Childers v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.’s Empirical Analysis
881 F.2d 1259 · 1989
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 8 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 50 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably Jackson v. Kimel (1993), Martin Marietta Corporation Aero Naval Systems v. Maryland Commission on Human Relations (1994)
12 federal appellate · 8 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1441 · 29 U.S.C. § 185 (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act))
Relies on Erie Co v. Tompkins · United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs · Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California · Singleton v. Wulff · Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“is limited to those whose lack of merit is apparent. Where the plaintiff appears to state a claim under state law, a federal district court would be well-advised to proceed to the § 301 inquiry and, if the state claim is not preempted, to remand the entire action to state court. Where the complaint, however, plainly fails to state a cause of action under state law, it is open to the federal court to dismiss it.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“federal court has jurisdiction in a removed § 301 action to address the merits of alleged state-law claims in the course of determining its own jurisdiction, and [may] dismiss meritless state-law claims”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Even with a provision such as § 502(a)(1)(B) that lies at the heart of a statute with the unique pre-emptive force of ERISA, however, we would be reluctant to find that extraordinary preemptive power, such as has been found with respect to § 301 of the LMRA, that converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule. But the language of the jurisdictional subsection of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions closely parallels that of § 301 of the LMRA. [T]he touchstone of the federal district court’s removal jurisdiction is not the “obviousness” of the pre-emption defense but the intent of Congress. Indeed, as we have noted, even an “obvious” pre-emption defense does not, in most cases, create removal jurisdiction. In this case, however, Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of §' 502(a) removable to federal court.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.