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← 88 Ohio App. 3d 379 - Besser v. Griffey

88 Ohio App. 3d 379 - Besser v. Griffey’s Empirical Analysis

1993

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
1
states following
March 2024
most recently cited

36 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently March 2024 · most notably State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School District Board of Education (1995), In re Kister (2011)

36 state decisions

1901993200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. · 33 Ohio App. 3d 220 - Biskupich v. Westbay Manor Nursing Home · Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education · Marshall v. Aaron

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In determining that summary judgment should not be entered sua sponte , the Ohio Supreme Court relied in part on federal case law under similar provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 . See Marshall v. Aaron (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 48 , 51 , 15 OBR 145 , 147 , 472 N.E.2d 335 , 338 . Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte , so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all her evidence." (Emphasis added.) Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317 , 326 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 2554 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 , 275 . The federal appellate courts now permit a sua sponte entry of summary judgment provided that the nonmovant is given the notice dictated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 so that he can marshall evidence to show a genuine issue of fact. See, generally, N.L. Industries, Inc. v. GHR Energy Corp. (C.A.5, 1991), 940 F.2d 957 , 965 ; Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aries Marine Corp. (C.A.5, 1991), 932 F.2d 442 , 445 ; Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Edn. (C.A.3, 1990), 913 F.2d 1064 , 1069 ; Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez (C.A. 1, 1989), 878 F.2d 1555 , 1560 . The Ohio Supreme Court, nevertheless, appears to have maintained its disapproval of sua sponte summary judgments notwithstanding the change in federal *Page 14 case law. See Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84 , 94 , 585 N.E.2d 384 , 393 . * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “Our Supreme Court has consistently indicated that a sua sponte entry of summary judgment is not permitted under Ohio law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.