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886 F.2d 984

Docket No. 89-1541.

United States v. Conner

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted Sept. 14, 1989.

Filed Sept. 28, 1989.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1989-09-28

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The double jeopardy clause only protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. [The defendant’s violent felony] convictions and the federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon resulted from charges brought ... for conduct arising out of unrelated incidents. The double jeopardy clause has no relevance to [the defendant’s] enhanced federal sentence.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. Presley

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 924

Relies on United States v. Dinitz · Scarborough v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1989-09-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently April 2007

12 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

130198919902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*985Mark Godwin, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.

¶2Linda R. Reade, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee.

¶3Before McMILLIAN and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Floyd Vance Conner, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Supp. V 1987). The district court enhanced Conner’s sentence based on his three state armed robbery convictions. See id.§ 924(e)(1). We affirm.

¶6Conner contends section 922(g) is unconstitutionally vague. Conner argues “[a] convicted felon possessing a firearm … would have no reason to know the words ‘in or affecting commerce’ would subject him to federal felony prosecution if that firearm had once traveled in interstate commerce.” This argument is meritless. The challenged phrase clearly signals Congress’s intent “that the firearm [has] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1969, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1976).

¶7Conner next contends the district court violated the Constitution’s double jeopardy clause when it used his three state armed robbery convictions to enhance his federal sentence. Although Conner concedes the armed robbery convictions are violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), he argues that because he received mandatory prison sentences under state law, the use of his state convictions to enhance his federal sentence constitutes multiple punishments for the same crimes. We disagree.

¶8The double jeopardy clause only protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). Conner’s state robbery convictions and the federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon resulted from charges brought by separate sovereigns for conduct arising out of unrelated incidents. The double jeopardy clause has no relevance to Conner’s enhanced federal sentence.

¶9We affirm the district court.

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