties, entered an order affirming the report, from which order the defendant, Tsc'hantz, appeals.

— Hon. W. I. Babb, Judge. Action in equity for an accounting, and to recover ¿mounts alleged to be due under the provisions of a mining lease. There was a hearing on the merits, and a decree for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. D. Byan,. Judge. Proceeding to contest the validity of a last will, and testament. There was a decree for the defendants,, and the plaintiff appeals.

—Hon. M. Kayanagh, Judge. Action on a written contract for the delivery of wall paper. There was a verdict and. judgment for the-defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

<p>-Replevin: property seized on execution: validity of judgment: collateral ATTACK. An action of replevin will not lie for tlie recovery of personal property seized under execution upon a judgment, alleged to have been recovered without either actual or constructivo service of original notice, in the absence of any showing that the court wherein the judgment was rendered was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. The validity of a judgment can not be attached for such cause in an action of replevin.</p>

— Hon. L. G-. Kinne, Judge. The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses, and judgment entered against him, from which he appeals.

— Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge. Action in equity to compel the defendant to execute and deliver a deed for certain lands to the plaintiffs, and to enjoin the defendant from disposing of or incumbering said lands. There was a decree for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appeal.

— Hon. A. Howat, Judge. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the district court affirming an assessment for taxation upon the plaintiff’s railroad bridge across the Mississippi river at the city of Clinton.

— Hon. J. H. Applegate, Judge. The defendant was accused and convicted of the offense of peddling without a license. From the judgment requiring him to pay a fine of twenty dollars and costs, he appeals.

— Hon. J. H. Applegate, Judge. ' The plaintiff seeks to recover on account of money deposited in the Farmers’ Bank of Fontanelle, and to have the amount of its recovery established as a preferred claim against property in the hands of the assignee of the owner of that bank. The intervenors, who are general creditors of the bank, resist the demands of the plaintiff.

— Hon. David Ryan, Judge. This action involves the title to a certain tract of land. The plaintiff claims to be the owner by reason of an agreement in writing entered into between himself and E. Mendenhall on the second day of April, 1864, ánd a deed of general warranty executed by said E. Mendenhall on the fifteenth day of February, 1884.

— Hon. James D. Gteeen, Judge. Action against the plaintiff to recover for wages as .a school teacher. From a verdict and judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Divorce: inhuman treatment: evidence. Where, in an action by the wife for a divorce, the evidence showed that the plaintiff had been peevish, quarrelsome and needlessly meddlesome in her husband’s business and other affairs, and had thus provoked much of the abuse heaped upon her by her husband, held, that the plaintiff’s conduct was no excuse for the husband repeatedly striking, kicking and otherwise abusing the plaintiff, and that the court did not err in granting her a divorce on the ground of inhuman treatment.</p> <p>2. --: -: custody op children. It appearing that the plaintiff had more ability and disposition to provide for the comfort and education of the children than the defendant, held, that a decree awarding her the custody of the children, with certain privileges to the defendant, and requiring the defendant to pay a certain sum per month for their support, was proper.</p>

Appeal-front Iowa District Court. — Hon. S. H. Fairall, Judge. Action on two promissory notes. From a verdict and judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. D. Eyan, Judge. Certiorari proceeding to set aside the action of the defendant in vacating a portion of one highway and in establishing another. The district court granted the relief demanded. The defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from Scott District Court. — Hon. Andbew Howat, Judge.</p> <p>Action to enforce a mechanic’s lien. Decree for the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal.</p>

— Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge. The plaintiffs brought separate actions against the defendants to recover damages for negligently setting out a fire while operating a railroad train, by which certain property of the plaintiffs was destroyed. The actions were consolidated, and were thus tried to a jury. There was a verdict and judgments for the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal.

<p>Deed: delivery: presumption: innocent purchaser. While it is true that where a deed has been executed,1 acknowledged and filed for record by the grantor, a delivery thereof to the grantee will usually be presumed, yet such presumption may be overcome by evidence. And where a voluntary deed gfrom a mother to her married daughter was so executed, acknowledged and filed for record by the mother, but, after it had been recorded, was taken by her and locked up in a tin box which she kept in her house, from which it was stealthily extracted by the daughter’s husband, and the evidence showed that the mother had no intention of delivering the deed .until it should be signed and concurred in by her husband, and that, after the deed was so taken, the daughter and her husband leased the land of the mother and paid rent therefor, held, that there was no delivery of the deed, and that a conveyance by the daughter and her husband to one who was chargeable with knowledge of the facts conveyed no title as against the mother.</p>

— Hon.' W. P. Conbad, Judge. This is an action to recover damages for the negligent construction of a railroad track along a street in the city of Des Moines. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained. The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. S. H. Fairall, Judge. Action to recover damages alleged to have been caused by an assault and battery committed by the defendant. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. A. R. Dewey, Judge. Appeal by the plaintiffs upon a certificate of the trial judge afe follows: “Where the judgment debtor, who is a resident of this state and the head of a family, is temporarily absent from her homestead for the period of one year for the purpose of educating her daughter, and voluntarily executes a lease of the homestead to a tenant during and for the period of said absence, are moneys which are due and owing to the judgment debtor from the tenant…

— Hon. John J. Net, Judge. Indictment for rape. There was a verdict for art Assault with intent to commit a rape, and the defendant appeals.

— Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge. Action for a settlement of partnership accounts. From a decree entered by the district court, the plaintiff appeals.

Appeal' from Van Burén District Court. — Hon. W. I.. Babb, Judge.

— Hon. A. Howat, Judge. Action at law to recover for paving done by the plaintiff, for which the defendant is alleged to be liable. There was a trial by the court, which resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a part of the amount it claims to be due. Both parties appeal, the appeal of the defendant having first been taken.

— Hon. O. P. Holmes, Judge. Action on contract for the payment of a mortgage debt. Joseph B. Davis was the owner of the property, being certain lots in the city of Des Moines, and he gave a mortgage thereon to the New England Loan & Trust Company, due February 1, 1894. The lots were conveyed to the defend_ant, and by him to the plaintiff, with the incumbrance thereon; the defendant agreeing to discharge the mortgage.

