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← 883 F.2d 475 - Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation

Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation’s Empirical Analysis

883 F.2d 475 · 1989

Citation profile

68
cited by 68 later decisions
1
states following
August 2017
most recently cited

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 68 later decisions — most recently August 2017 · most notably Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court (2000), Jackson v. Quanex Corp. (1999)

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

4801989199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson · Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins · Patterson v. McLean Credit Union

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) The employee belongs to a protected group; (2) The employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, as defined in legislation. “Unwelcome” means that the employee did not solicit or incite it, but rather regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive; (3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex, i.e., but for her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment; (4) The harassment unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs work performance and created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment that seriously affected a term, condition or privilege of employment, which includes her state of psychological well-being. Whether sexual harassment in the workplace is sufficiently severe and persistent to seriously affect an employee’s psychological well-being is a question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances and evaluated based upon the reasonable woman standard; (5) Respondeat superior, i.e., she must show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. Knowledge can be determined by evidence of complaints or by evidence of pervasiveness.”
    8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “This standard ... takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. As we pointed out in Meritor, “mere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a[n] employee” ... does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII violation. But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality. The appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and t”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.