88 N.C. App. 606 - Becker v. Becker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a legislative enactment of public policy so strongly favoring the equal division of marital property that an equal division is made mandatory “unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable.” N.C.G.S. 50-20(c). The clear intent of the legislature was that a party desiring an unequal division of marital property bear the burden of producing evidence concerning one or more of the twelve factors in the statute and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an equal division would not be equitable. Therefore, if no evidence is admitted tending to show that an equal division would be inequitable, the trial court must divide the marital property equally. When evidence tending to show that an equal division of marital property would not be equitable is admitted, however, the trial court must exercise its discretion in assigning the weight each factor should receive in any given case. It must then make an equitable division of the marital property by balancing the evidence presented by the parties in light of the legislative policy which favors equal division.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 140 N.C. App. 552 - Khajanchi v. Khajanchi · 147 N.C. App. 677 - Crowder v. Crowder

2. “The trial court found that the marital residence had a rental value during the post-separation period when it was occupied by defendant. Defendant does not take issue with the value component found by the trial court, but argues that the trial court was without authority to include any such value in the marital estate. We agree with defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (b)(l) provides: (1) “Marital property” means all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties. . . . Thus, the statute makes it clear that for the purpose of classification of property (as either marital or separate) the marital estate is frozen as of the date of separation. While its components clearly may increase in value after separation and before distribution, see e.g. Swindell v. Lewis, 82 N.C. App. 423 , 346 S.E.2d 237 (1986), no new property may be added to the marital estate after the date of separation. Our decision does not mean that a trial court is foreclosed from considering the post-separation use of the marital residence in reaching its decision as to whether an equal distribution is equitable. G.S. § 50-20(c) contains provisions pertinent to this issue as follows: (c) There shall be an equal division . . . unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable. If the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide the marital property equi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 111 N.C. App. 541 - Wilkins v. Wilkins