— Hon. L. G. Kinne, Judge. Action in equity, by which the plaintiffs seek to quiet their title to one hundred and twenty-sis acres of land in Tama county. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained, and the plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Ramillón District Court. — Hon. J. L. Stevens, Judge.</p> <p>Action on a beneficiary certificate. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.</p>

— Hon. J. J. Ney, Judge. Action in equity to foreclose a lien on real estate,. and to fix and limit the time within which redemption: therefrom may be made. From a decree in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant, Susan E. Daniels, appeals.

— Hon. W. F. Conrad, Judge. Action for damages arising from alleged malpractice. Trial to a jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. Lot Thomas, Judge. Action in equity to establish and foreclose a mechanic’s lien on account for materials furnished for the erection of a dwelling house, in lot 5, block 33, town of Estherville. The issues presented on this appeal are between the plaintiff and the defendants as above named. The answer may be summed up as presenting a general denial. The issues will sufficiently appear in the opinion.

<p>1. Title to Real Estate: deed from widow and heir of patentee : identification : evidence. In an action to quiet title as against a tax title, the plaintiff proved that the land was patented to one John F.; that one Margaret F., a widow, and her daughter Nellie conveyed it to the plaintiff; that the name of Margaret’s husband and Nellie’s father was John F., who died intestate prior to the last named conveyance, and that Nellie was his only heir; that the John F. last named, prior to his death, claimed to be the same John F. who was the patentee of the land, and that he had papers in his possession relating to the land. JBeld, that it sufficiently appeared that the plaintiff’s grantors were the widow and only heir of the patentee, and that the plaintiff had sufficient title to enable him to question a tax deed under section 897 of the Code.</p> <p>2. Deed: acknowledgment: seal of notary wanting: evidence. A deed, which purports to be acknowledged before a notary public subsequent to the passage of the curative aet of the Thirteenth General Assembly, is not admissible in evidence if the signature and certificate of the notary are not authenticated by his notarial seal.</p> <p>3. Tax Title: estoppel to deny: pleading. Where in such action the plaintiff in his petition relied, first, upon his patent title and the invalidity of the tax title, but, second, claimed that, if the tax title was good, he was the owner of the land under such title, held, that he was not thereby estopped to deny the validity of the tax title, nor to object to the insufficiency of subsequent deeds conveying the same, and under which the defendant claimed.</p> <p>4. -: adverse claims under: proof of ownership. Where, in an action by the holder of the patent title to quiet his title to land as against a tax title, the plaintiff also claimed that, if the tax title was good, then he, and not the defendant, was the owner of it, and he permitted the defendant to testify that one from whom he derived title was the owner of the land, without requiring competent proof of that claim, held, that this was a sufficient showing of title in the defendant to enable him to question the tax title relied upon by the plaintiff under section 897 of the Code.</p> <p>5. -: action to set aside: laches defeating. It appeared that the tax title had been in existence and unchallenged for nearly twenty years; that the claimants thereunder had paid all the taxes during that time, and that the defendant was an innocent purchaser for value of that title. On the other hand, the evidence showed that the patent title had been in the patentee and his immediate heirs for twenty-six years; that the plaintiff purchased it from his heirs a short time before the commencement of this action; and that he had reason to know that the defendant claimed the land, and the basis of his claim; that the holders of the patent title, prior to the plaintiff, never paid any taxes on the land, except possibly for one or two years, and never concerned themselves about the land, although the public records showed that others were claiming it under the tax title, the invalidity of which was as apparent at any time as it was when the plaintiff purchased the land. Meld, that the laches of the plaintiff’s grantors was such that they could not have asserted their title in a court of equity as against the defendant’s tax title, and that the plaintiff’s equities were no better than those of his grantor.</p>

— Hon. F. B.. Gaynor, Judge. Action for personal injuries. The following with-, certain omissions, are the facts as stated by the district, court to the jury: “That on or about the evening of the second day of December, 1890, while the defendant was so operating its passenger train, the plaintiff became a passenger thereon; that is, on a train run and operated by the-defendant, by its agents and employees, from the town of Primghar to the town of Gaza, in this county, both.…

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. The town of University Place is an incorporated town; and the other defendants are the mayor and eouncilmen thereof. The plaintiffs are owners of what is designated as “Lot 26” in said town, it being thus-designated on an official plat of the southwest quarter of. section twenty-three, township seventy-nine, range twenty-four.

- — Hon. George W. Paine, Judge. The plaintiff, as trustee, prosecutes this action in equity to recover judgment against Fanton R. Lawlor, ' on Ms promissory note, and for a decree foreclosing a trust deed on certain land in Crawford county, executed by F. R. Lawlor to tbe plaintiff, as- trustee, 'to secure tbe payment of said note.

— Hon. S. F. Balliet, Judge. Action by attachment wherein one Cook was garnished as a debtor- of the defendant, the Iowa Buggy Company. The Western Mining and Investment Company intervened, claiming to be the owner of the defendant’s claim against Cook under an assignment made prior to the attachment. The - plaintiff alleged that said assignment was fraudulent. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the intervenor appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion.

— Hon. J. H. Preston, Judge. The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of T. J. Mc-Daneld, brings this action to charge the defendant, H. O. McDaneld, garnishee, as an alleged debtor of said T. J. McDaneld. Issues were joined upon the answer of the garnishee, and the case submitted to a jury. A verdict was returned for the defendant, and judgment entered thereon, from which the plaintiff appeals.

A. R. Dewey, Judge. Action for breach of' promise of marriage. Jury trial. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

John C. Shebwin, Judge. Action in equity to restrain the defendants from cutting or otherwise interfering with ice, and to recover the value of ice which they have cut, which is claimed by the plaintiff. There was a hearing on the merits, and a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. Such cases as we have been able to find, except the case of Iliggins v. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 318, hold that ice is realty. 9 Am. and Eng.

— Hon. J. H. Preston, Judge. The plaintiff and the defendant Daniel Lothian were husband and wife. On the seventh day of January, 1890, they were divorced by a decree of the Linn district court, on the petition of the plaintiff. Permanent alimony was allowed, consisting of certain real estate, and a money judgment was rendered for seven thousand dollars. The defendants Davis & Voris were attorneys for the plaintiff in the action.

— Hon. N. W. Macy, Judge. Action to recover damages to crops by being overflowed in consequence of the negligent construction and abandonment of a certain ditch by the defendant county. The defendant demurred to the petition, and the demurrer being sustained, and the plaintiff electing to stand upon his petition, judgment was entered against him, from which he appeals.

