Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 88 U.S. 73 - Hamilton v. Dillin

Hamilton v. Dillin’s Empirical Analysis

88 U.S. 73 · 1874

Citation profile

50
cited by 50 later decisions
17
cited 17 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
February 2026
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 50 later decisions (17 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2026 · most notably Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), Downes v. Bidwell (1901)

11 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

1101874188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “* * * The conditions exacted by him [the President] were not imposed in the exercise of the taxing power, but of the war power of the government. The exaction itself was not properly a tax, but a bonus required as a condition precedent for engaging in the trade. * * * •i* :!: * * It is hardly necessary, under the view we have taken of the character of the regulations in question, and of the charge or bonus objected to by the plaintiffs, to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the act of July 13th, 1861, regarded as authorizing such regulations. As before stated, the power of the government to impose such conditions upon commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war as it sees fit, is undoubted. It is a power which every other government in the world claims and exercises, and which belongs to the government of the United States as incident to the power to declare war and to carry it on to a successful termination. We regard the regulations in question as nothing more than the exercise of this power. It does not belong to the same category as the power to levy and eolleot taxes, duties, and excises. It belongs to the war powers of the government, just as much so as the power to levy military contributions, or to perform any other belligerent act. [Emphasis added.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “It shows, however, that the rule of construction depends, at least in some sort, upon the ■nature of the subject-matter. In the case before us, the power of the government to open and regulate trade with the enemy was intended to be conferred upon the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. The power of regulation in such a case is to be taken in its broadest sense, and, in our judgment, included the power to impose such conditions as the President and Secretary should see fit.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[W]hatever view may be taken as to the precise boundary between the legislative and executive powers in reference to [trade with the Confederacy during wartime] there is no doubt that a concurrence of both affords ample foundation for any regulations on the subject.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.