Watts v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[First], the court must compare the statute defining the crime charged and the statute defining the alleged lesser-in-eluded offense. If the alleged lesser-included offense maybe established by proof of all of the same or proof of less than all of the same material elements to the crime, or if the only difference between the two statutes is that the alleged lesser-included offense requires proof of a lesser culpability, then the alleged lesser-included offense is inherently included in the crime charged. [Second], if the trial court determines that the alleged lesser-included offense is not inherently included in the charged crime, it must compare the statute defining the alleged lesser-included offense with the charging instrument in the case. If all of the elements of the alleged lesser-included offense are covered by the allegations in the charging instrument, then the alleged lesser-included offense is factually included in the charged crime. [Third], [i]f the trial court has determined that the alleged lesser-included offense is either inherently or factually included in the charged crime, ... the trial court must examine the evidence presented by each party and determine whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute over the element or elements that distinguish the crime charged and the lesser-included offense. If it would be possible for a jury to find that the lesser, but not the greater, offense had been committed, then the trial court must instruct the jury on both”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terrence T. Walker v. State of Indiana · Paul J. Coy v. State of Indiana

2. “(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) kills another human being; or (2) kills a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in IC 16-18-2-365); while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon. (b) The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder under section 1(1) of this chapter to voluntary manslaughter.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. SUPRENANT v. State · Andrew McWhorter v. State of Indiana

3. “[T]his case illustrates how a voluntary manslaughter instruction in the absence of evidence of sudden heat can prejudice a defendant. One legitimate trial strategy for the defendant in a murder trial is an “all-or-nothing” one in which the defendant seeks acquittal while realizing that the jury might instead convict of murder. In a situation where a jury must choose between a murder conviction and an acquittal, the defendant might well be acquitted. But if the jury has voluntary manslaughter as an intermediate option, the defendant might be convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a “compromise.” Such a verdict is not appropriate if unsupported by any evidence of sudden heat; moreover, an, unsupported voluntary manslaughter instruction deprives the defendant of the opportunity to pursue a legitimate trial strategy.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. True v. State