— Hon. D. R. Hindman, Judge. Action to recover for injuries alleged to have been •caused by negligence on the part of the defendant. 'There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. G-eokge. H. Cakk, Judge. Action to recover for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of negligence on the part of the defendant. There was a trial by-jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.. The defendant appeals.

<p>Torts: damages: limitation of actions: revival by note and mortgage given in settlement. An action for a tort, when barred by the statute of limitation, can not, like an action founded upon contract, be revived by a new promise. Accordingly where an action for damages because of criminal conversation was barred by the statute, held, that a note and mortgage given in settlement thereof were without consideration, and could not be enforced.</p>

<p>Appeal from Henry District Court. — Hon. E. L. Burton, Judge.</p> <p>Action upon certain promissory notes aided by an attachment, in which one Griffith intervened. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the intervenor appeals.</p>

— Hon. A. B. Thornell, Judge. This is an appeal from an order of the district court overruling a motion to correct a computation made by this court in the trial of an appeal from a decree foreclosing a mortgage upon real estate. The defendants filed the motion, and they appeal.

— Hon. N. W. Macy, . Judge. Action by attachment against the defendant, in which certain creditors of the defendant were attached as garnishees. The American Hand-Sewed Shoe Company intervened, claiming, to be the owners of the-indebtedness due from the garnishees to the defendant. Trial to the court. Judgment against intervenor dismissing its petition, and for costs, from which ifc appeals.

— Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge. This is a suit in equity and it involves the title to a tract of land in Webster county. There was a trial on the merits and a decree for the plaintiff. The defendant, W. Gr. Watters, appeals.

— Hon. John J. Ney, Judge. This action was commenced with the railrqad_.commissioners as plaintiffs, and the state subsequently substituted. It is an action to enforce an order of the railroad commissioners to the defendant company for the switching of ears from the station at Dubuque, Iowa, to Eagle Point, a place within the city of Dubuque. The necessary facts are as follows: Fendler & Schwaegler is a firm doing a business of burning lime at Eagle Point.

— Hon. L. Gr. Kinne, Judge. The plaintiff sold to the defendant firm certain lands, and as a part consideration therefor the firm agreed “to make a good and sufficient transfer and assignment of one hundred and twenty shares in the capital stock of the Iowa Falls Mineral Springs Improvement Company,” valued by the parties at one thousand, two hundred dollars.

<p>Fraud: conveyance to wife disregarded. V. purchased one hundred shares of stock for five thousand dollars. Of this sum he had of his own money one thousand, five hundred dollars, which he paid, and borrowed three thousand, five hundred dollars, giving T. as his indorser, and agreeing to give T. the stock, when issued, as collateral security. At V.’s request, only one share of the stock was issued to him, and ninety-nine shares were issued to his wife. The stock was handed to T. in an envelope. Afterwards V. desired to sell or trade the stock, and he procured the envelope and contents of T., with the understanding that he should return the stock, or what V. procured in exchange for it. V. sold the stock, taking therefor a deed to his wife for some land, and notes for three thousand, five hundred dollars. He then returned the envelope to T., who received it and put it away unopened, believing that it contained either the stock or its proceeds. After this V. again asked for and received the envelope, on the ground that he desired to make another trade, and upon the agreement that he would return the collaterals or their proceeds, but he failed to do so. T. was compelled to pay the note which he had indorsed for V., and he obtained judgment against V. for that amount. V. had no property in his own name subject to execution, and an execution issued upon the judgment was levied on the land conveyed to V.’ s wife as part payment for the stock, whereupon the wife brought this action to enjoin the sale of the land. Held, that her action was without equity, and was properly dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Cherokee District Court. — Hon. George W. Wakefield, Judge.</p> <p>This appeal comes up on the ruling of the court below, sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition. The petition, in substance, states that in February, 1890, tie plaintiff obtained a judgment against Addie J. and W. W. Meredith, husband and wife, for about nine hundred dollars, and also a decree of foreclosure against certain real property in Washta, belonging to said Addie J. Meredith. That J. D. F. Smith and the Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Wagon Company were made defendants, and their rights in said premises foreclosed, as shown in the decree, which is set out. That a special execution'issued, and said premises were sold to the plaintiff April 8, 1890, and a certificate of sale made by the sheriff. That in 1889 said defendant company had a claim against said W. W. Meredith for a large amount, and commenced an action by attachment thereon, and thereunder levied on certain property of said Meredith, and garnished certain persons as supposed debtors of said Meredith. That the legal title of lot 7, in block 4, in Washta, was in said Addie J. Meredith; the same being a part of the real property covered by said decree of foreclosure. That said Addie J. Meredith and W. W. Meredith conveyed said lot to J. D. F. Smith, by deed, for the sole purpose of securing the said claim on which said attachment suit had been commenced, “and for no other purpose whatever.” That at the time said deed was made it was orally understood and agreed that on payment of said debt, or the balance after deducting the amount realized from the sale of the personal property, and from garnishments above referred to, said Smith should reconvey said premises to said Addie J. Meredith; that rents were to be collected by said Smith, and applied on said claim, and accounted for. That said title was in fact held by Smith in trust for the defendant company. That said conveyance to Smith was not an absolute conveyance, but only a security for said claim, and that Smith never became the owner of the property under said deed. That January 10, 1891, said Smith and wife conveyed said property by quitclaim to the defendant wagon company. That February 28, 1891, said Addie J. and her husband conveyed said property by quitclaim to one J. H. Allen. That said defendant made no attempt to redeem from said sale until April 8, 1891, when it paid to the clerk of said court the amount necessary to redeem from said sale, and said clerk receipted for the same, and still holds said money. That on account of said attempted redemption the sheriff refuses to execute to the plaintiff a deed for the premises, notwithstanding there has been no other redemption than asset out above. That said pretended redemption prevents the plaintiff from securing his deed. And the petition prays that the said redemption be set aside, and the plaintiff be decreed to be entitled to a sheriff’s deed, and also judgment for the rental value of the property since the plaintiff was entitled to his deed.</p> <p>To this petition the defendant demurred on the ground that the facts stated do not entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded. This demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff appeals, assigning error on .said-ruling.</p>

