Banner v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “is essentially a question of legislative intent.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Luther A. Woodfork v. Harry K. Russell · Jones v. Baker

2. “In Pryor, a habeas case involving the question of multiple punishments, our en banc court independently interpreted the scope of Tennessee criminal statutes for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. WTiile indicating that the views of the Tennessee Supreme Court on the double jeopardy issue were entitled to consideration, id. at 530 , relying upon Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 , 692, 100 S.Ct. 1432 , 1438, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), and its application of Blockburger, we held that multiple punishment was forbidden under the double jeopardy clause. In evaluating Pryor’s claim and holding that the Tennessee legislature did not intend cumulative punishments, we stated: “We therefore hold that the Tennessee legislature has not dearly indicated that consecutive sentences are proper in the situation presented by this case.” 724 F.2d at 531 (emphasis supplied). Analysis in prior Tennessee cases, we held, was “wholly unacceptable under Whalen, which requires that the legislature ‘clearly indicate’ that consecutive sentences are permissible for offenses which are the same under the Blockburger test.” Id. Thus, in evaluating Banner’s claim in light of Blockburger, there is a tension between: (1) adherence to the multiple punishment determination made by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and Tennessee Supreme Court and (2) application of the Blockburger test (which is used as a gauge for determining legislative intent) as it was interpreted in Whalen and applied in Pryor. This”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. White v. Howes

3. “When assessing the intent of a state legislature, a federal court is bound by the state court’s construction of the state’s own statutes. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. [359] at 368, 103 S.Ct. [673] at 679 [ 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983)]; O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 , 94 S.Ct. 740, 744 [,] 38 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). Under the double jeopardy clause, when evaluating whether a state legislature intended to prescribe cumulative punishments for a single criminal incident, a federal court is bound by a state court’s determination of the state legislature’s intent. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. [493] at 499, 104 S.Ct. [2536] at 2541 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) ] (“We accept, as we must, the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here.”); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 , 103 S.Ct. at 679 (“In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature intended that punishment for violations of the statutes be cumulative. We are bound to accept the Missouri court’s construction of the State’s statutes.”); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 , 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) (Ohio Court of Appeals had “final authority, to interpret that state’s legislation.”). As we observed in Smith v. Sowders, 848 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir.1988), “[t]he only significance of the ‘same transaction’ inquiry of the Kentucky Court of Appeals was to determine whether state law required the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 823 F. Supp. 615 - Marshall v. Farley