Clark Assignee v. Iselin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate · 31 district · 37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 133 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Xow, in a case where a creditor, holding a confession of judgment per-Ecu ¡y lawful when it was given, causes the judgment to be entered of record, hovv'ttin if he said the debtor procures the catty at the time it is made? It is true, the judgment is entered in virtue of his authority, — an authority given when the confession was signed. That may have been years before, or, if not, it may have been when the debtor was perfectly solvent. But no consent is given when the entry is made, where the confession becomes', an actual judgment, and when the preterence, if it be a preference,, is obtained. The & btor has nothing to do viih the entry. As to that ho is entirety passive. Ordinarily he knows nothing of it, and he could not prevent it if lie would. It is impossible, therefore, to maintain that such a judgment is obtained by him when his confession is placed on record. Such an assertion, if made, must rest on a mere fiction. And so- it has been decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Balfour v. Wheeler · Duncan v. Landis

2. ““ Now, in a case where a creditor, holding a confession of judgment perfectly lawful when it was given, causes the judgment to be entered of record, how can it be said the debtor procures the entry at the time it is made? It is true the judgment is entered in virtue of his authority, an authority given when the confession was signed. That may have been years before, or, if not, it may have been when the debtor was perfectly solvent. But .no consent is given when tbe entry is made, where the confession becomes an actual judgment, and when the preference, if it be a preference, is obtained. The debtor has nothing to do frith • the entry. As to that he is entirely passive. Ordinarily he knows nothing of it, and he could not prevent it if he would. It is irhpossible, therefore, to maintain that such a judgment is obtained by him when his confession is placed on record. Such an assertion, if made, must rest on a mere fiction. And so it has been decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Sleek v. Turner's Assignee, Legal Intelligence, Sept. 25, 1894. “ More than this, as 'we have seen, in order to make a judgment and execution against an insolvent debtor a preference fraudulent under the law, the debtor must have procured them with a view or intent to give a preference, and that intent must-have existed \yhen the judgment was entered. But how- can a'debtor be said, tfe intend a wrongful preference at the time-a judgment is obtained against him when he knows nothing-of the judgme”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wilson v. Nelson

3. “a fair exchange of values may be made at any time, even if one of the parties to the transaction be insolvent. There is nothing in the Bankrupt Act, either in its language or object, which prevents an insolvent from dealing with .his prop-' erty, selling it.or ex-ehanging it for other property, at any time before proceedings in bankruptcy are taken by or against him, provided such dealing be conducted without any purpose to defraud or delay his creditors or give preference to any one, and does not impair the value of his estate. An insolvent is not bound in the misfortune of his insolvency to abandon all dealing with his property; his creditors can only-complain-if he waste his estate or give preference in its disposition to one over another. His dealing will stand if it leavé his estate in as good plight and condition as previously.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stewart v. Platt