<p>Appeal from Sioux District Court. — Hon. George W. Wakefield, Judge.</p> <p>Action in equity to quiet the title to eighty acres of land in Sioux county, claimed by the plaintiff through a tax deed. There was a hearing on the merits, and a decree in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from O’Brien District Court. — Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge.</p> <p>Action for the foreclosure of a mortgage against it leasehold.. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. From a decree adjudging the plaintiff’s mortgage a first lien upon the property, certain of the defendants appeal.</p> <p>All parties were held to know the extent of S. R. Kelly’s interest, and that it was a leasehold interest and that he was a tenant. A notice of a lease is notice of all the covenants and provisions contained in it. Having notice of its existence, all parties are chargeable-with notice of all its contents, tjones on Real Estate-Mortgages, section 593; Taylor v. Btibbert, 2 Vesey,. 437; George v. Kent, 7 Allen (Mass.), 16; Pike v. Goodenoto, 12 Allen (Mass.), 472; Martin v. Caudle, 72 Ind. 67. When once conceded that the hotel building is-personal property, it establishes the chattel mortgage of Mrs. Judd as the superior lien. For a criterion by which to determine whether an immovable fixture is-personal property or real estate, see Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 530; Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 296; McCrea v. Bank, 66 N. Y. 489; Ottumwa Woolen Mills v. Hawley, 44 Iowa, 59, One who purchases fixtures-with a view that they shall be annexed to, or placed in, a building of which he is the owner, and who executes a chattel mortgage on the property fixtures, thereby evinces his intention that the property shall retain its-character as personalty, regardless of the manner in which it may be annexed to the freehold. Eaves v. Estes, 10 Kan. 314; Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344; Bisson v. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542; Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377. When buildings and other trade fixtures are erected upon real estate upon the faith of an implied license from the owner, they will not be treated in equity as a part of the realty, in the hands of a subsequent purchaser who acquired his title with full knowledge of such license. Walgus v. Gettings, 21 Iowa, 177. Although it is a general rule that a building permanently annexed by the builder with his own money, for his own exclusive use, as disconnected from the use of the land, and with an agreement to that effect between the owner of the land and the builder, will, as between the parties, be considered as personal property. District Township of Corwin v. Moore-head, 43 Iowa, 466; Curtis v. Hoyt, 19 Conn. 154; Fuller v. Taylor, 39 Me. 519; Bringholff v. Munzenmaier, 20 Iowa, 513. When a person claims under a deed which by its recitals leads him to other facts affecting the title, he is presumed to know such facts. TEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Ford,'89 111. 246; United States Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 111. 483; Hassy v. Vinache, 1 McCrary, 213; 1 Jones on Mortgage, section 596. Possession by one who is not the owner of record is a fact which should induce one proposing to purchase or take a mortgage to inquire whether the possession is founded on any title. It is notice of the rights of the occupant, whatever they are. Truesdell v. Ford, 37 111. 210; Brown v. Gaffney, 28 111. 149; Doyle v. Stevens, 4 Mich. 87; Farmers’ Loan Co. v. Malthy, 8 Page (N. Y.), 361; Groff v. Bamsey, 19 Minn. 44. Such possession is also held to be notice of a collateral .agreement held by the tenant relating to the property. Kerr v. Day, 14 Penn. 112. Where one person by the permission of another erects a house upon that other party’s land, such building will, if the builder have no estate in the land, be the personal property of the builder. Aldrich v. Parson, 6 N. H. 555; Osgood v. Howard, 6 Greenleaf, 452; Bussell v '. Bichards, 1 Par. 429; Ashum v. Williams, 8 Pick. 402; Bogers v. Woodbury, 15 Pick. 156; Washburn on Real Property, section 3; Eastman v. Foster, 8 Mete. 26; Ogden v. Stoch, 34 111. 522. The permanency of attachment, and its character in law does not depend so much upon the degree of physical force with which the thing is attached, or the manner of its attachment, as upon the motive and intention of the party attaching it. It must usually depend on the express or implied understanding of the parties concerned. Coleman v. Stearns, 38 Mich. 40; Crippen v. Morrison, 13 Mich. 23; Adams v. Lee, 31 Mich. 440; McAuliffe v. Mann, 37 Mich. 539; Jones v. Chair Co., 38 Mich. 92; Robertson v. Corsett, 39 Mich. 777; Ingersoil v. Barnes, 47 Mich. 104, 10 N. W. Rep. 127; Ferris v. Quimby, 41 Mich. 202, 2 N. W. Rep. 9; Wheeler v. Bedell, 40 Mich. 696; Manivaring v. Jenison, 27 N. W. Rep. 899. 'The rule of construction in favor of fixtures retaining their personal character is much stronger as between landlord and tenant than between heirs and executors or vendors and vendees. Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Haiuley, 44 Iowa, 59; Adams v. Beadle, 47 -Iowa, 439; Denham v. Sanke, 38 Iowa, 269; 2 Kent Com. [8 Ed.], 409; Snoivdon v. Craig, 26 Iowa, 156. The mere fact that a building is upon leased land does not constitute it a part thereof. Nigro v. Hatch, 11 Arizona Rep. 177; Docking v. Frasell, 17 Kan. 160; Kile v. Giebner, 7 Pa. 154. Kelly has no right or interest whereby he can acquire the realty by a payment therefor. His interest lacks the element that connects the title of the person.alty with the realty. Where by agreement between landlord and tenant the right of removing fixtures is reserved to the tenant, it seems that such fixtures remain personal property. Hartwell v. Kelly, 117 Mass. 235; Alexander v: Touby, 13 Kan. 64; Adams v. Cioddard, 48 Me. 212; Ewell on Fixtures, chap. 3, 4.</p> <p>“It is a general principle of law that a building permanently annexed to the freehold becomes a part of it, and is real estate.” District Township v. Mooreheacl, 43 Iowa, 466. One of the leading cases in this country on this question is the case of Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio 53t. 511. The evidence shows the foundation of the building to be on the ground, and at some places beneath the surface. The controlling evidence of the intent of these parties is in the lease, and, if at time of the-executing of this lease it .was the intention of the parties that the building should become part of the realty, no act of Kelly’s afterwards could sunder or sever it, for the^owners of the land then became vested with ownership of the buildings. The lease provides that Kelly is to keep the. property insured against loss-by fire; why, if the company were not the owners of the building, should they be interested in the question of insurance? At the expiration of the term of the-lease, it is provided that the company may pay the appraised value of the building, and retain the same. In only one contingency has Kelly the right to remove-the buildings and that only in the event that the company require him to do so. If he can not remove-them, are they not fixtures that pertain to, and become a part of, the realty? ICutter v. Smith, 2 Wallace, 491. Kelly’s rights in the building are those simply of a. tenant, and are plainly fixed and determined by his lease. Fletcher had notice of the fact that Kelly could not assign the lease, both actual and constructive, when he took his mortgage; he knew that he was violating the lease, and,that he could acquire no rights thereby. The cross bill set up these facts, and set up the election of the appellants, Wheeler & Flint, to-terminate and declare null the lease. They had the right to ' do this, as they had succeeded to all of the-interest of the railroad company, and had the company’s title to the land. Conceding that the mortgage which Kelly gave conferred upon Fletcher a right to the interest Kelly had, what did he have? Simply a. right, after the property had been appraised, to receive' from the railroad company or from Wheeler & Flint, the two-thirds of the appraised value of the building..</p> <p>Kelly'was the owner of an estate in the land. He-had an estate for years in 'the land, and the buildings. were connected with, andpartof, that estate. He had an interest in the land, and the buildings were attached to, and part of, that interest. By his mortgage to plaintiff he conveyed all his interest in the premises, his estate in the land, and the buildings attached thereto. “The words land, real estate and real property, include lands, tenements and interests, hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests therein, equitable as well as legal.’'’ Code, section 45, subdiv. 8. “Every conveyance of real estate passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used.” Code, section 1930; Frederick v. Callahan, 40 Iowa, 313. Kelly covenanted in the mortgage that he had good right, and lawful authority to sell the property, and warranted the title against all persons. And the mortgage estops him from claiming he was not the owner of the land. The general rule between mortgagor and mortgagee, is that all annexations to the realty pass by the mortgage, unless by express terms the mortgagor except them from the terms of the conveyance. 8 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, page 50, and notes. Fixtures pass to a Iona fide purchaser of the real estate, notwithstanding an agreement between the owner of the land and the vendor of the fixtures, that they should remain personal property. 8 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, page 56, citing Bringholff v. Mumemnaier, 20 Iowa, 513; Knowltonv. Johnson, FI Mich. 47, and other cases. Fixtures annexed to real estate already mortgaged, pass to the mortgagee. 8 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, pages 50, 51, and notes. Most cases hold that chattels already mortgaged, if afterwards attached to realty so as to become fixtures, may be held under the chattel mortgage against a prior mortgage on the land, if they can be removed without serious injury. 8 Am; and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, page 51 and notes, citing First National Banlt v. Flmore, 52 Iowa, 541. All that Wheeler & Flint could claim would be the surplus over the payment of plaintiff’s mortgage. 'McClain’s Code, section 3317; German Banlt v. Sclotte, 59 Iowa, 316; Curtis v. Broadivell, 66 Iowa, 662; Miller v. Seal, 71 Iowa, 392.</p>

