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← 886 F.2d 247 - Chaloux v. Killeen

Chaloux v. Killeen’s Empirical Analysis

886 F.2d 247 · 1989

Citation profile

55
cited by 55 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
November 2010
most recently cited

23 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 55 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2010 · most notably Mary Elizabeth Leary v. Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent of the Jefferson County Board of Education (2000), Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990)

23 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

3001989199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 407 (§ 207 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 45 U.S.C. § 231M (Railroad Retirement Act of 1974)

Relies on Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York · Ex Parte: Edward T Young · Monroe v. Pape · Kentucky v. Graham · Will v. Michigan Department of State Police

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We reach this conclusion upon review of the policy justifications supporting the decision in Monell . The Monell Court set forth an “official policy or custom” requirement to limit § 1983 damage awards against municipalities. That limitation served to alleviate the imposition of financial liability on local governments based solely on a respondeat superior theory. We find no persuasive reasons for applying the Court’s “official policy or custom” requirement to suits against counties only for prospective relief. The justification for limiting an action for damages is notably absent when the relief sought is an injunction halting the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statutory scheme. The relief sought here, a declaration that the Idaho statutes are unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement, do not carry any threat of fiscal liability.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers. . . . [They can also be sued for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id., at 690-691 (footnote omitted).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions against state officers in their official capacities if the plaintiffs seek only a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.