<p>Estates of Decedents: administrator’s risht to rents of land. Where the real estate of a decedent was mortgaged, and the mortgage was foreclosed and the land sold, but the widow and adult heirs were in possession during the year for redemption, and the administrator-had no order of court to apply the rents and profits to the payment of claims, held, that he could not recover such rents and profits of the widow and heirs, though there were no other assets available for the payment of debts.</p>

— Hon. J. P. Con-nor, Judge. Action by the plaintiff to recover the value of certain oats, claimed by Mm by virtue of a landlord’s lien for rent due and unpaid. Answer in denial, and plea of estoppel. Jury waived, trial to the court, and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Dubuque District Court. — Hon. John J. Ney, Judge.</p> <p>Action against tbie defendant for the .recovery of nine thousand dollars, being the proceeds of United States bonds which the plaintiff claims the defendant received from the decedent, John McNamara, and converted to its own use. From a verdict and judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Highways: obstruction: evidence of dedication: plat. In the prosecution of a railway eofnpany for obstructing a city street by buildings upon its depot grounds, the question was whether or not the street crossed the grounds, and that depended upon whether or not there had been dedicated to publie use that portion of the land which was necessary to make the street continuous over the depot grounds. The original plat of the city was substantially the only evidence in the case. That plat showed the depot grounds, with an unbroken line bounding them intersecting all the streets approaching these grounds, including the street in question, except the streets at either extremity of the grounds, across which was a broken line, and in the case of some of the streets the name of the street appeared on the plat on one side of the depot grounds, and the word “street” on the other side. Held, that, while the meaning of the plat was properly submitted to the jury, it did not show a dedication of the street across the depot grounds beyond a reasonable doubt, which was necessary to a verdict of guilty in such a case.</p>

— Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge. Action to recover an amount-alleged to be due the plaintiff for services rendered in effecting an exchange of real estate. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. J. H. Preston, ' Judge. Action to recover for cattle filled by the defendant’s train. There was a judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. Action in equity to enforce a mechanic’s lien for material, machinery, and labor furnished for the completion of an oatmeal mill. The defendant answered, denying that the plaintiff! filed with the clerk of the court a statement of its claim, as required by law, and •alleging, by way of counterclaim, a failure to complete the mill within the time and in the manner required by the contract, and asking damages.

<p>Justices of the Peace: civil liability tor otticial misconduct: pleading. The petition in this case averred that the defendant was a justice of the peace; that in a cause wherein the plaintiffs herein were defendants, the said justice rendered a judgment against these plaintiffs; that they had filed an appeal bond, which said justice had approved, and that he had agreed to send up the transcript, expressly waiving payment of his fees therefor in advance; that ten days after this he notified the plaintiffs of the amount of his fees, and that he would not send up the transcript without payment, and ten days later still he entered in his docket: “And defendants filed bond, the appeal was allowed, and the defendants to pay for the transcript and bond before the appeal was taken, but the defendants refused to pay for the transcript and bond, and the appeal was not taken;” that this entry was false, and corruptly made, with intentto injure the plaintiffs and prevent an appeal; that afterwards he issued execution upon the judgment, under which the plaintiffs’ property was sold to their damage; and that they had a good defense to the action in which the judgment was rendered. Held, that the petition stated a good cause of action, and that it was the right of the plaintiffs under it to show that the acts of the defendant were malicious and corrupt, and not merely the result of the mistaken judgment of a judicial officer.</p>

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. Action to recover au amount alleged to be due on a promissory note. After the evidence for the defendant had been introduced, the court sustained a motion • of the plaintiff tó direct a verdict in his favor. A verdict was returned as directed for the amount of the note, and judgment was rendered thereon in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

<p>1. Highways: dedication by conduct: intent: evidence. Where the only evidence of the dedication of a highway is the conduct of the owner of the land, it is his right, in denial of the claimed dedication, to state what his intention was in doing as he did; for there can be no dedication by conduct where there is no such intention, and the intention is a material fact to which he may testify. Accordingly, where the owner, in planting a grove, had left a space along the line of the alleged highway, it was his right to state his purpose in doing so.</p> <p>2. -: -: -: -. Where, in an action involving the question of the dedication of a highway by the conduct of the owner, it was sought to bind the owner by evidence that he had heard rumors that there was a road along his land, and of his acts after hearing of such rumors, held, that it was error not to permit the owner to testify that, when he heard such rumors, he employed counsel to ascertain whether there was a road located along his line, and that he was informed by counsel that there was none. Such evidence was material as bearing upon the question of his intention.</p>

— Hon. L. O. Hatch, Judge. Action at law to recover of the defendants for the failure to guarantee the payment of a draft drawn by. the plaintiff’s assignor on the Nashua Union Woolen Mill Company.

<p>Appeal from Woodbury District Court. — Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge.</p> <p>Action in detinue to recover a certain certificate of deposit for thirty-five dollars. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.</p> <p>The amount in controversy being less than one hundred dollars, the appeal is upon a certificate of the trial judge, as follows: “Wilber F. Wills v. Martin Neilan, as Police Judge of Sioux City, Iowa.</p> <p>“The undersigned, judge of said court, hereby certifies that the above case involves the determination of a question of law upon which it is desirable to have the opinion of the supreme court. On the seventeenth day of Januai’y, 1891, Wilber F. Wills was arrested for frequenting a bawdy house within the limits of Sioux City, Iowa. He gave bond for his appearance in the police court before the defendant, as judge, on January 19, 1891, and delivered, as part of said bond, a certificate of .deposit amounting to thirty-five dollars. That the said Wills appeared in said court on the nineteenth day of January, 1891, and was adjudged, guilty of frequenting a bawdy house, and fined ten dollars, or three days in the city jail, and the said Wills elected to take the jail part of the sentence, and the court orally ordered, at the time of rendering the judgment, that ten dollars of the certificate be applied on the fine, and the balance of said certificate be returned to said Wills, and he be released, said oral order not being entered of record until some-five days afterwards, and more than three days thereafter. That said Wills was never imprisoned, but brought an action in detinue against the defendant in justice’s court for the whole of said certificate of deposit. The justice held that the said Wills was entitled to the possession of the whole of said certificate of deposit, and rendered judgment against the defendant for thirty-five dollars or the return of the certificate. From that decision the defendant appealed to the district court, where the decision of the justice was affirmed. From the above facts an opinion is desired on the following question: Is a police judge liable to a civil action in detinue in a case where he imposed a fine of ten dollars or three days in the city jail, for applying, out of a certificate of deposit in his possession as bail at the time of the trial, the amount of the fine imposed, when the prisoner preferred to serve the jail part of the sentence, and under the circumstances above related?</p> <p>“Scott M. Ladd, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of Iowa.</p> <p>“July 8,1891.”</p>

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. The defendant was convicted of the crime of burglary, and adjudged to be imprisoned in the penitentiary at Ft.. Madison for the period of sis years, and to pay the costs. From that judgment he appeals.

— Hon. A. E. Dewey, Judge. The defendants were indicted and put on trial for the crime “of compelling a woman to be defiled against her will. ” After the state rested, the defendants moved to take the case from the jury, and that they be discharged, “for the reason that all the testimony on the part of the state does not constitute the crime charged in the indictment.” This'motion was sustained, and the state appeals.

— Hon. Gr. W. Buddick, Judge. Action against the defendant for compensation for services as an attorney. From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. W. I. Babb, Judge. Action to quiet title to certain lands. There was a trial to the court, resulting in a decree against the plaintiff, and judgment against her for costs, from which she appeals.

— Hon. J. L. Stevens, Judge. Action for mandamus to compel the defendant to file and approve a teacher’s contract. Judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appeals.

— Hon. G. W. Wakefield, Judge. Action to enjoin the payment, and for the cancellation, of certain county bonds.' Decree for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appeal.

— Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge. Action at law, aided by attachment, to recover the amount of a judgment rendered in Maryland. Richard S. Culbreth intervened, claiming an interest in the attached property. -There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment in - favor of the plaintiff for eighteen thousand, two hundred and thirty dollars and fifteen cents and costs, and in favor of the intervenor as to the attached property. The plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Woodbury District Court. — Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge.</p> <p>Action to recover an amount alleged to be due the plaintiff as compensation for effecting a sale of real estate which was owned by the defendants. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.</p>

— Hon. J. H. Appelgate, Judge. Action against the defendant for the price of a harvester. The defense was a breach of warranty. There was a jury trial resulting in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Lot Thomas, Judge. The defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment for nuisance, and on February 22, 1893, judgment was entered that he pay a fine of three hundred dollars, and costs taxed at one hundred and thirty-five dollars and eighty cents, including an attorney’s fee of twenty-five dollars, and that he be committed to the jail of Clay county for ninety days unless the fine and costs be sooner paid. The defendant appeals.

— Hon. W. F. Conrad, Judge. Action to recover- damages for a persoual injury resulting from a defective bridge. There was atrial to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Polk District Court. — Hon. W. F. Conrad, Judge.</p> <p>The plaintiff, a resident of the state of Iowa, brought this action in equity, aided by attachment, .against the defendant, a resident of the state of Ohio, to set aside a settlement, and for an accounting and judgment. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the action was sustained, and judgment entered accordingly, from which the plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Audubon District Court. — Hon. Geobge Oabson, Judge.</p> <p>Action on two promissory notes. From a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.</p>

— Hon Scott M. Ladd, Judge. . Action on a promissory note, jointly made by the defendants to the plaintiff firm. The defendant Ferguson alone answers, pleading, among other defenses, an estoppel. The jury found for the defendant Ferguson on his plea of estoppel, and from a judgment on the-verdict the plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Appeal: question not raised below. In a proceeding to establish a claim against the estate of a decedent, the defense that it was not filed and proved within twelve months after the notice of administration can not be raised for the first time in the supreme court.</p> <p>2. Estates of Decedents: provino claims against: evidence necessary. Since by Code, section 2410, all claims against an estate, which are not admitted by the executor, are considered as denied without any pleading on behalf of the estate, it is error for the court to allow a claim not so admitted, without proof on the part of the claim ant of the amount due; and a mere showing that he had agreed to perform certain work for the decedent for a certain price, and that he had done the work, is not sufficient.</p> <p>3. ---: EVIDENCE OE PERSONAL TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEDENT. Where a claim against an estate was "based upon a written contract between the plaintiff and the decedent for the erection of a house for the latter according to certain plans and specifications, held, that the plaintiff, under section 3639 of the Code, was properly permitted to testify whether or not he had the contract, and whether he had ever had it, or knew where it was placed, as such testimony did not relate to a personal transaction with the decedent; but that it was error, under the same section, to permit him to state that a certain exhibit was a part of the specifications under which the house was built, and that it was also error to permit him to testify as to the provisions of the contract which was shown to be lost.</p>

— Hon. J. L. Hosted, Judge. The plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the defendant, H. D. Kelley, who is insolvent, bring this action in equity to declare a certain chattel mortgage and bill of sale executed by the defendant Kelley to the defendant Linehan void, and to subject money in the hands of the defendant J. J. Dunn, derived from the sale of part of the mortgaged property, to the payment of their judgments.

— Hon. J. L. Stevens, Judge. The facts of the case, without substantial dispute, are as follows: The defendant Losier is the administratrix of the estate of Johanna Cohn, deceased. On December 20, 1886, H. C. Riefe was the owner of a stock of goods at Charles City, Iowa, and was there engaged in selling the same at retail. On that day he traded said stock of goods to James Thompson, a resident of Franklin county, Iowa.

— Hon. J. C. Mitchell, Judge. The defendant was charged by indictment as follows: “The said Joshua Burk, on the seventh day of (September, A. D. 1891, in the county and state aforesaid, did then and there sell and vend liniments, nostrums, ointments and other drugs to one Asa Hale, the said Joshua Burk then and there being an itinerant vender of said drugs and nostrums, and did then and there publicly profess to said Asa Hale, to whom he then and there sold said drags and…

— Hon. D. Ryan, Judge. The defendant was accused of the crime of maliciously threatening another to compel her to do an act against her will, was tried; by jury, found guilty, and adjudged to be imprisoned in the penitentiary at Ft, Madison. From that judgment, he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Cass District Court. — Hon. N. W. Macy, Judge.</p> <p>The defendant was indicted, tried, convicted, and 'sentenced for seducing one Bridget Dunley, who is alleged to have been an unmarried woman, of previously chaste character. The defendant appeals.</p>

— Hon. W. P. Conrad, Judge. By the petition it appears that the plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of the city of Des Moines; that the defendant board was elected by the legal voters of said city at the city election in April, 1892; that said board has certified to the county auditor of Polk county a tax of one mill on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the taxable property of said city for assessment and collection; that the board has prepared, in amount, three…

— Hon. D. Ryan, Judge. The city of Oskaloosa entered into an agreement with the plaintiff by which he was to pave certain streets in the city around a public square for a specified compensation. The work was properly done, and there remains unpaid for the part of the paving abutting on the public square that which would be assessable thereto. For this part of the paving the city issued certificates of assessments against the public square and Mahaska county.

<p>Appeal from Webster District Court. — Hon. S. M. Weaver, Judge.</p> <p>Indictment for nuisance in obstructing a highway. Plea of not guilty. Verdict of guilty. Sentence imposed. The defendant appeals.</p>

— Hon. G. W. Wakefield, Judge. Indictment for burglary. There was a verdict of guilty, and judgment thereon, and the defendant appealed. -There is no appearance in this court for the defendant, and no briefs or arguments in the case. The attorney general appeared for the submission.

— Hon. John T. Stoneman, Judge. Action in replevin for certain liquors. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was overruled; and, the defendant having elected to 'stand on the demurrer, judgment was entered accordingly, from which he appealed.

— Hon. James D. Smyth, Judge. Action by a principal against his agent to recover for losses sustained through the acts of the agent., The facts are stated in the opinion.

- — Hon. Charles D. Leggett, Judge. Action to recover double the value of two animals claimed to have been killed by the defendant’s trains. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff from which the defendant appeals.

— Hon. D. Byan, Judge. Action in equity to redeem from a foreclosure sale of land under a senior mortgage. The plaintiff claims the right to redeem upon the grounds that she was the owner of a junior mortgage at and ever since the commencement of the action to foreclose the senior mortgage, and was not made a party to that action.

— Hon. A. Howat, Judge. Action in equity by which the plaintiff, who is a judgment creditor of the defendant, J. B. Miller, seeks to subject certain land to the payment of his judgment indebtedness. The land was formerly owned by said J. B. Miller, and, after the debts upon which the judgment indebtedness is founded were contracted, said J. B. Miller conveyed the land to the defendant, D. Y. Miller.

— Hon. D. E. Hindman, Judge. The plaintiff is the son of Mary Nelson, who was the widow of Antone Nelson, who died, leaving two children, Neis M. and Cora; the plaintiff not being a son of Antone Nelson. Antone died leaving forty acres of land and some personal property. The defendant was a brother of Antone Nelson, and after his death was married to his widow, Mary.

— Hon. George H. Carr, Judge. Action of mandamus to compel the defendant and its hoard of directors to meet the plaintiff’s board of directors, or to appoint arbitrators for making an equitable division of the assets and liabilities of the district township of Lu Verne as they existed at the time of the plaintiff’s organisation. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

— Hon. W. A. Hoyt, Judge. Novembf,r 12, 1890, John B. Kaye, county attorney, commenced this action in equity to enjoin the defendant Severson from maintaining a liquor nuisance upon the' prerhises'described, and the defendant Barthell, as owner of said premises, from permitting the same to be so kept and used. 'Barthell answered, admitting that he had'owned the premises since September 9, 1890- under a sheriff’s deed on a foreclosure salé against Severson; that Severson and…

<p>Lease: reformation: mutual mistake: evidence.</p>

— Hon. George W. Wakefield, Judge. Action in equity for the specific performance of an alleged contract for the sale of a tract of land. The defendant denied that he at any time entered into a contract with the plaintiff, as alleged in the petition. There was a full hearing on the merits, and a decree for the defendant. 'The plaintiff appeals.

— Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge. This is an action at law to recover the proceeds of the sale of certain .cattle which tho plaintiff’s assignor shipped to Chicago, in the name of the defendants. The defense was that the said money was not due to the plaintiff, because it was held by the defendants as the cash payment upon another lot of cattle purchased by plaintiff’s assignor from the defendants.

<p>Appeal: insufficient record : dismissal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Harrison District Court. — Hon. George W. Wakefield, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Pollc District Court. — Hon. O. P. Holmes, Judge.</p>

<p>Criminal Case: no error found.</p>

— Hon. George Carson, Judge. This is an action at law to recover damages of the defendant for certain alleged fraudulent representations made by the defendant to the plaintiff, touching the title to certain real estate, by which the plaintiff was induced to purchase the same from the defendant. It is alleged that the defendant had no title to said real estate. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

- — Hon. D. R. Hindman, Judge. Indictment for an assault with an intent to commit murder. There was a verdict of assault with intent to inflict a great bodily injury. Prom the judgment on the verdict, the defendant appeals.

— Hon. E. It. Gaynor, Judge. Action in equity for an accounting and settlement of a copartnership, and for judgment on a bond given by the defendant Smith, with defendants H. S. Payn and J. H. Hoffman as his sureties, to the plaintiff, to secure the performance of certain stipulations in the contract of copartnership. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for six hundred and thirty-five dollars. The defendants appeal.

Proceeding by certiorari to review the action of the district court in and for Polk county, adjudging the plaintiff guilty of contempt.

— Hon. George W. Paine, Judge. This is an action at law to recover damages for an alleged trespass upon a farm, by entering thereon, and cutting and carrying away part of the crops. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

— -Hon. J. M. Casey, Judge. The plaintiff brings this action upon the official bond of the defendant Fullerton as sheriff. He asks to recover of him as principal, and of the defendants J. N. Martin and J. W. Gilbert as his sureties, damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the wrongful taking and keeping of a certain stock of millinery goods.

— -Hon. J. H. Macomber, Judge. Action in equity to subject certain real estate and personal property to the payment of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants. Decree was entered for plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

— Hon. N. W. Macy, Judge. Action to recover the value of certain personal property, in excess of the amount of a mortgage thereon, owned by the defendants. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal.

— Hon. E. L. Burton, Judge. The plaintiffs, heirs at law and legatees under the last will and testament of Thomas Moorman, deceased, alleged that said deceased died seized in fee simple of certain real estate described, in which the widow’s dower interest has been set off to her; that said last will and testament contains the following provision: “Item Second. I will that th^ balance of my land be sold to the highest bidder, for ready money.

— Hon. E. E. Gaynor, Judge. The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted upon a charge of keeping and maintaining a building with the intent to sell intoxicating liquors therein, and was adjudged to pay a fine of four hundred dollars, from which he appeals.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of keeping a place in which he kept for sale, and sold, intoxicating liquors in violation of law. Prom the judgment of the district court, requiring him to pay a line and costs, and committing him to jail in default of payment, he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sioux District Court. — Hon. P. R. Gaynor, Judge.</p>

— Hon. C. D. Goldsmith, Judge. Action at law to recover the value of a horse lulled on a public crossing of the defendant’s railroad by one of the defendant’s engines while in the operation of the road. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The' defendant appeals.

— Hon. S. H. Fairall, Judge. Action for money had and received, an equitable counterclaim, and a decree from which the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Liquor Nuisance: conviction: appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Polk District Court. — Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge.</p> <p>Indictment for a liquor nuisance. The defendant was convicted, sentenced, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Polk District Court. — Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge.</p>

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. The defendant was convicted of the crime of keeping a house of ill-fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness. From the judgment, which required him to be imprisoned in the penitentiary at. Ft. Madison for the period of eighteen months, and to pay the costs, the defendant appeals.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. The defendant was convicted of the crime of nuisance committed by maintaining a place in which he kept for sale, and sold, in violation of law, intoxicating liquors. Prom the judgment imposing a fine, and providing for his imprisonment in case of a failure to pay the fine and costs, and for the abatement of the nuisance, the defendant appeals.

— Hon. C. P. Holmes, Judge. The defendants were indicted for a liquor nuisance; were convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of three hundred dollars each, and costs and attorneys’ fees, and to stand committed to the jail of Polk county, Iowa, for one hundred and seven days, unless said fine and costs should be sooner paid. The defendant, Luick, excepted, and he appeals.

— Hon. A. R. Dewey, Judge. Action in equity to enjoin a liquor nuisance. Judgment and decree dismissing the plaintiff’s petition. The plaintiff appeals.

<p>Nuisance: conviction: appeal.</p>

— Hon. John R. Caldwell, Judge. Indictment for a liquor nuisance. Verdict of guilty, and judgment, from which the defendant appealed. The cause was submitted by the attorney general on an abstract, without argument by either party.

— Hon. E. L. Burton, Judge. The plaintiff states as his cause of action that he placed in the hands of the defendant, an attorney at law, a certain promissory note for collection; that the defendant brought an action on said note, and pending said action, without authority so to do, settled said action, and received from the defendants therein five hundred and fifty dollars in full satisfaction of said note, that being a less amount than was then due upon said note; that the…

— Hon. James D. Smythe, Judge. The plaintiff seeks, by this action, to charge the garnishee, E. T. Dankwardt, with being indebted to, or having property in his hands belonging to, one Jacob Wertz. Dankwardt, the garnishee, answered, denying that he was in any manner indebted to Wertz, or that he had any property of Wertz’s under his control. Issue was taken by the plaintiff upon the answer of the garnishee.

— Hon. David Ryan, Judge. Action to recover possession of a piano manufactured by the plaintiff company, and known as number 1406. At the conclusion of the testimony introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, the court sustained the defendant’s motion for a verdict, and judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.